E00008_The_Analysis_of_Matter_page-0019

Prévia do material em texto

<p>8 THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM perception, and also of the generally assumed physical tion of perceptions-e.g. by or In connection with this latter it is necessary to consider how far, and in what way, a perception can be supposed to resemble its external cause, at least, to allow as to characteristics of that This, in turn, demands a careful consideration of causal laws, which, however, is in any case a necessary part of the analysis of physics. Throughout this inquiry, we are asking ourselves what grounds exist for supposing that physics is " true." But the meaning of this question requires some elucidation in connection with what has already been said about Apart altogether from the general philosophical problem of the meaning of "truth," there is a certain degree of vagueness about the question whether physics is "true." In the narrowest sense, we may say that physics is if we have the perceptions which it leads to In this sense, a solipsist might say that physics is for, although be would suppose that the sun and moon, for instance, are merely certain series of perceptions of his own, yet these perceptions could be foreseen by assuming the generally received laws of So, for example, says: Although the whole of this life were said to be nothing but a dream, and the visible world nothing but a I should call this dream or phantasm real enough, if, using reason well, we were never deceived by A man who, without being a believes that whatever is real is mental, need have no difficulty in declaring that physics is "tree" in the above sense, and may even go further, and allow the truth of physics in a much wider sense. This wider sense, which I regard as the more important, is as follows: Given physics as a deductive system, derived from certain hypotheses as to terms, do there exist particulars, edition, vol. p. 320.</p>