LevitskyWay 2003

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Autocracy by Democratic Rules: 
The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
 
 
 
 
Steven Levitsky 
Department of Government 
Harvard University 
Levitsky@cfia.harvard.edu 
 
Lucan A. Way 
Department of Political Science 
Temple University 
Lway@temple.edu 
 
 
 
March 25, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper Prepared for the Conference, “Mapping the Great Zone: Clientelism and the Boundary 
between Democratic and Democratizing,” Columbia University, April 4-5, 2003. [This is a revised 
 
 
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version of a paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Boston, MA, August 28-31, 2002.] 
 
 
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Notwithstanding the extensive literature on the spread of democratic regimes during the 
1980s and 1990s, one aspect of the third wave of democratization has received less scholarly 
attention: the emergence and persistence of mixed or hybrid regimes. In much of Africa, post-
communist Eurasia, Asia, and Latin America, political regimes combined meaningful democratic and 
authoritarian features during the 1990s. Though not a new phenomenon, hybrid regimes 
proliferated after the end of the Cold War. In 2002, they easily outnumbered democracies among 
developing countries (Diamond 2002: 30-31; Schedler 2002: 47). In light of this proliferation, 
scholars created a variety of new regime subtypes, including “hybrid regime” (Karl 1995), “semi-
democracy” (Case 1996), “electoral democracy” (Diamond 1999), “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 
1997), “semi-authoritarianism,” (Olcott and Ottaway 1999), “semi-dictatorship” (Brooker 2000), 
“soft authoritarianism” (Means 1996), and “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 2002b). 
 
Nevertheless, the literature on these regimes remains underdeveloped. Two weaknesses 
are worth noting. First, scholars frequently place mixed cases in residual categories (such as “semi-
democratic,” “semi-authoritarian,” or Freedom House’s “partly free”) that tell us little about the 
regimes other than what they are not, which tends to obscure important differences among mixed 
cases.1 Second, much of the literature on mixed regimes suffers from a democratizing bias.2 
Mixed regimes are frequently treated as partial forms of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997), or 
as regimes that are “in transition” to democracy. Yet such characterizations may be misleading. 
Although some mixed regimes did in fact democratize during the post-Cold War period (Mexico, 
Serbia), others remained stable (Malaysia, Ukraine), moved in multiple directions (Albania, 
Zambia), or became increasingly authoritarian (Azerbaijan, Belarus). Various hybrid regimes have 
now remained in place for more than a decade, which is longer than the life span of many Latin 
American military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than treating mixed regimes as partial or 
“transitional” democracies, then, it may be more useful to think about the specific types of regimes 
they actually are. 
 
 This paper examines one type of hybrid regime, which we call competitive 
authoritarianism.3 Such regimes are authoritarian in that they do not meet standard procedural 
minimum criteria for democracy. Elections are often unfair and civil liberties are frequently violated. 
However, they are competitive in that democratic institutions are more than façades. Rather, they 
permit opposition groups to contest seriously for—and sometimes even win—power. The 
combination of autocratic rule and democratic rules creates an inherent source of tension. 
Consequently, competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by periodic crises in which 
opposition challenges force incumbents to choose between cracking down and losing power. These 
 
1For example, El Salvador, Latvia, and Ukraine each received a combined political and civil liberties score of six—or 
“Partly Free”—from Freedom House in 1992–93. Yet whereas Latvia denied full citizenship rights for people of 
Russian descent, El Salvador was characterized by widespread human rights violations and a lack of civilian control 
over the military. Ukraine possessed broad citizenship rights and civilian control over the military, but civil liberties 
were frequently violated and incumbents routinely manipulated democratic procedures. 
2Similar critiques can be found in Herbst (2001), Carothers (2002), and the articles in the April 2002 issue of 
the Journal of Democracy. 
3This concept is discussed in greater detail in Levitsky and Way (2002). 
 
 
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crises have resulted in a variety of outcomes, ranging from authoritarian entrenchment (Malaysia, 
Zimbabwe) to incumbent turnover without regime change (Ukraine, Zambia) to democratization 
(Peru, Serbia). 
 
We seek to explain these diverging regime trajectories. We focus on three variables. The 
first is incumbents’ organizational capacity to thwart opposition challenges, which we argue is 
enhanced by elite cohesion and strong coercive and electoral organizations. The second variable is 
the organizational capacity of the opposition. Well-organized and united opposition movements are 
more likely to topple autocratic incumbents than those that are poorly organized and/or divided. 
The third variable is countries’ linkage to, and dependence on, Western governments and 
institutions. Close ties to the West generally raised the costs of authoritarian entrenchment during 
the 1990s. Thus, incumbent survival is most likely in countries with a cohesive elite and strong 
states and governing parties, weak and divided oppositions, and weak ties to the West. Incumbent 
turnover is most likely in countries with weak states and governing parties, united opposition 
movements, and close ties to the West. 
 
We apply this framework to 12 cases of competitive authoritarianism, all of which faced 
some kind of regime crisis between 1990 and 2001. The cases are taken from five regions: Africa 
(Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe), Central Europe (Albania, Serbia), the former Soviet Union (Armenia, 
Russia, Ukraine), Latin America (Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru), and East Asia (Malaysia). We find 
that in cases of high Western linkage, such as countries in Central Europe and Latin America, even 
autocratic incumbents with substantial coercive capacity were likely to yield to, rather than repress, 
serious democratic challenges. In cases of low Western linkage, outcomes hinged on the 
organizational capacity of governments and their opponents. Where governments possessed 
substantial coercive capacity and strong ruling parties (Malaysia, Zimbabwe), or where they faced 
weak and deeply divided oppositions (Kenya, Russia), incumbents survived crises. Where elites 
were fragmented and ruling party and state organizations were weak, and/or where opposition 
movements were united, incumbents fell (Ukraine, Zambia). Yet where competition was primarily a 
product of incumbent weakness, the removal of autocratic incumbents often did not result in 
democratization, but rather in a new period of competitive authoritarian rule. 
 
These results have important implications for comparative research on regimes and regime 
change. First, they suggest that several factors that are said to contribute to democratic stability, 
such as elite cohesion, strong parties, and effective states, also contribute to the stability of 
authoritarian regimes. Elite fragmentation and state and party weakness limit incumbents’ capacity to 
build and maintain authoritarian rule, which may result in competitive politics and even incumbent 
turnover. Yet these factors are unlikely to contribute to stable democracy. In other words, the very 
conditions that enhance pluralism and competition in some authoritarian regimes may simultaneously 
inhibit democratization (Way 2002a, Way 2002b). These results caution against viewing 
competitive authoritarianism as a “halfway house” on the road to democracy. 
 
 
 
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Our findings alsorun counter to several contemporary approaches to regime change, 
particularly those that focus on elite attitudes and behavior and on institutional design.4 We find that 
leadership choices are often better explained by domestic and international constraints than by the 
presence or absence of democratic values,5 and that in the absence of other structural factors 
supporting pluralism, the long-term effects of democratic statecraft are often quite meager. We also 
find that because formal political institutions in many competitive authoritarian regimes are weak and 
easily manipulated by incumbents, institutional design is often better understood as endogenous to 
regime outcomes than as an independent cause of those outcomes. Our analysis of regime change is 
thus closer to approaches that emphasize structural factors such as the role of state power, the 
balance of social forces, and international constraints (Skocpol 1979; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and 
Stephens 1992; Collier 1999). 
 
The Concept of Competitive Authoritarianism 
 
 Competitive authoritarian regimes are regimes in which democratic institutions exist and are 
widely viewed as the primary means of gaining and maintaining power, but in which incumbents 
violate democratic rules to such a degree that the regime cannot be labeled a democracy. Examples 
include Croatia under Franco Tudjman, Haiti under Jean Bertrand Aristide, Malaysia under 
Mahathir Mohammad, Peru under Alberto Fujimori, Russia under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, 
Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic, and Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, as 
well as Albania, Armenia, Cameroon, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe during much of the 1990s.6 
 
Competitive authoritarian regimes are non-democratic in that they do not meet standard 
“procedural minimum” definitions of democracy.7 Democratic regimes meet four minimum criteria: 
(1) executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; (2) virtually 
all adults possess the right to vote; (3) civil and political liberties are broadly protected; and (4) 
elected authorities are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders.8 Although 
democracies may at times violate these criteria, such violations are not sufficiently severe or 
systematic to impede challenges to incumbents. By contrast, competitive authoritarian regimes are 
 
4For example, Robert Moser, summarizing a recent collection of essays on Russian politics, suggests that the 
problems of Russian democracy “arose primarily from poor elite decisions and institutional design” (Moser 
2001: 10). On elite attitudes and decisions, see Di Palma (1990), Fis h (1998), and McFaul (2002). On institutional 
design, see Stepan and Skach (1993), Linz and Valenzuela (1994), Lijphart and Waisman (1996), and Fish (2001). 
5Thus, in certain contexts autocratic leaders have behaved democratically (Nicaragua in 1990, Zambia in 
1991, Mexico in 2000), whereas in other contexts seemingly “democratic” opposition leaders have behaved 
in a highly undemocratic manner (Berisha in Albania, Ter-Petrosian in Armenia, Chiluba in Zambia). 
6Competitive authoritarianism does not encompass all hybrid regimes. Other regimes that mix authoritarian and 
democratic features include constitutional oligarchies (electoral regimes in which suffrage is denied to certain 
groups, as in Latvia during the 1990s), semi-competitive regimes (electoral regimes in which a major political force is 
barred from competition, as in Argentina between 1957 and 1966), and tutelary regimes (electoral regimes in which 
non-elected actors such as military or religious authorities wield substantial veto power, as in Guatemala in the 
1980s and Iran in the late 1990s). 
7On procedural minimum definitions, see O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 8) and Collier and Levitsky (1997). 
8This definition is consistent with “mid-range” definitions of democracy. See Diamond (1999: 13-15). 
 
 
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characterized by frequent and often severe violations of democratic procedure, such that the playing 
field between government and opposition is markedly uneven.9 Incumbents routinely abuse state 
resources, restrict the media, and manipulate electoral results, and journalists and opposition 
politicians are frequently subject to surveillance, harassment, and, occasionally, arrest, exile, or 
violent repression. 
 
Yet competitive authoritarian regimes are not fully closed. In full-blown authoritarian 
regimes, formal democratic institutions such as elections, parliaments, and courts either do not exist 
or exist merely as façades or legitimating mechanisms. They do not yield meaningful contestation for 
power or generate uncertainty with regard to the allocation of political authority.10 In competitive 
authoritarian regimes, by contrast, the existence of meaningful democratic institutions creates arenas 
through which opposition groups may contest seriously for—and occasionally win--power. 
Elections are often bitterly fought contests. Although fraud, unequal media access, and harassment 
of the opposition stack the cards in favor of incumbents, elections often generate considerable 
uncertainty, and in some cases (Nicaragua in 1990, Zambia in 1991, Serbia in 2000), incumbents 
lose them. Similarly, although institutions such as the courts, legislatures, and the media are often 
weak and/or subordinated to the executive, opposition forces may, on occasion, use them to pose 
serious challenges to the government. Although incumbents may repress these challenges, direct 
assaults on democratic institutions tend to be costly in terms of both domestic and international 
legitimacy. Consequently, efforts to limit competition and suppress dissent often take more subtle 
forms, such as bribery, blackmail, and the manipulation of debts, tax authorities, compliant 
judiciaries, and other state agencies to “legally” harass or persecute opponents. 
 
Although competitive authoritarian regimes are not new,11 they became especially prevalent 
in the post-Cold War period. The Western liberal hegemony that emerged in the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union undermined the legitimacy of alternative regime models, eliminated 
many alternative sources of financial and military support, and created strong incentives for 
peripheral states to adopt formal democratic institutions. As Andrew Janos (2000) has argued, 
liberal hegemony places a “web of constraints” on peripheral elites seeking to maintain good 
standing in the international community. In a non-hegemonic context, Western powers are also more 
likely to tolerate (and in many cases, support) authoritarian regimes that present themselves as 
buffers against Western rivals. This was clearly seen during the Cold War. The rise of the Soviet 
Union after World War II contributed to the emergence of both quasi-Leninist dictatorships and 
U.S.-backed anti-communist dictatorships in much of the Third World. 
 
 
9Competitive authoritarianism must therefore be distinguished from unstable, ineffective, or otherwise 
flawed regimes that nevertheless meet the minimum criteria for democracy, such as what Guillermo 
O’Donnell (1994) has called delegative democracies. 
10According to this definition, regimes in Egypt, Singapore, and the Central Asian republics were fully 
authoritarian during the 1990s. 
11Historical examples include Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania in the 1920s, Argentina under the first Perón 
government (1946-55), Zambia in the 1960s, and the Dominican Republic in the 1970s. 
 
 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a period of Western liberal hegemony of 
unprecedented scope. These changes increased the cost of building and sustaining authoritarian 
regimes in several ways. For one, the evaporation of alternative sources of military andeconomic 
support created an incentive for peripheral elites to remain on good terms with Western 
governments and institutions. Other forms of international influence included demonstration effects, 
direct state-to-state pressure (in the form of sanctions, behind the scenes diplomacy, and in some 
cases, military intervention), explicit conditionality (as in the case of European Union membership), 
and the activities of emerging transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The effects of 
international pressure vary considerably across states and regions. Many autocratic governments 
benefit from pockets of international permissiveness created by economic or security interests that 
trump democracy promotion on Western foreign policy agendas. Nevertheless, for most 
governments in lower and middle-income countries, the costs associated with the maintenance of 
full-scale authoritarian institutions—and the benefits associated with adopting democratic ones--rose 
considerably in the 1990s. As a result, even highly autocratic leaders were at times forced to 
tolerate the uncertainties created by meaningful democratic institutions. 
 
Crisis and Change in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Competitive authoritarian regimes may be relatively enduring.12 As long as autocratic 
incumbents do not cancel or openly steal elections or commit egregious human rights violations, they 
may be able to hold onto power for many years. Using techniques such as bribery, co-optation, 
and various forms of “legal” persecution, governments may limit opposition challenges without 
provoking massive protest or international repudiation.13 Yet the coexistence of autocratic 
incumbents and democratic rules creates an inherent source of instability. The persistence of 
meaningful elections, formally empowered courts and legislatures, and an independent media 
provides mechanisms through which opposition forces may periodically challenge the government. 
Such challenges present autocratic incumbents with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, overt 
repression—canceling elections, jailing opponents, ignoring Supreme Court rulings, or closing the 
legislature—is costly, because the challenges are formally legal and often enjoy broad domestic and 
international legitimacy. On the other hand, if opposition challenges are allowed to run their course, 
incumbents risk losing power.14 Such situations frequently result in an incumbent crisis in the 
government is forced to choose between egregiously violating democratic rules, at the cost of 
international isolation and domestic conflict, and allowing the challenge to proceed, at the cost of 
possible defeat. 
 
Such crises resulted in a variety of regime outcomes. In some cases (Kenya, Russia, 
Malaysia), incumbents weathered the storm. In other cases (Peru, Serbia), failed crackdown 
attempts eventually led to the removal of autocratic incumbents. In still other cases (Nicaragua, 
Zambia in 1991, Ukraine in 1994), incumbents lost elections and ceded power peacefully. Yet the 
 
12Perhaps the clearest case of a stable competitive authoritarian regime is Malaysia. See Case (1996). 
13For an insightful account of such strategies in Ukraine, see Darden (2001). 
14These dilemmas are insightfully presented by Schedler (2002a). 
 
 
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removal of autocratic incumbents does not always lead to democracy. As Table 1 shows, only half 
of our cases of incumbent turnover (Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia) resulted in democratization. 
In four cases (Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, Zambia), turnover was accompanied by the persistence 
of competitive authoritarian rule. Hence, although the removal of autocratic incumbents creates an 
opportunity for democratization, it should not be equated with democratization. 
 
--Table 1 about here— 
 
 We seek to explain the variation in regime outcomes shown in Table 1. Why are some 
autocratic governments able to weather the storms created by episodes of democratic contestation, 
often by cracking down and further consolidating authoritarian rule, while others lose power, either 
because they fail to crack down or because they attempt to crack down but fail? More broadly, 
what explains why some competitive authoritarian regimes democratize in the face of crisis while 
others remain stable or experience authoritarian retrenchment? 
 
We begin with the assumption that incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes seek to 
remain in office, and that extra-legal tactics (such as electoral fraud and various forms of repression) 
are among the options they consider as they pursue that goal. Given this assumption, three 
variables are of particular importance in explaining regime outcomes: (1) incumbent capacity; (2) 
opposition unity and strength; and (3) the international context. 
 
Incumbent Capacity 
In large part, the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes in crisis hinges on the capacity of 
incumbents to thwart opposition challenges. Maintaining an authoritarian regime requires substantial 
political, organizational, and financial resources. Governments that possess such resources are 
much more likely to survive opposition challenges than those that lack them. Three dimensions of 
incumbent capacity are particularly important to regime survival: (1) elite cohesion; (2) coercive 
capacity; and (3) electoral capacity. 
 
Elite Cohesion 
Elite cohesion refers to the degree of discipline and loyalty that executives can command 
from other regime elites, such as cabinet ministers, military leaders and other security officials, and 
parliamentary and party leaders. Just as elite cohesion is critical to democratic stability (Linz 1978; 
Higley and Gunther 1992), it is also critical to the survival of authoritarian regimes (Easter 1997; 
Roeder 2001). This is particularly true in periods of crisis, when incumbents must consider 
strategies—such as violent repression or electoral fraud—that can potentially bring high costs. 
Incumbents who cannot rely on key regime allies or subordinates during periods of crisis are less 
likely to risk such strategies, and if they adopt them, they are more likely to fail. 
 
Regimes vary considerably on the dimension of elite cohesion. In some cases, due to weak 
states, unstable political institutions, or deep ideological or ethnic divisions, incumbents repeatedly 
 
 
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confront insubordination from within the government or the security forces.15 In other cases, due to 
strong social or ideological ties or highly institutionalized parties or militaries, cases of defection or 
insubordination are rare. 
 
Coercive Capacity 
Incumbent survival also depends on the government’s capacity to repress or control 
opposition forces. Coercive capacity is important on at least two levels. On one level, an effective 
coercive apparatus may employ “low level” repression (surveillance, harassment, detention, and 
occasional beatings or killings) to intimidate citizens and discourage them from participating in 
opposition activities. On another level, an effective coercive apparatus must be able to reliably 
suppress (or pre-empt though massive shows of force) opposition protests. Where incumbents lack 
the capacity to crack down on such protests, they are more likely to fall. 
 
Coercive capacity requires both an infrastructure of repression and effective control over 
that infrastructure. In many regimes, this includes well-equipped and disciplined military and police 
forces and an internal security apparatus equipped with secret police and extensive surveillance 
operations (including the use of phone tapping, media monitoring, and informant networks). It may 
also include state-sponsored paramilitary organizations and party-affiliated informant and thug 
networks. Other state agencies, such as the tax administration, may also be used as mechanisms for 
intimidating and controlling the media,the private sector, and much of the opposition. For such an 
apparatus to be effective, of course, incumbents must fully control it. Where presidents cannot rely 
on military, secret service, or other agencies of coercion to follow their orders, incumbent capacity 
will be reduced. 
 
Electoral Capacity 
A third dimension of incumbent capacity is electoral organization. Unlike their counterparts 
in full-scale authoritarian regimes, incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes must win 
elections. This must be done through a combination of voter mobilization and fraud, both of which 
require an organizational infrastructure, often in the form of a party. Electoral machines are 
particularly important when—as is often the case in competitive authoritarian regimes--incumbents 
lack widespread popular support. In such cases, unpopular incumbents must rely on local party 
structures, patronage networks, various government agencies, and—in post-Soviet countries—
directors of enterprises to bring voters to the polls. 
 
Beyond winning votes, electoral machines are also critical for stealing votes. Marginal 
electoral manipulation or fraud—often on the scale of 5-10 percent of the vote—can be decisive for 
the fate of unpopular incumbents. Like get-out-the-vote efforts, activities such as stuffing or 
destroying ballot boxes, tampering with voter registration rolls, intimidating voters, or manipulating 
electoral results require the coordination and control of thousands of local officials and activists. 
Without a minimum of organization, such coordination is extremely difficult. 
 
15Such was the case in many former Soviet republics, where the leading threats to incumbents have often 
come from former members of the government, particularly prime ministers. 
 
 
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In general, then, incumbent capacity is enhanced by strong states and governing parties. 
State strength—which entails both the domination of state officials over subordinates and the 
capacity of state agencies to successfully implement the objectives of state officials—tends to foster 
elite cohesion and enhance the coercive and electoral capacity of incumbents. In the absence of a 
minimum of state strength, governing elites tend to fragment, executives have a more difficult time 
utilizing state agencies and regional administrations to intimidate opponents or manipulate electoral 
process, and governments will be less able to rely on repression to put down social and political 
protest (Way 2002). Strong parties foster elite cohesion (through institutionalized patronage 
networks or shared ideology), facilitate electoral mobilization (and manipulation), and may carry out 
activities—such as surveillance and intimidation—that enhance incumbents’ coercive capacity. 
Revolutionary parties are often particularly effective in these areas. Revolutionary struggles tend to 
produce disciplined parties whose leaders and cadres exhibit high levels of ideological commitment 
and internal solidarity. 
 
Opposition Capacity 
A second variable that shapes the fate of incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes is 
the strength of the political opposition. Strong opposition movements are more likely to defeat 
autocratic incumbents at the polls. They also raise the cost of repression, which increases the 
likelihood that incumbents will choose not to crack down. We measure opposition capacity along 
two dimensions: (1) cohesion; and (2) mobilizational capacity. 
 
Opposition Cohesion 
Opposition cohesion is often critical to the success of anti-authoritarian movements (Bratton 
and van de Walle 1997: 198-200; Corrales 2001). Divided oppositions may contribute to the 
survival of autocratic incumbents in at least two ways. First, in the electoral arena, opposition 
division often enables unpopular incumbents to win with a mere plurality of the vote. Although 
incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes often lack majority support, their core support base, 
combined with incumbency advantages and vote rigging, usually helps to ensure at least 30-40 
percent of the vote. If opposition parties fail to coalesce behind a single candidate, such pluralities 
may be sufficient to win.16 Polarized oppositions also enable autocratic incumbents to employ 
divide and rule strategies. In cases of severe internal division, one opposition party may work with 
the incumbent to prevent the victory of a rival party.17 
 
We measure opposition cohesion in terms of three levels. In cases of high cohesion, 
virtually major opposition groups are organized into single party or coalition. In cases of medium 
cohesion, opposition parties are fragmented but are not deeply divided along ideological, ethnic or 
other lines. The absence of deep cleavages makes it more likely that they will be able to unite into 
broad anti-authoritarian coalitions during elections or moments of regime crisis. In cases of low 
 
16A clear example is Kenya in 1992 and 1997. 
17Such debilitating splits emerged within the Mexican opposition in 1988 and between communist and non-
communist opposition parties in Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s. 
 
 
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cohesion, opposition parties are deeply divided along ideological, ethnic, or regional lines. In such 
cases, opposition parties often oppose each other as much, if not more, than they do the party in 
power, which seriously inhibits the formation of broad anti-authoritarian coalitions. 
 
Mobilizational Strength 
 A second component of opposition capacity is the ability of opposition movements to 
mobilize citizens against the government. The capacity to mount large and sustained protest 
movements raises the cost of repression for incumbents. The repression of large demonstrations 
requires a more extensive use of force, which may bring severe costs in terms of both domestic and 
international legitimacy. Hence, the better organized and mobilized an opposition movement is, the 
more likely incumbents will be to cede power. In measuring mobilizational strength, we focus on (1) 
the strength of opposition party organizations; (2) the strength and independence of civil society, 
particularly labor, student, and human rights organizations; and (3) the degree to which civil society 
organizations are aligned with the political opposition. 
 
The International Dimension: The Role of Western Influence 
The third variable shaping the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes is the international 
environment. International influences are difficult to measure and compare. For one, they take a 
variety of forms. Although some of these forms are easily observable (military intervention, explicit 
conditionality), others (demonstration effects, the diffusion of ideas) have subtler effects that are 
difficult to measure. Moreover, the effects of the international environment vary across time, region, 
and individual states. Yet the effect of the international environment on regimes appears to be 
considerable.18 Our hypothesis is that in the post-Cold War period, ties to the West—particularly 
the United States and the European Union—raise the cost of authoritarian entrenchment and 
strengthen incentives for elites to play by democratic rules. We disaggregate Western influence into 
two dimensions: linkage and leverage. 
 
Linkage to the West 
Linkage to the West takes a variety of forms. These include geographic proximity, 
economic integration, military alliances, flows of international assistance, international media 
penetration, ties to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other transnational 
networks, and networks of elites employed by multilateral institutions and/or educated in Western 
universities. During the post-Cold War period, these linkages raised the costs of authoritarian 
entrenchment in several ways. First, Western governmentswere more likely to promote or defend 
democracy in neighboring countries, particularly in Central Europe and Latin America.19 This was 
the case for several reasons, including cultural proximity, fear of large-scale immigration or regional 
conflict, and a greater penetration of Western media and international NGOs, which exposed 
authoritarian abuses and generated pressure for Western responses. Second, the possibility of entry 
into Western alliances and institutions (particularly the EU and NATO) created a strong incentive 
 
18See Starr (1991); O’Loughlin et al (1998); Kopstein and Reilly (2000); and Brinks and Coppedge (2001). 
19Thus, whereas Western governments were often inconsistent in their democracy promotion efforts in Africa 
and Asia during the 1990s, they intervened with greater force and consistency to block moves toward 
authoritarianism in Central Europe and Latin America. 
 
 
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for elites in neighboring countries to play by democratic rules (Gentleman and Zubek 1992; 
Kopstein and Reilly 2000: 25).20 Third, close proximity to the West increases the flow of 
information and ideas across borders, which may influence elite and mass expectations about what 
is (and is not) acceptable or possible. Where such information flows are high, it is often more 
difficult for leaders to achieve an elite or mass-level consensus around authoritarian measures. 
Finally, the presence within the government of Western-educated technocrats may provide an 
additional source of resistance to overtly authoritarian acts. This resistance may be a product of 
socialization into democratic norms, but it may also be strategic: many technocrats seek to pursue 
careers in Western and multilateral institutions and thus seek to avoid tarnishing their reputations 
among Western colleagues. 
 
Western Leverage 
Linkage is most influential when it is combined with economic and/or military dependence 
on the West. Several factors may reduce the leverage of Western states and institutions and 
therefore permit greater margin for authoritarian entrenchment. These include: (1) a strong 
economy with a large domestic market or a highly valued commodity such as oil; (2) military 
security or other issues (such as drugs or immigration) that trump democracy promotion as a foreign 
policy goal for Western states; and (3) the presence or absence of a regional hegemon that is able 
and willing to provide alternative sources of support. At times during the 1990s, China, Russia, and 
–to a lesser extent—Nigeria and South Africa provided critical resources to non-democratic 
regimes in smaller neighboring states, which helped to mitigate the impact of the Western influence.21 
 
Applying the Framework 
 
This section applies the framework developed above to 12 cases of competitive 
authoritarianism: Albania, Armenia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua under the Sandinista 
government, Peru, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In all of these cases, 
competitive authoritarian regimes experienced at least one incumbent crisis between 1990 and 
2002. We define an incumbent crisis as a period of opposition contestation that forces the 
government to choose between egregiously violating democratic rules and running a serious risk of 
losing power. The cases fall into three distinct outcomes: (1) incumbent survival and regime 
persistence (Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, Zimbabwe); (2) incumbent turnover without democratization 
(Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, Zambia); and incumbent turnover with democratization (Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia). 
 
 Incumbent Survival and Regime Stability 
In Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, and Zimbabwe, autocratic incumbents survived opposition 
challenges throughout the 1990-2002 period, and as a result, regimes either remained stable or 
underwent authoritarian entrenchment. All four cases were marked by relatively low Western 
 
20This effect was clearest in the case of the EU, which has an explicit democracy clause, but initial talks 
toward a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas have also included discussion of a democracy clause. 
21France occasionally played a similar role in francophone Africa. 
 
 
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influence and either (1) high incumbent capacity or (2) weak and/or divided oppositions. Table 2 
summarizes the cases. In Malaysia, a strong state and governing party, together with low Western 
influence and a weak and divided opposition, enabled the Mahathir government to survive the 
challenge posed by Anwar Ibrahim and the Reformasi movement in 1998-99. In Zimbabwe, a 
powerful repressive apparatus, low Western influence, and the support of South Africa enabled the 
Mugabe government to suppress an electoral challenge mounted by a strong and united opposition. 
In Kenya, greater Western influence and only moderate incumbent capacity nearly resulted in the 
defeat of the Moi government, but a deeply divided opposition enabled Moi to survive two electoral 
challenges. Finally, in Russia, which was characterized by low incumbent capacity, low Western 
influence, and a weak and divided opposition, Boris Yeltsin managed to fend off a challenge by the 
Duma and win re-election in 1996. 
 
--Table 2 about here-- 
Kenya 
 After a period of relatively mild one party rule under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-78), Kenya 
became increasingly authoritarian during the 1980s under President Daniel Arap Moi. Opposition 
parties were banned and civil liberties severely restricted (Kamua 1991; Throup and Hornsby 
1998). In 1991, however, domestic and international pressure forced President Moi to restore 
multiparty competition, which transformed Kenya into a transformed into competitive authoritarian 
regime and created an immediate incumbent crisis. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: The Moi government possessed moderate incumbent 
capacity. Elite cohesion was moderate. Although Moi confronted substantial elite fragmentation—
resulting in both cabinet instability and an attempted coup--during his initial years in office (Throup 
and Hornsby 1998: 31-33, 45), he consolidated control over the governing Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) during the 1980s. Nevertheless, Moi never achieved the elite cohesion of the 
Kenyatta period (Throup and Hornsby 1998). The government’s coercive capacity was relatively 
high. The Kenyan state has historically been one of the strongest in Africa (Jackman and Rosberg 
1982: 9, 12; Widner 1992: 14). Central to this coercive capacity was the Provincial Administration 
established under colonial rule (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 10-11). During the 1980s, Moi 
doubled the size of army, expanded the police forces, and increased the state’s surveillance capacity 
(Widner 1992: 125, 144). Finally, the government’s electoral capacity was moderate. A 
predominantly patronage-based party, KANU had been very weak under Kenyatta (Widner 1992: 
31-32, 39-40). During the 1980s, however, Moi infused it with state resources, revitalized local 
organizations, and created a youth wing and other ancillary organizations (Widner 1992; Throup 
and Hornsby 1998: 36-38, 354-355). As a result, party membership skyrocketed (Berg-Schlosser 
and Siegler 1990: 139), and KANU became an increasingly effective mechanism of control 
(Widner 1992). During the 1990s, KANU was “by far the largest party” in Kenya, and the only 
one with an “established presence in every part of the country” (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 339, 
179). 
 
 Opposition capacity was medium-low. On the one hand, Kenyan civil society, based on 
church organizations, lawyers’ groups, and the Kikuyu-dominated business community, had 
 
 
13
developed a moderate mobilizational capacity by the 1990s (Widner 1992: 190, 202; Throup and 
Hornsby 1998: 302-303). On the other hand, the political opposition was deeply divided along 
ethnic lines, particularly between the Kikuyu and the Luo, which made theformation of a broad 
opposition front difficult (Oyugi 1997; Throup and Hornsby 1998: 141, 589-90). 
 
 Western influence in Kenya--scored as medium--is relatively high by African standards 
(Berg Schlosser and Siegler 1990: 153) but lower than in Latin America and Central Europe. On 
dimensions such as geographic proximity, media and cultural penetration, and technocratic linkage, 
Kenya scores fairly low. However, Kenya maintained close ties to the West during the Cold War, 
and Great Britain retained “immense strategic interests” in the country through the 1990s.22 
Moreover, because nearly a third of government expenditure was derived from foreign assistance 
during the 1990s, international donor countries enjoyed substantial leverage over the Moi 
government (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 74, 266-270). 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: In the context of a prolonged economic downturn and 
increased civic protest, the Moi government confronted a deep political crisis in the early 1990s. In 
July 1991, opposition leaders, including Luo leader Oginga Odinga and Kikuyu leader Kenneth 
Matiba, created the multi-ethnic Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). The 
government successfully repressed incipient pro-democracy protests (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 
66), but this repression drew the ire of Western governments. In November 1991, the Paris Group 
of international donors suspended $350 million in aid and explicitly linking its restoration to political 
reform (Barkan 1993: 91; Barkan and Ng’ethe 1999: 185). This pressure was decisive: within two 
weeks, opposition parties were legalized, paving the way for multiparty elections in 1992 (Throup 
and Hornsby 1998: 87-88). 
 
The aid cutoff ushered in KANU’s “darkest hour” (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 105). With 
the government “reeling from the Western freeze on aid,” and with a united FORD presenting “a 
real threat” (Barken 1993: 92), KANU elites began to defect to the opposition (Throup and 
Hornsby 1998: 105, 93-96). However, two factors enabled Moi to survive the crisis. First, the 
security forces remained intact and under Moi’s control (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 105), which 
allowed the government to launch a “low-level campaign of violence against the opposition” (Throup 
and Hornsby 1998: 371), including attacks on the media, the burning of opposition headquarters, 
and state-sponsored “ethnic clashes” that left thousands dead (Barkan 1993: 93; Throup and 
Hornsby 1998: 380-81; Adar 2000: 116-120). Second, FORD divided along ethnic lines, with 
Luo elites creating Ford-Kenya and Kikuyu leaders joining FORD-asili (Oyugi 1997). Although the 
1992 election was far from fair--KANU engaged in intimation and ballot stuffing in rural areas 
(Throup and Hornsby 1998: 289, 454-462)—it was the FORD split that “effectively ensured 
President Moi’s re-election” (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 118). Moi won just 36 percent of the 
vote, but with the opposition vote divided, KANU managed to retain the presidency and win a 
parliamentary majority. Western governments accepted the results and external assistance was 
 
22Africa Today, June 2002, p. 13. 
 
 
14
restored (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 520-523, 564). The opposition remained divided in the 1997 
elections, which allowed Moi to win another re-election--this time with 40 percent of the vote. 
 
Although Moi held onto power through the end of the decade, civil society pushed the 
regime in an increasingly open direction. In 1997, a broad array of civic and political organizations 
created the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), which launched a campaign for 
constitutional reform (Steeves 1999: 72; Adar 2000: 124). In mid-1997, large-scale civic protest 
and a new round of international pressure forced the government to make a series of concessions 
that “leveled the playing field somewhat” for that year’s election (Steeves 1999: 73-75; Barkan and 
Ng’ethe 1999). As it became clear that Moi would not seek re-election in 2002, KANU 
fragmented. With KANU divided, opposition forces gained influence in the parliament and 
transformed the body into a “real center of power.”23 Hence, a divided opposition enabled Moi to 
retain power through 2002, elite fragmentation and an increasingly robust civil society created the 
potential for incumbent turnover in the relatively near future. 
 
Malaysia 
 Although Malaysia maintained an electoral regime since independence, politics was 
dominated by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), its allies in the National Front 
(BN), and, beginning in the late 1980s, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad. The government 
maintained substantial limits on civil liberties and exerted substantial control over the judiciary and 
most of the media (Crouch 1996: 77-77; Slater 2001). Hence, even though elections were 
“contested vigorously” and opposition parties often captured at least 40 percent of the vote, the 
electoral system was “heavily loaded in favor of the government” (Crouch 1996: 75). 
 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: The Mahathir government enjoyed substantial incumbent 
capacity. The governing elite “remained remarkably cohesive” for most of the post-independence 
period (Crouch 1996: 54). Although UMNO briefly divided in 1987, Mahathir subsequently 
purged and reconsolidated control over the party control (Milne and Mauzy 1999: 41-43; Slater 
2001). Malaysia also scores high in terms of coercive capacity. It has a strong state apparatus with 
a powerful bureaucracy (Jesudason 1995) and a “highly effective and repressive police force” 
(Slater 2001: 14). With respect to electoral capacity, UMNO maintained a powerful party 
organization, with more than two million members, 16,500 local branches, and an extensive 
grassroots organization that enabled it to assign an activist to monitor every ten households (Case 
2001: 52; Gomez 1995: 22-23). Financed by vast patronage resources, UNMO thus served as an 
“effective electoral machine that virtually guaranteed large majorities for the government” (Crouch 
1996: 55). 
 
 By contrast, opposition capacity in Malaysia was low. Due to ethnic division, a weak labor 
movement, and years of corporatist control over major social organizations, civil society was weak 
(Jesudeson 1995; Salleh 1999). Moreover, the leading opposition parties were divided along 
ethno-religious lines. Whereas the Democratic Action Party (DAP) was based among the Chinese 
 
23Africa Today, February 2001, pp. 35-36. 
 
 
15
and Indian minorities, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) emphasized “Malay communal issues” 
and sought the creation of an Islamic state (Crouch 1996: 66-67). 
 
 Finally, Malaysia is a case of low Western influence. Due to its relatively developed and 
diversified economy, Malaysia enjoyed substantial autonomy from Western governments and 
institutions. Malaysia’s major trading partners were Japan and Korea, not the U.S. or Europe, and 
it was able to turn to these countries (and increasingly, to China) as alternative sources of assistance 
(Felkner 2000: 55-59). Finally, relative to Latin America and Central Europe, the influence of the 
Western-based media, international NGOs, and Western-educated technocrats was low (Milne and 
Mauzy 1999: 146-47; Salleh 1999: 195). 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The Mahathir government confronted its “most severe test” in 
the wake of the country’s 1997 financial crisis (Funston 1999: 176). The challenge came from 
Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, a popular politician who many viewed 
as responsible for overcoming the 1997 crisis. When Anwar moved to challenge Mahathir 
politically, Mahathir sacked him, and when Anwar began to mobilize protests against the 
government in September 1998, he was arrested—and later convicted—on charges of sexual 
misconduct. Anwar’s detention sparked the emergence of the opposition Reformasimovement, 
which was backed by a range of parties and NGOs (Funston 1999: 173-76). Anwar’s wife, Wan 
Azizah, created the National Justice Party, which, together with the DAP and PAS, launched the 
broad-based Alternative Front to challenge UMNO in the 1999 elections. On the international 
front, U.S.-Malaysian relations reached an “all-time low” (Chin 1998: 189), and the IMF and U.S. 
government officials publicly backed the Reformasi movement (Funston 1999: 183; Singh 2000: 
534). These developments left the government “as vulnerable as it had ever been” (Case 2001: 
51). 
 
Mahathir survived the challenge. On the external front, Western institutions ultimately 
exerted little leverage over the Mahathir government. Malaysia spurned the IMF and, with financial 
assistance from Japan, its economy recovered in 1999 (Felkner 2000: 55, 57; Case 2001: 43). 
Domestically, Mahathir was able to “deploy an armada of packed regime institutions—the media, 
the police, the judiciary, and the national election commission—to prevent Anwar from challenging 
his leadership” (Slater 2001: 23). State security forces were “remarkably effective in suppressing 
the popular dissent that arose” after Anwar’s sacking (Slater 2001: 14, 24). At the same time, 
opposition forces remained weakly organized (Boo Teik 2000: 4; Slater 2001: 23). Consequently, 
although UMNO’s electoral performance in 1999 was its worst in 40 years, the governing BN 
retained more than three-quarters of the seats in parliament. The government cracked down on 
opposition groups after the election (Muzaffar 1999), and soon afterward, ideological conflict 
between the DAP and the PAS led to the break up of the opposition coalition. Hence, substantial 
incumbent capacity, together with a weak and divided opposition allowed the Mahathir government 
to survive the 1998-99 crisis with relative ease. 
 
Russia 
 
 
16
Though more open than under Putin, Russia under Boris Yeltsin was nevertheless a 
competitive authoritarian regime. Elections were marred by at least some fraud (Sobyanin 1994; 
Mendelson 2001; Fish 2001b), and in 1993, Yeltsin used the military to shut down Parliament. In 
this context, Yeltsin successfully weathered two major threats to his tenure: the 1993 challenge by 
Parliament and the 1996 presidential election. 
 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Under Yeltsin, incumbent capacity was quite low. For much of 
the 1990s, the Russian state was relatively weak. The central government faced numerous 
challenges from the country’s 89 regions (cf. Treisman 1999), and control over military was 
uncertain. The failure of the August 1991 attempted coup had been largely due to the army’s refusal 
to follow orders from Soviet leaders (Remington 1997: 74), and in the immediate post-Soviet 
period, government officials were unsure of their capacity to command military forces (Foye 1993a: 
4, 6). Yeltson’s electoral capacity was also weak. Like many post-Soviet politicians, Yeltsin 
refused to invest political capital in building a pro-government party, but instead used divide and rule 
tactics to fend off opposition challenges. Several attempts at creating a ruling party—including 
“Democratic Russia” (1990), “Russia’s Choice” (1993), and “Our Home is Russia” (1995)—failed, 
in part due to Yeltsin’s unwillingness to support them (McFaul 1997: 16). As a result, Yeltsin was 
unable to build a stable majority in the legislature. 
 
Yet the opposition to Yeltsin was also extremely weak. For one, it was deeply divided. As 
in Ukraine, the best-organized opposition forces were extremist, particularly the unreformed 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Viewed by many observers as the only 
functioning party in Russia in the 1990s (cf. Sakwa 1997), the CPRF attracted a much more stable 
and loyal support base than other parties (Colton 1999). Yet the communists’ radical message of 
re-nationalization and revival of the USSR and association with neo-Nazi groups meant that they 
had great difficulty attracting majority support, and other leading opposition parties, such as the 
liberal Iabloka, refused to cooperate with them. 
 
Finally, Western influence in Russia was comparatively low. Unlike Central Europeans, few 
Russians traveled to the West or enjoyed access to Western-based media and NGOs. The share 
of foreign direct investment in GDP hovered around 1 percent during the 1990s, and foreign aid as 
a share of gross national income never exceeded 1 percent (World Development Indicators). 
Finally, Russia’s nuclear and military capacities substantially reduced Western leverage. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The most serious threat to Yeltsin’s power came in 1993 when he 
was challenged by the head of Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, and Vice President Aleksandr 
Rutskoi. In October of that year, Yeltsin attempted to dissolve the Supreme Soviet. However, 
Khasbulatov, and Rutskoi, backed by the Constitutional Court, refused to back down and, in 
alliance with Communist and nationalist forces, began mobilizing armed resistance against the 
president. Yeltsin survived the challenge because he managed—despite his precarious control over 
 
 
17
coercive structures--to convince the military to take the legislature by force.24 He also benefited 
from the refusal of liberal opposition groups to back the Parliamentary rebellion. 
 
 The 1996 presidential election presented Yeltsin with a second crisis. At the outset of the 
electoral campaign, Yeltsin’s public approval rating was in the single digits. Although the election 
was marked by at least some fraud, Yeltsin’s survival was largely a product of opposition 
polarization. Because the leading opposition candidate was Communist leader Gennadii Zyuganov, 
Yeltsin was able to play into fears of a Stalinist revival among liberals and other anti-communist 
critics. The unwillingness of opposition forces to unite behind Zyuganov allowed the unpopular 
incumbent to win re-election with 54 percent of the vote. 
 
 Since taking office in 2000, Vladimir Putin has addressed many of the weaknesses in 
Yeltsin’s rule. He has weakened the “oligarchs” and regional elites, secured control over much of 
the media, and cracked down on various forms of dissent. He has also invested in a ruling party, 
Unit, which has been effective at subordinating the Duma to the president’s dictates. At the same 
time, a strengthening economy and increased energy production has further eroded Western 
influence. The combination of state strength, heightened international autonomy, and Putin’s party 
building efforts all suggest that Russia is unlikely to democratize in the near future. 
 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe has been a competitive authoritarian regime since the end of white rule in 1980. 
Despite regular elections and a degree of judicial independence, post-1980 politics was dominated 
by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and President Robert 
Mugabe. The government strictly controlled the media and at times engaged in large-scale human 
violations.25 Although efforts to create a one-party state failed in 1990, violence and intimidation led 
opposition parties to boycott elections in 1995 and 1996.26 
 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Zimbabwe scores high on the dimension of incumbent 
capacity. Elite cohesion was moderate to high. Forged in the struggle against white rule, the new 
governing elite remained “fairly united and cohesive” during the 1980s, particularly after the 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was purged from the security forces (Darbon 1992: 2-
3; MacBruce 1992: 212-213). Although fissures emerged in the 1990s (Sithole 1999: 76-77), a 
series of purges allowed Mugabe to consolidate a “vise-like grip” on ZANU by the end of the 
decade (Rotberg 2002: 236). The Mugabe government’s coercive capacity was very high. 
Zimbabwe had one of the strongest states in Sub-Saharan Africa (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989: 40-
41; Herbst 1990), witha particularly effective coercive apparatus (Weitzer 1984a, 1984b). The 
Rhodesian government had created a “remarkably efficient and brutal state”--including a repressive 
 
24According to Yeltsin’s own account, he had an extremely difficult time finding the forces willing to undertake this 
task: “the army, numbering two and a half million people, could not produce even a thousand soldiers, not even one 
regiment could be found to come to Moscow to defend the city” (Yeltsin 1996: 276). 
25The most significant of these was the massive repression in Matabeland between 1982 and 1984, during 
which several thousand people were killed (Weitzer 1984a: 545; Cokorinos 1984: 50; Rotberg 2002: 228). 
26 Hence, politics was marked by “elections without competition” throughout much of the 1990s (Quantin 1992: 25). 
 
 
18
police force, an elaborate surveillance system run by the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), 
and an army capable of relocating 500,000 Africans into “protected villages”--as part of its 
counterinsurgency war in the 1960s and 1970s (Herbst 2000: 17; Weitzer 1984a, 1984b). Not 
only did this apparatus remain intact after 1980, but security spending increased dramatically and 
new repressive bodies, such as the notorious Fifth Brigade, were added (Weitzer 1984a: 534; 
MacBruce 1992: 214-215). ZANU also possessed relatively high electoral capacity. Due to the 
need to wage a protracted guerrilla war, ZANU developed a “stronger presence in the rural areas 
than most African parties had at independence” (Herbst 1990: 34). The party also sponsored a 
range of ancillary and paramilitary organizations--such as Women’s and Youth Leagues and the 
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association—that were used to both mobilize 
supporters and intimidate opposition activists (Cokorinos 1984: 52; Darbon 1992: 11; Sithole and 
Makumbe 1997). 
 
Opposition capacity was relatively high in the late 1990s. Although opposition parties and 
civil society had been weak during the 1980s (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989: 107-108; Sithole 1998: 
28; Alexander 2000: 386),27 student, human rights, and church groups grew stronger and more 
independent during the 1990s (Sithole 1999: 82-83; Dorman 2002). In particular, the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), whose membership soared to a reported 700,000 in 1998 
(Alexander 2000: 386-89), “emerged as a force to be reckoned with” (Sithole 1999: 85). 
Together with the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, the ZCTU launched the broad-based National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998. The next year, NCA and ZCTU leaders founded the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which united the opposition into a single, well-
organized party (Alexander 2000: 389-391). 
 
Western influence in Zimbabwe was relatively low. Because Rhodesia was largely cut off 
from the West after its 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, it became relatively self-
sufficient. Western media and NGO penetration are relatively low, as was the number of top 
ZANU and government officials who maintained close ties to Western institutions. Western 
influence was also limited by a regional hegemon: South Africa. South Africa was Zimbabwe’s 
leading trading partner, and Zimbabwe depended heavily on South Africa for fuel, electricity, and 
transport (Cokorinos 1984: 52; Hamill 2001: 12). 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: After running virtually unopposed in the 1995 (parliamentary) 
and 1996 (presidential) elections, ZANU faced a severe electoral challenge beginning in the late 
1990s. A major turning point came in February 2000, when a government-sponsored constitutional 
reform package was defeated in a referendum (Sithole 2001). This set the stage for parliamentary 
and presidential elections (in 2000 and 2002, respectively) in which ZANU would confront a unified 
opposition. 
 
 
27The leading opposition party in the 1990 election, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, had “no intelligible 
structures, no headquarters anywhere” (Sithole 1998: 117). 
 
 
19
Mugabe survived these challenges through massive and sustained repression. The 2000 
parliamentary election took place in an atmosphere of state-sponsored violence, in which journalists 
and MDC activists were repeatedly attacked and government-backed “war veterans” carried out 
campaigns of intimidation in rural areas (Rotberg 2000: 48; Sithole 2001: 166). Despite doctored 
voter rolls and some rigging (Compagnon 2000: 451; Rotberg 2000: 49), the MDC nearly won the 
election, capturing 57 of 120 seats. Although the MDC hoped to topple Mugabe via Serbia-style 
post-election protests, the government responded with a show of “brutal force” that was 
“unquestionably successful,” and further protests were cancelled.28 
 
State-sponsored violence increased in the run-up to the March 2002 presidential election, 
which pitted Mugabe against popular MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangarai. In rural areas, 
government-backed war veterans invaded white-owned land and attacked MDC supporters.29 
Although the Supreme Court ruled that the land invasions were unconstitutional, the government 
ignored these rulings, and in early 2001, Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay resigned violent threats 
(Meredith 2002: 205-6). In early 2002, parliament approved legislation that made it illegal for 
citizens to criticize the president or for journalists to operate without government accreditation, and 
the military command declared that it would not accept an MDC victory.30 Just weeks before the 
election, Tsvangirai was arrested on charges of plotting Mugabe’s assassination. On election day, a 
reduction in the number of voting booths in (MDC-dominated) Harare left 350,000 registered 
voters unable to cast ballots. These measures, combined with severe rural intimidation, paved the 
way for an easy Mugabe victory.31 
 
 Neither opposition protest nor external pressure succeeded in forcing Mugabe from power 
in the immediate aftermath of the election. The MDC organized mass protests, including a three-day 
general strike, but the protests again fizzled in the face of massive repression.32 Although the EU and 
U.S. imposed sanctions and Britain orchestrated Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth, 
“it quickly became apparent that Britain...enjoyed little or no leverage over the Harare government” 
(Hamill 2001: 12). Mugabe benefited from the tacit support of the South African government, which 
lobbied against international sanctions, refused to use its control over Zimbabwe’s power and fuel 
supplies as leverage against Mugabe, and—in stark contrast to Western governments--accepted the 
2002 election as “legitimate.”33 This support, together with the government’s coercive capacity, 
enabled Mugabe to survive the crisis. 
 
Turnover without Democratization 
In Albania (1997), Armenia (1996-1998), Ukraine (1994), and Zambia (1991), incumbent 
crises resulted in turnover but not full democratization. These outcomes were largely a product of 
low incumbent capacity (except in Armenia), combined with relatively low levels of Western 
 
28Africa Report, December 2000, p. 22-24; February 2001, p. 29. 
29Africa Today, October 2000, p. 13, June 2001, p. 26-27; September 2001, p. 20. 
30Africa Today, February, 2002, p. 22-23. 
31Africa Today April-May 2002, p. 24. 
32The Economist, 23 March 2002; Africa Today, April-May 2002, p. 20. 
33Africa Today April-May 2002, p. 20-22. 
 
 
20
influence (except in Albania). The cases are summarized in Table 3. In Albania, a virtual state 
collapse encouraged the intervention of European powers, which oversaw an election that brought 
the opposition to power. In Ukraine in 1994, the government’s inability to control its own regional 
administrations contributed directly to the president’s electoral demise. In both Albania and 
Ukraine,uncertain control over the military limited the options of incumbents and essentially forced 
them to abide by democratic institutions. In Zambia, a bankrupt state and relatively weak, 
patronage-based party could not fend off a united and mobilized opposition. In Armenia, which 
possessed a relatively strong state, the government fell amidst severe elite fragmentation. In 
Armenia, Ukraine, and Zambia, incumbent turnover in a context of low Western influence led not to 
democratization but rather to a continuation of competitive authoritarian rule. In Albania, which 
experienced greater Western influence during the 1990s, incumbent turnover resulted in a marginally 
democratic regime that was contingent on sustained external intervention. 
 
--Table 3 about here-- 
 
Albania 
Following its defeat of the communist Albanian Party of Labor (APL) in 1992, the 
Democratic Party, led by Sali Berisha, governed Albania via a combination of authoritarian and 
democratic means.34 After a severe crisis and external intervention brought a change of government 
in 1997, Albania became more pluralistic but nevertheless remained on the borderline between 
competitive authoritarianism and democracy. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity in Albania was very low in the 
1990s, due, in large part, to state weakness. As a result of a lack of any foreign assistance during 
the last 13 years of the communist regime (Johnson 2001: 181), the army suffered from minimal 
training, shortages of food, fuel and ammunition, inoperable equipment, and an ineffective command 
system (Vickers and Pettifer 2000: 46, 211-12). Coercive organs were further undermined under 
Berisha, who slashed military spending, purged as much as two-thirds of the military officer corps, 
and dismissed 70 percent of the secret police (Biberaj 2000: 324, 152-3; Vickers and Pettifer 
2000: 217). The government also lacked effective control over the military (Vickers and Pettifer 
2000: 62; Biberaj 1998: 93). After Berisha appointed a loyalist with no military experience as 
defense minister in 1992, some senior officers openly refused to obey him. 
 
Opposition strength was moderate. Though lacking the mobilizational muscle of the 
Serbian opposition, the Socialist Party--which was built upon the bases of the old APL--possessed 
a national structure and attracted substantial support in rural areas. Moreover, the Socialists’ 
dominant position within the opposition meant that opposition forces were relatively unified (Biberaj 
1998: 282). Finally, Albania was closely linked to, and highly dependent on, the West. At one 
 
34Although a vibrant independent press developed under Berisha, the president prevented the emergence of 
independent television and radio and made frequent use of libel laws to silence criticism (Biberaj 2000: 161, 
221). In 1993, Socialist Party leader Fatos Nano was arrested on embezzlement charges in what was viewed 
by international human rights organizations as a move to silence opposition (Amnesty International News 
Service 45/97). 
 
 
21
level, Albania’s unique level of isolation from the world under Hoxha means that Albania lacks the 
web of contacts with Western countries found in other more open communist regimes in Central 
Europe. Nevertheless, the country’s proximity to Western Europe meant that Western governments 
quickly felt the impact of Albania’s political crises. Estimates suggest that roughly 600,000 legal and 
illegal migrants fled from Albania into surrounding countries between 1990 and 1999. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Berisha’s fall from power in 1997 can be directly traced to the 
state’s failure to control social unrest, which triggered intervention by neighboring countries fearful of 
the effects of a sustained crisis. In 1996, the Democrats won parliamentary elections that were 
widely viewed as rigged (ODIHR Albania 1996). Both the OSCE and the United States 
government demanded that new elections be held in disputed areas. Although the government 
initially weathered the crisis, riots broke out in early 1997 after the failure of numerous pyramid 
schemes in which hundreds of thousands of Albanians had invested their savings. Uprisings broke 
out in the south and armed bandits began roaming the countryside robbing banks, destroying public 
buildings and looting arms depots that had been abandoned by security forces (Schmidt 1998; 
Biberaj 2000: 323). A state of emergency failed to quell the unrest, and in the ensuing disorder, 
Socialist leader Fatos Nano, who had been imprisoned since 1993, was able to walk out of prison. 
According to Johnson (2001: 179), weak military capacity was a major reason why the government 
subsequently rejected the use of force. 
 
International actors played a central role in resolving the crisis. In March 1997, the OSCE 
brokered a compromise that established a government of national reconciliation and new elections. 
After the EU and NATO declined to send troops, Italy received a UN mandate to send a 
Multinational Protection Force of 6,000 to Albania. The force oversaw elections two months later in 
which the Socialists won two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Increased international engagement, 
particularly in the wake of the 1999 crisis is Kosovo,35 resulted in greater political freedom after 
1997.36 However, the removal of Berisha did not lead to full-scale democratization. International 
human rights organizations continued to document substantial violations of civil liberties under the 
Socialists (Human Rights Watch 2001). 
 
Ukraine 
Ukraine remained competitive authoritarian throughout the 1990s. President Leonid Kravchuk 
repeatedly interfered with media coverage of the government during the early 1990s (Roeder 1994: 
79) and attempted fraud during the 1994 presidential elections (Democratic Elections in Ukraine 
1994). In 1994, Kravchuk lost to his former Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma, who governed in an 
increasingly autocratic manner over the rest of the decade. 
 
 
35Both the collapse of the pyramid schemes and the Kosovo crisis motivated increased European Union 
involvement in Albania through “aid provision and civil society programs aimed at re-establishing control 
over public utilities and policing” (Johnson 2001: 175). Foreign aid per capita increased from being the 29th 
highest in the world in 1994 ($52 per capita) to being the fourth highest in 1999 ($152). 
36For example, the press has become increasingly free with the emergence of independent radio and 
television (U.S. Department of State 2000). 
 
 
22
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity was low in the early 1990s. The post-
communist governing elite was highly fragmented. No ruling party emerged. Rather, the “party of 
power” functioned via loose and unstable coalitions (Kuzio 1997: 21-22; Wasylyk 1994). State 
capacity was initially undermined by a deep cleavage between the Ukrainian speaking western part 
of the country and the predominantly Russian speaking east. During Kravchuk’s presidency, the 
central government confronted secessionist demands and rebellions in several regions of the country. 
Kravchuk also faced problems creating a loyal national army. In the early 1990s, there was 
tremendous uncertainty concerning the loyalty of the armed forces and other security organs (Kuzio 
2000: 182), particularly given that military officers were overwhelmingly Russian (Foye 1993b: 62, 
63). Coup rumors abounded in 1993 (Kuzio 1993). 
 
 Opposition forces were also weak during the 1990s. Civil society was weakly organized, 
and opposition parties were little more than loose collections of like-minded elites. Although key 
opposition forces (including the communists) united behind Kuchma in 1994, as the Communist 
Party grew in strength, the opposition divided between anti-communist nationalists supportingUkrainian independence and the communists, who sought closer ties to Russia. 
 
 Western influence in Ukraine was relatively low. International media and NGO influence 
was low, and few elites were trained in the West. Ukraine’s dependence on the West was also 
low. Western aid represented a small share (about 1 percent) of gross national income and capital 
formation during the 1990s (World Development Indicators 2001). In addition, economic 
dependence on Russia,37 as well as close elite ties to Russia, meant that Russia served as an 
important alternative hegemon for Ukraine. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: State weakness and elite fragmentation contributed directly to 
Kravchuk’s removal in 1994. Kravchuk lost the 1994 presidential race in part because of his weak 
grip on his own administration in key locales in the east, where many state officials supported--and 
manipulated--the voting process in favor of Kuchma.38 Another important factor undermining 
Kravchuk’s ability to retain power was his weak influence with security forces. Almost certainly 
inspired by Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Russian legislature, Kravchuk contemplated disbanding 
parliament (FBIS-SOV 1 October 93: 25; Kravchuk 2002: 227) in 1993 in the midst of a deep 
conflict with parliament. According to his own account, however, Kravchuk was dissuaded from 
taking any action when the Ukrainian intelligence service rejected the idea (Kravchuk 2002: 228). 
 
Ukraine did not democratize after Kravchuk’s removal. Indeed, Kuchma’s ability to 
consolidate state control over the regions and the security forces, together with an effective system 
of internal surveillance and blackmail (Darden 2001), enhanced elite cohesion and allowed the 
president to govern in an increasingly authoritarian manner. In 1999, tight control over state 
agencies enabled Kuchma to manipulate elections through “widespread, systematic and 
 
37In 1999, Russia accounted for 48 percent of Ukraine’s imports, most of which was natural gas and other 
energy resources (CIA fact-book). Ukraine’s energy debt to Russia is estimated to be between US$ 1.4 and 
2 billion. 
38See Kuzio (1996: 132-133); FBIS-SOV 3 August 1994: 38; and Democratic Elections in Ukraine (1994). 
 
 
23
coordinated” action by “[s]tate officials and public institutions at various levels” (ODIHR 1999: 18; 
Darden 2001).39 Kuchma also benefited from a deeply divided opposition, as nationalist forces 
opted to back the government when the Communists emerged as the leading contender for the 
presidency in 1999. Finally, Kuchma benefited from the support of Russian president Putin, 
particularly in the wake of a 2000 scandal in which a leaked audiotape appeared to link the 
president to the murder of an independent journalist (Levitsky and Way 2001). 
 
Zambia 
Zambia experienced two incumbent turnovers between 1991 and 2001 but did not 
democratize. In 1991, after two decades of single party rule under the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP), longtime autocrat Kenneth Kaunda held multiparty elections and was 
defeated by union leader Frederick Chiluba. Yet the regime remained competitive authoritarian, as 
politics continued to be marked by fraud and regular abuses of civil liberties throughout the 1990s 
(Mphaisha 2000). 
 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity under Kaunda was medium-low. 
The Zambian state is considered among the weakest in southern Africa (Lodge 1998: 25-26; Shafer 
1994). Kaunda ruled largely through patronage and never developed the kind of repressive 
apparatus seen in neighboring Zimbabwe (Bratton 1994: 123; Baylies and Szeftel 1992: 88). The 
severe economic crisis of the late 1980s eroded the state’s capacity even further. Kaunda’s control 
over the security apparatuses also appears to have been relatively weak: the government suffered 
three coup attempts between 1980 and 1990. The government’s electoral capacity was moderate. 
Although UNIP possessed a national structure and maintained a large urban presence (Lodge 1998: 
32), it was a loosely structured, patronage-based organization with a fairly weak presence in rural 
areas.40 
 
Opposition strength was relatively high in the late 1980 and early 1990s. The labor 
movement, based largely in the copper sector, was particularly strong. The Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU), which had 380,000 members in 1980 (Bratton 1994: 113-114), was one of 
the most potent labor organizations in the region. The church also emerged as an important civic 
actor (Bartlett 2000: 435-6). The opposition was further strengthened by its internal cohesion. In 
1990, unions, students, and former government leaders founded the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy, which, under the guidance of ZCTU leader Frederick Chiluba, emerged as a united 
opposition front. 
 
Finally, Zambia’s ties to the West were relatively weak. The country’s dependence on the 
West was quite high. In the mid-1980s, it was the most indebted country in the world relative to 
 
39 Tax officers were used to blackmail local officials into getting out the vote (Darden 2001) and local and 
regional officials did everything from distributing campaign materials to threatening to cut off gas or 
electricity supplies if villagers did not support Kuchma (ODIHR Ukraine 1999: 16-17). 
40 According to Kees van Donge, UNIP was a “maximum coalition” of regional and other groups whose 
interests often had to be satisfied at the cost of party strength (1995: 209, 196; also Baylies and Szeftel 1992: 
78). 
 
 
24
GDP and received more per capita external assistance than any other African state (van de Walle 
1997: 29; Lodge 1998: 32). However, in terms of geographic proximity, elite linkages, and media 
and other influences, Zambia ranked low. The United States had “few identifiable interests” in 
Zambia, and Zambia “was low on the unusually crowded U.S. foreign policy agenda” the early 
1990s (Carothers 1999: 69, 73). 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: A combination of incumbent weakness and opposition 
capacity led to the collapse of one-party rule in 1991. During the second half of the 1980s, Zambia 
suffered a severe economic shock due to declining copper prices. Due to its heavy reliance on 
patronage, the crisis hit the government particularly hard (Bratton 1994: 124). Fiscal crisis and 
IMF-dictated food price increases led to riots in 1986 and 1990 (Lodge 1998: 32; Bratton 1992: 
85-86). The 1990 riots were followed by a coup attempt and mass demonstrations throughout the 
country. In this context, Kaunda agreed hold multiparty elections (Bratton 1992, 1994). 
According to Bartlett, political liberalization “was the only alternative open for a regime that lacked 
the will for, or the means of, repression” (Bartlett 2000: 444). The MMD, which benefited from the 
organizational strength of the ZCTU and a wave of defections from UNIP (Baylies and Szeftel 
1992: 81-83; Bratton 1994), overwhelmingly defeated UNIP in the 1991 election, and Kaunda 
peacefully handed the presidency over to Chiluba. 
 
 Although the Zambian regime remained competitive after 1991, it did not democratize. 
The Chiluba government repeatedly violated civil and political liberties, assaulted the independent 
media, and maneuvered to bar both Kaunda and his running mate from participating in the 1996 
presidential election (Bratton and Posner 1999; Mphaisha 2000). Chiluba was re-elected in 1996 in 
an election that was so riddled with abuse that UNIP opted to boycott it (Bratton and Posner 
1999). Chiluba retained power largely because the opposition was weak and fragmented, which 
allowed the government to essentially “dominate by default”(Burnell 2001: 256-258). Yet the 
fragmentation of the MMD coalition prevented Chiluba from consolidating power. In 2001, 
Chiluba attempted to change the constitution in order to serve a third term.However, he faced 
substantial intra-party opposition and was forced to back down (Bongololo 2001). In December 
2001, in elections that were widely criticized, Vice President Levy Mwanawasa narrowly defeated 
a highly fragmented opposition (with just 29 percent of the vote), which allowed the MMD to retain 
power for another term. 
 
Armenia 
Armenia has been a competitive authoritarian regime since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 
1996, Levon Ter-Petrosian, an anti-communist opposition leader who had been elected president in 
1991, stole an election from his former Prime Minister Vazgen Manukian. Less than two years 
later, however, Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign amidst severe elite fragmentation. Ter-
Petrosian’s removal did not result in democratization, but rather in an increasingly authoritarian 
regime. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: In contrast to the other cases discussed in this section, 
the Armenian government possessed substantial incumbent capacity. State capacity was relatively 
 
 
25
high. Ter-Petrosian initially faced tremendous state building challenges as armed groups--using 
weapons stolen from nearby Soviet army bases—that emerged to fight in the disputed Karabagh 
region of Azerbaijan created problems of public order. Yet the government quickly disarmed and 
subordinated these groups (Masih and Krikorian 1999: 20-22; Mitiaev 1998: 77-78). Armenia 
won the war in Nagorno-Karabagh (capturing 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory) in 1992-1994 
and emerged from it with a strong and disciplined military apparatus. In addition, the governing 
party, the Armenian National Movement (ANM), which had emerged out of the broad-based late 
1980s movement to assert Armenian control over Karabagh, was relatively strong. The ANM won 
a majority of seats in the 1990 legislative elections. At the same time, however, elite cohesion was 
relatively low. The ANM was a heterogeneous coalition that included intelligentsia from the 
communist era, younger activists, and figures from the Communist establishment (Aves 1996: 4). 
Throughout the early 1990s, ANM leaders broke off to form their own parties (Libaridian 1999: 
10, 23-24; Masih and Krikorian 1999: 45-46). 
 
Opposition capacity was medium-low. Civil society was fairly weak. Moreover, 
opposition forces were fragmented into at least five groupings led by different ex-government 
officials, as well as the Dashniak, a predominantly diaspora-based party. Unlike Russia and 
Ukraine, however, no strong communist party polarized the opposition. For the most part, 
differences among the parties revolved around personalities and tactics. 
 
Like many other post-Soviet countries, Armenia was weakly linked to the West during the 
1990s. The level of Western-based media, NGO, and technocratic linkage was low.41 
Facing a blockade from Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia was reliant on Western aid, which 
accounted for 58 percent of gross capital formation in 1999 (World Development Indicators). 
However, Russia, which remained very active militarily in the region, was the most important 
neighboring power. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: State strength and relatively weak Western influence 
facilitated authoritarian regime-building in Armenia. Despite his oppositionist credentials, Ter-
Petrosian responded in a harsh manner to opposition that emerged in the early 1990s. In December 
1994, Ter-Petrosian banned the Dashniaks, which was considered the most powerful party outside 
of the ANM. During the 1995 parliamentary elections, the ANM tightly controlled local electoral 
commissions, which denied registration to many opposition candidates (Dudwick 1997: 94-95; 
Fuller 1996: 45-46). In this context, the ANM won 62 percent of the seats in parliament. 
 
A more potent opposition threat emerged in 1996, when, just weeks before presidential 
elections, four parties united behind the candidacy of ex-Prime Minister Vazgen Manukian. 
Although official results stated that Ter-Petrosian won the election 52 percent to 41 percent, the 
results were widely considered inaccurate and were condemned by the U.S. government and the 
 
41Although Armenia has a very active and organized diaspora community, the ANM had relatively weak and 
often hostile relations with diaspora groups, which had actively opposed the movement for independence in 
the late 1980s (Masih and Krikorian 1999: 12-13). 
 
 
26
European Parliament. Manukian responded by leading a 150,000-strong demonstration that 
attacked Parliament (Danielian 1996-1997: 128). Yet--unlike Zambia, Albania, and Ukraine--the 
military remained unambiguously loyal to Ter-Petrosian during the crisis (Fuller 1996: 43), and 
security forces quickly put down the protests. Despite this apparent victory, the surprisingly strong 
opposition challenge convinced many ANM elites that the party was losing ground (Astourian 2001: 
48, Danielyan 1998). Within months, a deep split emerged (Mitiaev 1998: 129), and in February 
1998, long-simmering disagreements over Karabagh policies led to widespread defections from the 
party. As legislators abandoned the ANM, the government lost control over Parliament and Ter-
Petrosian was forced to resign (Mitiaev 1998: 131). 
 
Ter-Petrosian’s resignation and replacement by former Prime Minister Robert Kocharian 
pushed Armenia in an authoritarian, rather than a democratic, direction. In 1998, Kocharian won 
elections that were characterized by substantial abuse, and in March 2002, Kocharian closed down 
Television A+, the most independent station in the country. 
 
Incumbent Removal and Democratization 
In Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Serbia, autocratic incumbents were removed from power 
either through elections or in the context of post-election crises. In each of these cases, incumbent 
turnover was accompanied by a democratic transition. All four cases were characterized by 
relatively high levels of incumbent capacity, which in some cases enabled governments to survive 
repeated opposition challenges. However, high levels of Western linkage imposed severe 
constraints on incumbents, which ultimately facilitated their removal. In all four cases, regime change 
resulted in democratization. The cases are summarized in Table 4. In Mexico, a strong state and 
party and a divided opposition allowed the PRI to remain in power during the 1990s, but in a 
context of close integration with the United States, the government was unwilling to repress a 
growing opposition was thus forced to cede power in 2000. In Nicaragua, an effective coercive and 
electoral apparatus and a weak opposition allowed the Sandinista government to dominate politics 
throughout the 1980s, but a U.S.-sponsored war and embargo eventually compelled the 
government to hold free elections and, once defeated, cede power. In Peru, although Alberto 
Fujimori’s popularity and a weak opposition left the govnernment virtually unchallenged in the mid-
1990s, governing party weakness and a unified opposition challenge compelled the government to 
engage in a series of political shenanigans that—in a context of strong international pressure--
contributed to the regime’s implosion in 2000. Finally, in Serbia, a regime characterized by a 
relatively strong state and party was badly weakened by a U.S.-led war, after which a well-
organized and unified opposition movement forced Milosevic from power. 
--Table 4 about here-- 
 
Mexico 
 Prior to the 1980s, Mexico was a full-scale authoritarian regime. The Institutionalized 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) thoroughly dominated politics, and elections were “ritualistic pageants” in 
which the PRI usually won more than 80 percent of the vote (Lindau 1996: 319). Beginning in the 
1980s, however, the regime became increasingly competitive. Although elections were marred by 
fraud, violence, and widespread abuse of state resources (Levy and Bruhn 2001: 87-88), the27
opposition National Action Party (PAN) and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) slowly 
emerged as serious contenders for power. 
 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Mexico is a case of high incumbent capacity. Through 
the late 1980s, the regime was characterized by a “remarkable cohesive ruling elite” (Ronfeldt 1989: 
435). The PRI served as an effective vehicle for resolving elite conflict, suffering only one major 
fracture prior to 1987 (Ronfeldt 1989; Cornelius et al. 1989: 18). Moreover, the PRI’s tight 
control over the military ensured that the possibility of a coup was “virtually nil” (Wager 1995: 6, 
72). The PRI government’s coercive capacity was also high. The Mexican Revolution produced a 
strong state bureaucracy (Centeno 1994: 45-73) and a disciplined military that played an active—
and effective—role in suppressing protest (Ronfeldt 1984a: 17; 1984b; Wager 1984). The army 
put down peasant uprisings in several states during the 1960s, routed incipient guerrilla groups in the 
late 1960s, and crushed large-scale student protests in 1968 (Ronfeldt 1984b: 64-65). The size—
and budget—of the armed doubled during the 1980s (Wager 1984: 160-169, 175; Grayson 
1990a: 269-270). Finally, the PRI’s electoral capacity was high. Created as a mass party with 
close links to labor and peasant organizations, the PRI “became one of the world’s most 
accomplished vote-getting machines” during the 1940s and 1950s (Cornelius 1996: 57-58). Its 
strength lay not only in its ability to deliver votes but also in its remarkable capacity to organize 
fraud,42 which demonstrated clearly the party’s “capacity for control” (Bruhn 1997: 40). Although 
the PRI machine weakened during the 1980, it remained the only party with “a truly national 
network of campaign organizers” as late as 1994 (Cornelius 1996: 59).43 
 
Opposition capacity--scored as medium--was mixed. Whereas most civic and social 
organizations had been co-opted or repressed by the state before the 1980s, Mexico witnessed a 
“remarkable flowering of civil society” during the 1980s and 1990s (Schulz and Williams 1995: 3), 
as church and student groups, social movements, NGOs, and independent unions, business 
associations, and media outlets proliferated (Levy and Bruhn 2001: 69-71; Lawson 2002). During 
the 1990s, the opposition PAN and PRD developed relatively strong national organizations. 
However, opposition capacity was reduced by deep ideological differences between the 
conservative PAN and the leftist PRD, which made it difficult to construct a broad anti-PRI 
coalition. 
 
Finally, U.S. influence in Mexico was exceptionally high. Although the U.S. and Mexico 
maintained an “arm’s length” relationship during the Cold War (Domínguez and Fernández de 
Castro 2001: 3-10), the 1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in Mexico’s linkages to (and 
dependence on) the U.S. and international financial institutions (Kaufman Purcell 1997; Domínguez 
and Fernández de Castro 2001).44 Rapid economic integration during the 1980s, which culminated 
in the 1993 passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), quadrupled U.S. 
 
42Local PRI branches organized ballot stuffing, as well as “flying brigades,” or groups of voters that were 
trucked from polling station to polling station to cast multiple ballots (Cornelius 1996: 60). 
43According to Cornelius, the PRI mobilized 1.2 million activists on election day in 1994 (1996: 59-60). 
44For example, the U.S. and IMF orchestrated four major financial bailouts of Mexico—totaling nearly $70 
million--between 1982 and 1995 (Aguayo 2000: 35). 
 
 
28
investment in Mexico and transformed Mexico into the U.S.’s second largest trading partner (Levy 
and Bruhn 1999: 566). Political interactions between the U.S. and Mexico “multiplied at all levels” 
(Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2001: 75),45 which “expanded U.S. public interest in Mexico 
and Mexican affairs” (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2001: 92). Consequently, Mexican 
governments were forced to “accept the scrutiny of the U.S. Congress, public interest groups, and a 
myriad of committees and commissions” (Centeno 1994: 240). Increased linkage was also seen in 
the rise of U.S.-educated technocrats to the top of the Mexican power structure (Camp 1985; 
Centeno 1994). U.S.-educated technocrats predominated in the governments of Miguel De la 
Madrid (1982-88), Carlos Salinas (1988-94), and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) (Camp 1985; 
Centeno 1994).46 The emerging technocratic elite was fluent in English, was familiar with global 
intellectual and ideological trends, and maintained close ties to the U.S. intellectual, political, and 
economic elite (Centeno 1994: 125-126). Finally, Mexico was penetrated by U.S.-based media 
and international civil society (Lawson 2002: 98; Dresser 1996b). International NGOs established 
close ties to local human rights and pro-democracy groups, providing them with resources, 
protection, and access to the U.S. media and Congress (Dresser 1996b). 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The PRI regime entered into crisis in 1988, when left-of-
center PRI defector Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas challenged Carlos Salinas for the presidency and, in the 
face of possible defeat, the PRI carried out a massive fraud (Cornelius et al. 1989: 21; Bruhn 1997: 
140-41). Although Cardenas led a series of mass demonstrations that threatened the regime, the 
PRI survived because: (1) it maintained full control over the military (Bruhn 1997: 49); (2) the U.S. 
government—in the waning days of the Cold War-- backed Salinas (Whitehead 1991: 246); and 
(3) the opposition divided, as the PAN, fearing a Cardenas government, abandoned the protests 
(Magaloni 2001: 4, 11). 
 
Although PRI strength and PAN-PRD polarization enabled Ernesto Zedillo to win the 
presidency in 1994, the growing strength of parties and civil society, combined with unprecedented 
international scrutiny of Mexican politics (Kaufman Purcell 1997: 149-150), created a dilemma 
from which PRI leaders could not escape. On the hand, as the opposition gained strength, 
repression and fraud would be increasing necessary to retain power. On the other hand, the 
international media and NGO presence was such that even minor acts of repression and fraud now 
gained widespread—and costly--international attention (Kaufman Purcell 1997: 149-150). Though 
hardly democratic, the PRI’s technocratic leadership was “greatly concerned with the international 
image of Mexico and the damage done to that image by widespread reports of human rights 
violations and democratic failings” (Dresser 1996b: 337). These constraints compelled the PRI to 
respond to emerging opposition challenges with concessions, rather than repression. 
 
The 1990s were thus characterized by a series of PRI concessions that ultimately resulted in 
the party’s removal from power. First, in the early 1990s, when a string of local electoral scandals 
 
45U.S. and Mexican presidents met a stunning 23 times between 1989 and 2000. 
46According to one count, nearly two-thirds of President Miguel De la Madrid’s (1982-88) cabinet was 
educated abroad (Camp 1985: 103). 
 
 
29
provoked opposition protests that gained widespread international attention, the PRI began, for the 
first time, to concede state-level elections (Dresser 1996b: 332; Eisenstadt 2001). Second, 
although the government initially responded to the 1994 Zapatista National Liberation Army 
(EZLN) uprising in Chiapas with massive force (Wager and Schulz 1995: 172), the repression 
“spurred international concern and led to an influx of human rights organizations from abroad” 
(Dresser 1996b: 334). Thus, even though the army quickly cornered the rebels (Wager and Schulz 
1995), the government “found itself hampered in using force” (Kaufman Purcell 1997: 149) by 
concern that repression would “frighten away investors” and “createa backlash that could destroy 
NAFTA” (Schulz and Williams 1995: 12). Third, concerned about the international credibility of 
the 1994 election, the PRI agreed to “a series of unprecedented measures to limit fraud” (Kaufman 
Purcell 1997: 150), including the presence of foreign observers (Dresser 1996b: 336). Finally, 
weakened by a deep financial crisis, the Zedillo government “reluctantly and grudgingly” negotiated 
the 1996 electoral reforms that democratized Mexico (Lawson 2002: 20).47 The 2000 election, 
which was heavily monitored by international and domestic observers (Pastor 2000), was won by 
PAN candidate Vicente Fox. The PRI left power peacefully, largely because “the balance of forces 
had so dramatically changed that the costs for the PRI to refuse to recognize its defeat were 
enormous” (Magaloni 2001: 16). 
 
Serbia 
Throughout the 1990s, Serbia maintained a competitive authoritarian regime in which 
elections, though marred by fraud and intimidation, were nevertheless hotly contested. Despite a 
severe economic crisis, the loss of three wars, international sanctions, and some of the largest and 
most sustained demonstrations in the post-communist era, Slobodan Milosevic held onto power 
longer than any other post-Communist leader outside of Central Asia. 
 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: The Serbian government enjoyed substantial incumbent 
capacity during the 1990s. Elite cohesion was preserved through nationalist ideology, an extensive 
patronage network based on state owned enterprises (Cohen 2001: 131), and a strong party 
organization. In the late 1980s, Milosevic successfully transformed the existing communist party into 
the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), which retained key material and organizational resources from 
the previous regime. The SPS possessed a developed structure of branches and membership 
(estimated at 400,000 in 1990), substantial property, and a large media empire (Cohen 2001: 120, 
Thomas 1999: 76).48 During elections, Milosevic was able to draw on physical intimidation by 
gangs of party activists (Gagnon 1994/95: 161) and use party organs and state agencies to “pump 
in” 500,000-700,000 votes (roughly 10-15 percent of the overall vote) (Cohen 2001: 417). The 
government also possessed an extensive security apparatus, particularly the police, which employed 
 
47According to Beatriz Magaloni, PRI “was compelled to re-negotiate the rules of the game. The alternative 
was to crash after each electoral round until the legitimacy of the electoral system was destroyed” (2001: 11). 
48Among the assets obtained by the Party was the Socialist Alliance for the Working People of Serbia 
(SAWP), a government sponsored umbrella group for social organizations, which helped to transport pro-
Milosevic Kosovo Serbs to rallies across the country (Thomas 1999: 45-47). The SAWP, which ultimately 
merged with the SPS, maintained assets worth an estimated US$160 million (Andrejevich 1990). 
 
 
30
at least 100,000 people by 1995 and was armed with cannons and other heavy artillery (Cohen 
2001: 132). 
 
 Milosevic faced a well-organized but fractious opposition. The Serbian opposition’s 
capacity to mobilize street protests was probably greater than any of the other countries covered in 
this paper. Liberal groups organized massive protests in cities across the country throughout the 
1990s.49 By the late 1990s, the opposition had also managed to organize youth groups capable of 
actively resisting police intimidation (Bujasevic and Radovanovic 2001). For most of the decade, 
the opposition was weakened by a high level of fragmentation. Nevertheless, the absence of deep 
ethnic or ideological cleavages enhanced prospects for eventual opposition unity. 
 
Finally, Serbia was characterized by high Western influence. Close Western linkages were 
in part a product of the relative openness of the communist regime (Pribicevic 1995/1996: 124), 
which created an elite that was highly familiar with Western norms. In addition, Serbia’s proximity to 
Western Europe increased the likelihood that fear of a spreading Balkan war would led the U.S. 
and European governments to intervene in the region. 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The combination of effective nationalist appeals, high 
incumbent capacity, and a fragmented opposition allowed Milosevic to weather several challenges 
during the 1990s. In 1992-93, after the SPS failed to win a majority in parliament, Milosevic was 
able to lure the far right Serbian Radical Party, a one-time ally of oppositionist Vuk Draskovic, into 
a “red-brown” coalition. A more serious challenge emerged in the winter of 1996-1997 after the 
SPS was soundly defeated in a series of local elections. When the government annulled the results, 
the liberal opposition group Zajedno organized three months of daily demonstrations (reaching 
500,000 people in Belgrade) throughout the country to call for Milosevic’s ouster. Facing strong 
international pressure, as well as opposition from the Orthodox church, Milosevic reversed course 
and accepted the opposition victories – but did not relinquish control over the national government. 
Despite the size and persistence of the demonstrations, there were few government defections and 
Milosevic’s authority remained largely intact. 
 
 Two critical changes sealed Milosevic’s fate in the late 1990s. First, the regime and state 
were badly weakened by the war with NATO. Although sanctions and war may have helped 
Milosevic in the short run by strengthening Serbian nationalism (cf Thomas 1999: 131), they 
ultimately weakened both public and intra-regime support for Milosevic.50 By 2000, Milosevic’s 
capacity to withstand popular protest had diminished. Many in the police feared large-scale 
popular rebellion (Bujasevic and Radovanovic 2001: 28). There was also widespread 
dissatisfaction in the military, as many officers blamed Milosevic for the army’s failure in four 
successive wars (Cohen 2001: 417, 414). These developments weakened the command structure 
of the security forces (Cohen 2001: 420-21; Bujasevic and Radovanovic 2001). Second, and 
 
49These included rallies of 500,000 in 1991 and 100,000 in 1992, daily protests of between 50,000 and 500,000 
over the space of three months in 1996-97; and a critical anti-Milosevic demonstration of 600,000 in late 2000. 
50The NATO bombings had inflicted an estimated 30-40 billion dollars in damage to the country’s economic 
infrastructure (Bardos 2001: 419). 
 
 
31
crucially, opposition forces united behind the presidential candidacy of Vojislav Kostunica, a 
moderate nationalist politician. Kostunica’s broad-based candidacy gave the opposition an 
unprecedented capacity to win majority electoral support. 
 
 In this new context, Milosevic was unable to maintain himself in power. After Milosevic 
fraudulently claimed that Kostunica had failed to win the first round of the 2000 presidential 
election,51 the opposition organized a successful general strike, and on October 5, over 600,000 
demonstrators gathered in Belgrade and stormed Parliament, Radio-Television Serbia, several radio 
stations, and the SPS headquarters (Cohen 2001: 410-415; Bujasevic and Radovanovic 2001: 47-
97). Security forces refused to repress the demonstrations. A day later, Milosevic resigned. The 
new government received substantial support from the West. Although the Serbian/Yugoslav 
governments have been plagued by political infighting, the government has refrained from extra-legal 
measures and the country has remained democratic. 
 
Nicaragua 
 Nicaragua evolved from a one party authoritarian regime in the aftermath of the 1979 
revolution into a competitive authoritarian regime in the late 1980s. Although competitive elections 
were held in 1984, they were carried out in a context of civil war and were boycotted by the major 
opposition parties.Daniel Ortega of the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) won 
the presidency with 67 percent of the vote. Beginning in 1987, however, a series of internationally-
brokered concessions created the conditions for a highly competitive election in 1990. 
 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Nicaragua was a case of high incumbent capacity. Elite 
cohesion was extremely high. A former guerrilla movement, the FSLN was a centralized, 
disciplined party. Open conflict within the party’s National Directorate (DN) was rare (Miranda 
and Ratliff 1993: 19), and the DN did not suffer a single defection through the entire 1979-90 
period. The FSLN also possessed substantial coercive capacity. Confronted with a U.S.-backed 
civil war, the FSLN built a powerful army (Farhi 1990: 112; Walker 1991: 86-87). Whereas 
former dictator Anastasio Somoza’s National Guard contained only 7500 men (Farhi 1990: 33), the 
Sandinista Popular Army grew to 96,000 troops in 1990 (Prevost 1995: 103). The FSLN also 
established an “extensive state security system” (Leiken 1990: 28; Miranda and Ratliff 1993: 189-
90), which included an elaborate surveillance system, extensive informant networks, and a state 
security force that was ten times larger than Somoza’s (Miranda and Ratliff 1993: 189-90). The 
country’s 15,000 neighborhood-based Sandinista Defense Committees also played a role in 
policing and surveillance (Serra 1991: 53-54; Oquist 1992: 24). Finally, the FSLN possessed 
substantial electoral capacity. Although it maintained a “limited and selective membership” (roughly 
30,000 in the mid-1980s) (Vanden and Prevost 1993: 114), the FSLN possessed a degree of 
organization and discipline that was unmatched in Nicaraguan history. The party’s mobilizational 
capacity was enhanced by close ties to mass-based labor, peasant, youth, and women’s 
 
51According to the opposition count, Kostunica won the first round with 52 percent of the vote. However, 
the government claimed that Kostunica had only received 48.96 percent and that a run-off was required. 
 
 
32
organizations whose combined membership was an estimated 300,000 (Vanden and Prevost 1993: 
59-62; Williams 1994: 173). 
 
 Opposition capacity was, by contrast, relatively low. Because most major civic and social 
organizations were linked to the FSLN-state, independent civil society was weak (Luckham 1998). 
The political opposition was weak and fragmented into nearly two dozen small parties (Weaver and 
Barnes 1991). As late as 1990, the opposition possessed a “weak organization” with little more 
than a single office in each municipality (LASA 1990: 23). Yet despite its fragmentation, the 
opposition was not deeply divided (Kuant and O’Kane 1990: 9), and in 1989, 14 parties—ranging 
from the communist left to the conservative right—formed the National Opposition Union (UNO), 
which enhanced the opposition’s electoral capacity. 
 
 Finally, Western influence in Nicaragua was very high. Prior to 1979, Nicaragua had been 
one of the most heavily U.S.-dependent countries in the hemisphere (Farhi 1990: 31).52 Although 
the revolution loosened these ties, Nicaragua’s close proximity to the U.S. left it vulnerable to a 
“backyard effect.”53 Indeed, “not since Vietnam [had] a small country attracted so much U.S. 
media attention or caused such acrimony in Congress” (Leiken 1990: 26). U.S. attention to 
Nicaragua was reinforced by the displaced Nicaraguan elite, which established a well-financed and 
connected Miami-based exile community. Nicaragua’s proximity to the U.S. also exposed it to 
mass media penetration from neighboring countries (Frederick 1987; Reding 1991: 43). Finally, 
Western leverage over Nicaragua was high. Although the FSLN reduced Nicaragua’s dependence 
on the U.S., largely via the support from the Soviet bloc,54 this break provoked a costly U.S.-
sponsored civil war,55 and when Soviet assistance dried up in the late 1980s, Western leverage 
again increased dramatically. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Although the Sandinistas faced no serious domestic 
challenges during the 1980s, international constraints pushed the FSLN toward an increasingly 
competitive regime. By 1988, the human and economic costs of the U.S.-backed civil war had 
become virtually unbearable. After five years of recession and three years of hyperinflation (Conroy 
1990: 48-49), it became clear that there were “no viable options for economic recuperation so long 
as the contra war continued and Nicaragua remained on the margins of international trade, finance 
and assistance” (Roberts 1990: 93). At the same time, a withdrawal of Soviet aid compelled 
Nicaragua to “submit to the realities of U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere” (Vanden and 
Prevost 1993: 106). In this context, the FSLN government sought to enhance its legitimacy in the 
West—a strategy that required democratic reform (Roberts 1990). 
 
52The U.S. invaded Nicaragua four times in the nineteenth century and then occupied the country, off and 
on, from 1912 until 1932 (Robinson 1992: 20). 
53As an economic advisor to the Sandinista government put it: “This is a very small, vulnerable country, in 
the backyard of the United States, with long land borders...not an island like Cuba....These geopolitical 
realities are more important than the Sandinistas’ intentions...” (quoted in LASA 1984: 34). 
54Nicaragua received more than $3 billion in foreign aid and credit from the Soviet bloc between 1979 and 1987 
(Conroy 1990: 52). 
55The civil war resulted in 30,000 Nicaraguan deaths and as much as $4 billion in damages (Vanden and 
Prevost 1993: 130; Conroy 1990: 55). 
 
 
33
 
Western pressure thus achieved what a weak and fragmented opposition could not: political 
liberalization in anticipation of the 1990 elections. In 1989, the FSLN agreed to a series of political 
concession that included the repeal of repressive security laws, a more balanced Supreme Electoral 
Council, greater media access, and—crucially—UN and OAS observation of the 1990 election 
(LASA 1990: 11). Although reform concessions did not create a level playing field (the FSLN 
retained a near-monopoly over state resources and the media), two factors benefited the 
opposition. First, it united behind a single presidential candidate, Violeta Chamorro. Second, 
international actors intervened heavily in the election. U.S. logistical and financial support, which 
totaled an estimated $12.5 to $14 million (Reding 1991: 40;Williams 1994: 180), provided UNO 
with an organizational capacity that it could not have achieved on its own. More importantly, 
international observers played a critical role in mediating disputes between UNO and the 
government (LASA 1990: 32-33; Pastor 1990: 19-20).56 The election itself was “observed by 
more international observers than any previous election in an independent country” (Pastor 1990: 
18). When it became clear that Ortega had lost the election, Carter and representatives of the UN 
and OAS rushed to the FSLN headquarters to ensure that he would accept the result (LASA 1990: 
34; Pastor 1990: 21). The FSLN ceded power in April 1990, ushering in a surprisingly smooth 
democratic transition. 
 
Peru 
Peru’s competitive authoritarian regime emerged in 1992 after President Alberto Fujimori 
closed Congress and dissolved the constitution. Although international pressure forced Fujimori to 
quickly restore electoral politics (McClintock 1996: 69-70; Cameron 1997: 65-66), the post-1992 
regime was far from democratic. Civil liberties were routinely violated,57 and much of the media and 
the judiciary were embedded in a web of corruption and blackmail spun by Fujimori’s shadowy 
intelligence advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos (Cameron 2000, 2002; Youngers 2000). 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity in Peru was relatively high, but 
uneven. Though initially low,58 elitecohesion increased substantially over the course of the 1990s. 
The lynchpin of this cohesion was Montesinos, who stacked the military, the judiciary, and other 
state institutions with allies and ensured discipline through a vast network of bribery, surveillance, 
and blackmail (Obando 1999; Rospigliosi 2000; Cameron 2002). The government also possessed 
substantial coercive capacity. Although Fujimori inherited a badly weakened state in 1990, he took 
a series of measures to strengthen it in the early 1990s (Rospigliosi 2000: 113-114; 118-119). At 
the same time, Montesinos’ crafting of the military command consolidated the government’s control 
over the security apparatus (Rospigliosi 2000). The core of the new coercive structure was the 
National Intelligence Service (SIN), which Montesinos transformed into an “immense apparatus” 
 
56According to Robert Pastor, Carter “would listen to UNO’s charges...and then take them up directly with 
the senior levels of the Sandinista government. In virtually every case, Ortega responded” (1990: 19). 
57The most serious cases of human rights violations under Fujimori were the 1991 massacre of 15 people at 
Barrios Altos and the July 1992 killing of nine students at La Cantuta University. 
58The government suffered several important defections and shakeups in the 1990-93 period, as well as a 
coup attempt in November 1992. 
 
 
34
(Rospigliosi 2000: 156-158). The SIN staff grew from a few dozen to 1500, and its budget 
increased by more than 50 times relative to the 1980s (Rospigliosi 2000: 197-201). The SIN 
became “Peru’s political police” (Youngers 2000: 2), operating a death squad, spying on members 
of the government, the armed forces, the media, and the opposition, manipulating the courts, and 
bribing and blackmailing much of the media into submission (Cameron 2000, 2002; Rospigliosi 
2000). 
 
 At the same time, the government’s electoral capacity was relatively low. Fujimori invested 
little in party organization (Roberts 1995, 2002; Planas 2000: 347-351). During his decade in 
office, he created—and discarded—four different parties,59 none of which possessed even a 
minimal organizational structure. Consequently, Fujimori never possessed an effective governing 
party (Roberts 2002). Instead, he relied on direct appeals to win elections and on state agencies—
particularly the SIN and the armed forces—to govern (Roberts 1995; 2002). 
 
Opposition capacity in Peru was medium-low. In the wake of a profound economic crisis 
and a brutal guerrilla insurgency, both the party system and civil society decomposed in the early 
1990s,60 leaving the anti-Fujimori opposition fragmented and disorganized (Cameron 1997; Roberts 
1998; Tanaka 1998). Labor and other national civic organizations virtually disappeared (Roberts 
1998), and the opposition fragmented into dozens of personalistic parties that lacked even a 
minimum of organization or capacity for collective action (Levitsky and Cameron 2003). However, 
with the collapse of the populist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and the Marxist 
left, ideological cleavages within the opposition disappeared, which enhanced its capacity to form a 
broad anti-Fujimori front. 
 
 Western influence in Peru was high, though not as high as in Mexico and Nicaragua. The 
U.S. was Peru’s leading trading partner, and at several points during the 1990s, Peru was the 
largest recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America (Roberts and Peceny 1997: 220; Youngers 2000: 69-
70). In addition, much of Peru’s technocratic elite was educated in the West and maintained ties to 
Western institutions.61 Although the international media and NGO presence was not as extensive 
as in Mexico, journalists and human rights organizations maintained close ties to the transnational 
human rights and democracy network. U.S. leverage over Peru, though generally high, was limited 
by the fact that the U.S.-sponsored drug war trumped democracy promotion as a foreign policy 
goal during the 1990s (McClintock 2000; Youngers 2000). 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The Fujimori government regime faced few serious challenges 
between 1992 and 1995. U.S. pressure on the government eased considerably after the restoration 
of electoral politics (Cameron 1997: 60), and Fujimori’s popularity, together with extreme 
 
59These were: Change 90 (1990), New Majority (1992), Let’s Go Neighbors (1998), and Peru 2000 (2000). 
60Peru’s four largest parties, which accounted for more than 90 percent of the vote during the mid-1980s, 
declined to less than 10 percent of the vote--combined—in 1995 (Tanaka 1998: 55). 
61Fujimori’s first two Finance Ministers, Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller and Carlos Boloña, were educated at 
Harvard and Oxford, respectively, and his principal economic advisor during the 1990-92 period, Hernando 
de Soto, was a former GATT economist with close ties to U.S think tanks and government agencies. 
 
 
35
opposition weakness, allowed him to easily win re-election in 1995 (with 62 percent of the vote). 
However, as Fujimori’s public support began to erode during his second term, the government 
became increasingly coercive. Because Fujimori lacked a party or a viable successor, his re-election 
to a third term in 2000—despite its unconstitutionality—was seen as critical to ensuring regime 
continuity. To achieve this goal, the government undertook a series of autocratic measures, 
including passage of dubiously constitutional legislation allowing a third term, the sacking of 
members of the Constitutional Tribunal who moved to declare the bill unconstitutional, and the 
derailing of a referendum initiative on Fujimori’s re-election (Youngers 2000: 51-53; Conaghan 
2001: 308). Moreover, because Fujimori’s Peru 2000 lacked the organization to collect the nearly 
500,000 signatures required to register a new party, the government resorted to a massive forgery 
scheme whose exposure badly hurt its credibility. Finally, the electoral process was marred by the 
government’s near-monopoly over media access, harassment of opposition candidates, and 
widespread misuse of state resources (including the use of military personnel in the campaign) 
(Cameron 2000: 10-11; Conaghan 2001). 
 
 Although the continued weakness of the opposition might have ensured an easy victory in 
2000, two factors worked to undermine Fujimori’s re-election project. First, although civil society 
was unable to block government abuses, local linkages to international NGOs ensured that they 
gained substantial international exposure, which hurt Fujimori’s image abroad. As a result, the 2000 
electoral process came under close international scrutiny. International monitoring, which included 
observer missions from the Organization of Americas States (OAS), the U.S.-based National 
Democratic Institute, and the Carter Center, limited the government’s ability to carry out fraud or 
repression. Second, although opposition parties failed to unite around a single candidate in 2000, 
they nrallied behind Alejandro Toledo after he emerged as the leading anti-Fujimori candidate. 
Opposition unity and intense international scrutiny had a major impact on election night, when the 
government appeared to be manipulating electoral results. Strong pressure from the U.S. and the 
OAS, together with a mass protest backed by all major opposition parties, forced Fujimori to 
accede to a second round against Toledo. When Fujimori refused to clean up the electoral process 
for the second round, Toledo, backed by the entire spectrum of opposition parties, boycotted the 
race. The U.S. and OAS observer missions denounced the uncontested race as unfair, and in July 
2000, opposition forces united behind a massive three-day protest aimed at blocking Fujimori’s 
inauguration. 
 
Fujimori initially survived the crisis. The armed forces remained cohesiveand loyal, and the 
opposition was unable to sustain a mass protest movement. Soon after the election, the 
government—which had won only 52 of 120 seats in Congress—bought off 18 opposition deputies 
to win back its’ legislative majority (Cameron 2002: 10). Nevertheless, the regime was badly 
wounded by the 2000 election. Internationally, the government grew increasingly isolated.62 
Although the OAS did not impose sanctions, it sent a mission to Peru to push for democratizing 
reforms. The mission “became a fixture in Peruvian political life” (Cooper and Legler 2001: 124) 
 
62All but two Latin American presidents skipped Fujimori’s inauguration, and the U.S. congress voted to 
withhold $42 million in anti-narcotics assistance to Peru. 
 
 
36
and “made it impossible for the Fujimori administration to ignore or quash what had turned into an 
internationally monitored public discussion of the problems of democratization in Peru” (Conaghan 
2001: 19). In this context, elite cohesion eroded, as Western-oriented softliners such as Foreign 
Minister Francisco Tudela pushed for a compromise with the OAS. In September, a videotape of 
Montesinos bribing an opposition legislator was leaked, probably by military officials (Cameron 
2002: 4). The leaked videotape prompted Fujimori’s resignation and flight from Peru. In 
November 2000, the Congress appointed opposition legislator Valentín Paniagua as interim 
president. Paniagua oversaw a smooth democratic transition, culminating in Alejandro Toledo’s 
election as president in June 2001. 
 
Although the 2000-01 transition was largely a product of regime implosion, rather than 
domestic or external pressure (Cameron 2002; Levitsky and Cameron 2003), the variables 
employed in this study contributed to Fujimori’s fall in at least three ways. First, the lack of strong 
governing party forced Fujimori to rely on legal and political shenanigans—such as the signature 
scandal and the bribery of opposition deputies—that ultimately weakened it (Roberts 2002: 19-21). 
Second, international pressure during and after the 2000 election contributed to the regime divisions 
that gave rise to the leaked videotape. Third, the absence of deep cleavages within the opposition 
was critical. Had the opposition been deeply divided, Fujimori probably would have won the 2000 
election without having to resort to fraud. 
 
Comparing the Cases 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the theoretical framework outlined in this paper does a fairly good job 
of explaining the outcomes of our cases. First, Western influence is closely associated with both 
incumbent turnover and democratization. Among high linkage cases, not a single autocratic 
incumbent survived through 2002. Although some high capacity incumbents survived earlier crises 
(Mexico in 1988, Serbia in 1996-97), and although some regime changes required large-scale 
foreign intervention (Albania, Nicaragua, Serbia), in all cases, high Western linkage eventually made 
the cost of authoritarian entrenchment prohibitively high. Moreover, incumbent turnover in high 
linkage cases generally resulted in democratization rather than the emergence of a new autocratic 
government. Due to the incentives created by geographic proximity and the fact that opposition 
movements and leaders maintained close ties to Western elites and transnational democracy 
networks, the Fox (Mexico), Toledo (Peru), Chamorro (Nicaragua), and Djindjic (Serbia) 
governments all had strong incentives to adhere to democratic rules of the game. 
 
--Figure 1 about here— 
 
Among cases of low Western linkage, by contrast, not a single regime democratized. 
Although Armenia, Ukraine, and Zambia experienced incumbent turnover, the new governments 
showed no more respect for democratic institutions than their predecessors. Without the incentives 
created by geographical proximity and close ties to Western governments, institutions, and 
democracy networks, the Chiluba (Zambia), Kuchma (Ukraine), and Kocharian (Armenia) 
 
 
37
governments had weaker incentives to play by democratic rules. Consequently, patterns of 
competitive authoritarian persisted. 
 
Incumbent capacity also had a major impact on regime outcomes, although these effects 
varied according to the international context. In a context of high Western linkage, cases of high 
incumbent capacity eventually democratized (Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia). Albania, which 
was a case of high linkage and low incumbent capacity, remained competitive authoritarian after the 
1997 turnover, although the regime was closer to democracy than it had been in the pre-turnover 
period. Given that key components of incumbent capacity, such as strong states and parties, are 
widely believed to contribute to democratic stability, these outcomes should not be surprising. 
 
In a context of low Western linkage, by contrast, incumbent capacity is associated with 
authoritarian outcomes. Thus, in Malaysia and Zimbabwe (and to a lesser extent, Kenya), 
incumbent capacity allowed autocratic incumbents to ward off opposition challenges, which resulted 
in the persistence and even entrenchment of authoritarian rule. In contrast to high linkage cases 
such as Mexico and Nicaragua, the external costs associated with the full use of the regime’s 
coercive capacity were lower. Thus, whereas Salinas, Zedillo, and Ortega had strong incentives to 
under-utilize their coercive capacity after 1989, Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Ter-Petrosian in Armenia, 
and Mahathir in Malaysia did not. 
 
 In cases of low Western linkage and low incumbent capacity, autocratic governments often 
lacked the organizational resources to repress or defeat opposition challenges, which increased their 
vulnerability to opposition challenges. Here, the failure to repress opposition challenges was not a 
product of external constraints as much as it was a product of internal weakness. Whereas the PRI 
chose to under-utilize its coercive power, leaders like Kaunda, Kravchuk, and Yeltsin were not 
certain that they possessed such power. In these cases, the strength and unity of opposition forces 
was critical to explaining the fate of autocratic incumbents. Where opposition forces were able to 
unite behind a single candidate, as in Zambia in 1991 (and more ambiguously, Ukraine in 1994), 
weak incumbents lost power. Where opposition forces were internally polarized, as in Russia in 
1996, even weak incumbents were likely to survive. Ukraine (1999) and Kenya, which are cases 
of medium incumbent capacity, also fit this pattern, as united oppositions would likely have defeated 
Kuchma and Moi. 
 
Although opposition strength did not directly determine regime outcomes in other cases, it 
nevertheless had important effects. For example, even though high Western linkage/high incumbent 
capacity cases all eventually democratized, opposition capacity affected both the timing of the 
transition and the quality of the new democratic regime. Thus, in Mexico, opposition division clearly 
slowed down the transition after 1988, whereas in Nicaragua, a broad opposition coalition helped 
to avoid such an outcome in 1990. Moreover, where strong and sustained democracy movements 
played the leading role in bringing about transitions (Mexico, Serbia), new democracies tended to 
be stronger. 
 
 
 
38
Two cases do not easily fit the framework outlined in Figure 1: Armenia and Russia. 
Although our framework correctly predicts that Armenia—a case of high incumbent capacity and 
low Western linkage—would not democratize during the 1990s, it cannot easily account for the 
incumbent turnover of 1998. In Russia, our variables predict the right outcome but the mechanism 
is not entirely what we would expect. As our theory predicts, a polarized opposition helped Yeltsin 
overcome both the 1993 Duma crisis and the 1996 electoral challenge, despite a low level of 
incumbentcapacity. Yet our theory does not predict that Yeltsin would successfully use coercive 
force to overcome the 1993 crisis. (Of course, Yeltsin himself tells us that he was barely able to 
gain the military’s compliance). 
 
The outcomes discussed above can be usefully organized into four clusters, based on scores 
on the dimensions of Western linkage and incumbent capacity. These clusters are presented in 
Table 5. In the upper left quadrant we have cases of high Western linkage and high incumbent 
capacity. These conditions favor democratic outcomes, due to incentives created by high linkage 
and the existence, in most cases, of relatively strong states and parties. Mexico, Serbia, and—to a 
lesser extent—Nicaragua and Peru fall into this quadrant, as do Croatia and Slovakia. In the lower 
left quadrant we have cases of high Western linkage and low incumbent capacity. In these cases, 
incumbent turnover is very likely, but the domestic conditions for stable democracy are somewhat 
weaker. Thus, democratic outcomes will be highly contingent on external intervention, and the 
regimes that emerge are likely to be less stable (and perhaps less democratic). Albania falls into this 
category, as does Haiti. 
 
--Table 5 about here— 
 
In the upper right quadrant we have cases of low Western linkage and high incumbent 
capacity. Here, the conditions for stable authoritarianism are greatest, as incumbents possess the 
organizational capacity to crack down and face weaker external constraints against such 
crackdowns. Malaysia and Zimbabwe fall into this category, as does contemporary Russia under 
Putin. Finally, in the lower right quadrant we have cases of low Western linkage and low incumbent 
capacity. These conditions are not favorable to either democracy or stable authoritarianism. 
Autocratic incumbents are vulnerable to opposition challenges, but in the absence of either strong 
incentives to democratize or a solid organizational foundation for democracy, incumbent turnover is 
likely to usher in another autocratic government. Hence, these “low-low” conditions favor the 
persistence of (often unstable) competitive authoritarian regimes. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
These findings suggest several implications for the literature on regime change. First, 
“structural” variables such as international linkages and state and party strength seem to better 
explain competitive authoritarian regime outcomes than do approaches that focus on elite behavior 
and institutional design. Neither elite attitudes (Fish 1998; McFaul 2002) nor elite behavior (Di 
Palma 1990) have much explanatory power in our cases. In Albania, Armenia, and Zambia, for 
example, erstwhile “democratic” opposition leaders governed in an autocratic fashion after coming 
 
 
39
to power. At the same time, authoritarian incumbents in Mexico, Nicaragua, Ukraine (1994), and 
Zambia (1991) stepped down peacefully. Moreover, we find that in the absence of other structural 
factors supporting competitive politics, the longer-term effects of democratic crafting are often quite 
meager. Thus, Yeltsin’s relative tolerance of opposition and dissent during the early 1990s did 
little to prevent Putin from assaulting the media only a few years later. 
 
 Formal institutional design, as in the case of presidentialist versus parliamentary systems, 
also offers little explanatory purchase in our cases. Whereas all three of the presidentialist cases in 
Latin America democratized, neither of the two parliamentary systems in the sample (Albania and 
Malaysia) became fully democratic. More importantly, in countries with weak or fragile political 
institutions, constitutional choices often do not “lock in” as is often assumed (cf. Roeder 2001). 
Rather, they are frequently designed, and redesigned, by incumbents seeking to extend their power 
(Easter 1997). Thus, autocratic incumbents transformed parliamentary systems into presidential 
systems in Kenya and Zimbabwe, Presidents Yeltsin and Fujimori imposed hyper-presidential 
constitutions after carrying out coups, and Alexander Lukashenka had little difficulty transforming 
Belarus’s parliamentary republic into the most autocratic presidential regime in Europe.63 
 
Second, our results support recent scholarship that argues that international context is 
critical to explaining regime outcomes, and that, in the post-Cold War period, ties to the West 
increase the prospects for democracy (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Brinks and Coppedge 2001). 
Yet also find that different types of Western influence have very different effects, which suggests that 
the concept should be disaggregated. Specifically, we find that whereas Western linkages—in the 
form of geographical proximity, media and NGO influence, and elite technocratic ties—have a 
strong positive effect on democratization, the effects of Western leverage are weaker and less 
consistent. As the Kenyan case demonstrates, Western leverage can, at critical moments, be 
decisive in convincing autocratic incumbents to hold elections. However, the democratizing effect of 
leverage is limited in at least two ways. First, while the holding (or not) of minimally competitive 
elections is relatively easy to monitor and to enforce from the outside, it is much more difficult 
monitor or enforce truly clean elections and the broad protection of civil liberties—conditions that 
are necessary for a regime to be called democratic. Second, Western leverage tends to be 
employed unevenly and erratically as particular countries gain and lose salience on foreign policy 
agendas. Thus, international donors had a decisive impact in Kenya in late 1991 but then appeared 
to lose interest in democratization for much of the rest of the decade (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 
596). Hence, although leverage has been effective in particular cases at particular times, Western 
linkages appear to have a broader and more consistent democratizing effect. 
 
Third, we find that some variables that are widely believed to foster democratic stability may 
also contribute to authoritarian regime stability. Elite cohesion (Higley and Gunther 1992), effective 
states (O’Donnell 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996), and strong parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) 
have been all been linked persuasively to democratic stability. Yet each of these variables may also 
 
63Indeed, in 1990, Gorbachev created parliamentary systems in all of the soon-to-be post-Soviet republics, but almost all of 
them created presidencies within a year. 
 
 
40
contribute to the consolidation of authoritarian rule.64 Strong states and parties enhance the 
capacity of autocratic incumbents to maintain internal discipline, repress and co-opt opponents, put 
down opposition protests, and win—or steal—elections.65 And as cases such as Albania, Ukraine, 
and Zambia make clear, weak states and ruling parties may leave incumbents without the tools with 
which to maintain themselves in power. A major implication of this finding is that in some 
competitive authoritarian regimes, the very factors that sustain competitive rule and make incumbent 
turnover possible, such as fragmented elites and weak states and governing parties, may at the same 
time be serious obstacles to democratization (Way 2002a). In such cases, in which competition and 
turnover are largely a product of incumbent weakness, competitive authoritarianism should not be 
understood as a “halfway house” to democracy. Another implication is that in such cases of 
“pluralism by default” (Way 2002a), effective state and party-building, by enhancing the capacity of 
incumbents to crack down on their opponents, may well lead to increased authoritarian rather than 
democratization. This dynamic is clearly seen in several post-Soviet cases such as Russia under 
Putin, Ukraine under Kuchma, and Belarus under Lukashenka (Way 2002b). 
 
These findings lead us toa final, crucial point: incumbent turnover should not be conflated 
with democratization. Many regimes in Africa and the former Soviet Union have experienced one 
or more instances of incumbent turnover without democratizing. Indeed, turnover may be a 
relatively routine outcome in non-democratic regimes. It is therefore a mistake to assume that the 
replacement of an autocratic incumbent by a nominally democratic opposition constitutes a 
democratic transition (or even movement in a democratic direction). Not only are such assumptions 
empirically inaccurate and conceptually muddled, but they have theoretical costs as well. As this 
paper has shown, the factors that lead to non-democratic incumbent turnover often differ 
considerably from the factors that lead to democratization. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The category of mixed or hybrid political regimes remains under-developed. This paper has 
taken an initial step toward conceptualizing and theorizing one type of hybrid regime: what we call 
competitive authoritarianism. Drawing on a medium-n qualitative comparison, we explored the 
question of why some competitive authoritarian regimes survive periods of crisis while others break 
down. We further asked why some competitive authoritarian breakdowns lead to democracy while 
others do not. 
 
Several avenues for research emerge from the paper. First, there exists a clear need for 
further research on the problems of building and sustaining contemporary authoritarian regimes. In 
contrast to the vast literature on democratization and democratic consolidation that has emerged 
over the last 15 years, little work has been done on issues of authoritarian institution-building. Our 
analysis suggests that questions of state and party-building should be a primary focus of research in 
 
64Easter (1997) and Roeder (2001) make this point with regard to elite cohesion. 
65On parties and authoritarian capacity, see Widner (1992) and Slater (2001). On state capacity and 
authoritarian, see Bellin (2002). 
 
 
 
41
this area. It also suggests a need to further disaggregate the concept international influence, and to 
better understand the varying effects of different types of international influence. Finally, the paper 
highlights the utility of cross-regional comparison as a means of building and refining theories of 
regime change. For example, despite initial interest in comparing transitions in “East and South” 
(Przeworski 1991; Schmitter and Karl 1994), few scholars have undertaken systematic 
comparisons of cases from post-communist Eurasia, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
Notwithstanding important historical, cultural, and economic differences, competitive authoritarian 
regimes have emerged in each of these regions. Rather than a barrier to comparison, regional 
differences can provide important insights into why such regimes emerge, how they function, and 
why they endure or collapse. 
 
 
42
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62
Table 1: Outcome of Incumbent Crises in Selected Competitive Authoritarian Regimes 
 
 
 Incumbent Turnover? Democratization Non-Democratic Outcome 
 
 Yes 
 
Nicaragua 1990 
Mexico 2000 
Peru 2000 
Serbia 2000 
Zambia 1991 
Ukraine 1994 
Armenia 1996-98 
Albania 1997 
 
 No 
 
 Kenya 1992 
Russia 1993 
Malaysia 1998-99 
Zimbabwe 2002 
 
 
 
63
 
Table 2: Comparing Cases of Incumbent Survival 
 
 
 Incumbent Capacity 
 
Opposition Capacity Western Influence 
Kenya Medium 
 
Elite cohesion: medium 
Coercive capacity: high 
Electoral capacity: medium 
 Medium-Low 
 
Mobilizational: medium 
Unity: low 
Medium 
 
Linkage: medium-low 
Leverage: medium-high 
Malaysia High 
 
Elite cohesion: high 
Coercive capacity: high 
Electoral capacity: high 
Low 
 
Mobilizational: low 
Unity: low 
Low 
 
Linkage: low 
Leverage: low 
Russia Low 
 
Elite cohesion: low 
Coercive capacity: low 
Electoral capacity: low 
Low 
 
Mobilizational: low 
Unity: low 
Low 
 
Linkage: low 
Leverage: low 
Zimbabwe High 
 
Elite cohesion: med-high 
Coercive capacity: high 
Electoral capacity: med-high 
High 
 
Mobilizational:medium-high 
Unity: high 
Low 
 
Linkage: low 
Leverage: medium-low 
 
 
 
 
64
 
Table 3: Comparing Cases of Incumbent Turnover without Democratization 
 
 Incumbent Capacity 
 
Opposition Capacity Western Influence 
 
Albania 
(1997) 
 Low 
 
Elite cohesion: Low 
Coercive capacity: Low 
Electoral capacity: Med 
 Medium 
 
Mobilizational: Medium 
Unity: Medium 
 High 
 
Linkage: High 
Leverage: High 
 
Armenia 
(1996-98) 
Medium-High 
 
Elite cohesion: Low 
Coercive capacity: High 
Electoral capacity: High 
 Medium-Low 
 
Mobilizational: Low 
Unity: Medium 
 Low 
 
Linkage: Low 
Leverage: Low 
 
Ukraine 
(1994) 
 Low 
 
Elite cohesion: Low 
Coercive capacity: Low 
Electoral capacity: Low 
 Medium-Low 
 
Mobilizational: Low 
Unity: Medium 
Low 
 
Linkage: Low 
Leverage: Low 
 
Zambia 
(1991) 
 Medium-Low 
 
Elite cohesion: Low-Med 
Coercive capacity: Low 
Electoral capacity: Med 
High 
 
Mobilizational: High 
Unity: High 
 Medium 
 
Linkage: Low 
Leverage: High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65
 
Table 4: Comparing Cases of Democratization 
 
 
 Incumbent Capacity 
 
Opposition Capacity Western Influence 
Mexico High 
 
Elite cohesion: high 
Coercive capacity: high 
Electoral capacity: high 
 Medium 
 
Mobilizational: high 
Unity: low 
High 
 
Linkage: very high 
Leverage: high 
Nicaragua High 
 
Elite cohesion: high 
Coercive capacity: high 
Electoral capacity: high 
Medium-Low 
 
Mobilizational: low 
Unity: medium 
High 
 
Linkage: very high 
Leverage: very high 
Peru Medium-High 
 
Elite cohesion: medium-high 
Coercive capacity: high 
Electoral capacity: low 
Medium-Low 
 
Mobilizational: low 
Unity: medium 
High 
 
Linkage: high 
Leverage: medium-high 
Serbia High 
 
Elite cohesion: high 
Coercive capacity: med-high 
Electoral capacity: high 
Medium-High 
 
Mobilizational: high 
Unity: medium 
 High 
 
Linkage: high 
Leverage: medium-high 
 
 
 
66
Table 5: Four Clusters of Regime Outcomes 
 
 High Western Linkage Low Western Linkage 
 
 High Incumbent 
 Capacity 
 
 
 Democratization 
 
 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia 
 
 Incumbent Survival/ 
 Regime Stability 
 
Malaysia, Zimbabwe 
 
Low Incumbent 
 Capacity 
 
 
Unstable, Contingent 
Democratization 
 
Albania 
 
 Turnover without 
 Democratization 
 
Ukraine, Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
41