Prévia do material em texto
Risk-based Inspection API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 FIRST EDITION, MAY 2002 American Petroleum 1 Institute Helping You Get The Job Done Right."" COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services Risk-based Inspection Downstream Segment API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 FIRST EDITION, MAY 2002 American Petroleum 1 Institute Helping You Get The Job Done Right? COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services SPECIAL NOTES API publications necessarily address problems of a general nature. With respect to partic- ular circumstances, local, state, and federal laws and regulations should be reviewed. API is not undertaking to meet the duties of employers, manufacturers, or suppliers to warn and properly train and equip their employees, and others exposed, concerning health and safety risks and precautions, nor undertaking their obligations under local, state, or fed- eral laws. Information concerning safety and health risks and proper precautions with respect to par- ticular materials and conditions should be obtained from the employer, the manufacturer or supplier of that material, or the material safety data sheet. Nothing contained in any API publication is to be construed as granting any right, by implication or otherwise, for the manufacture, sale, or use of any method, apparatus, or prod- uct covered by letters patent. Neither should anything contained in the publication be con- strued as insuring anyone against liability for infringement of letters patent. Generally, API standards are reviewed and revised, r e a m e d , or withdrawn at least every five years. Sometimes a one-time extension of up to two years will be added to this review cycle. This publication will no longer be in effect five years after its publication date as an operative API standard or, where an extension has been granted, upon republication. Status of the publication can be ascertained from the API Standards Department [telephone (202) 682-8000]. A catalog of API publications and materials is published annually and updated quarterly by API, 1220 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, www.api.org. This document was produced under API standardization procedures that ensure appropri- ate notification and participation in the developmental process and is designated as an API standard. Questions concerning the interpretation of the content of this standard or com- ments and questions concerning the procedures under which this standard was developed should be directed in writing to the director, Standards Department, American Petroleum Institute, 1220 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, standards@api.org. Requests for permission to reproduce or translate all or any part of the material published herein should also be addressed to the general manager. API standards are published to facilitate the broad availability of proven, sound engineer- ing and operating practices. These standards are not intended to obviate the need for apply- ing sound engineering judgment regarding when and where these standards should be utilized. The formulation and publication of API standards is not intended in any way to inhibit anyone from using any other practices. Any manufacturer marking equipment or materials in conformance with the marking requirements of an API standard is solely responsible for complying with all the applicable requirements of that standard. API does not represent, warrant, or guarantee that such prod- ucts do in fact conform to the applicable API standard. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher: Contact the Publishel; API Publishing Services, 1220 L Street, N. IT, Washington, D. C. 20005. Copyright O 2002 American Petroleum Institute COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services FOREWORD This recommended practice is intended to provide guidance on developing a risk-based inspection (RBI) program on fixed equipment and piping in the hydrocarbon and chemical process industries. It includes: What is RBI What are the key elements of RBI How to implement a RBI program It is based on knowledge and experience of engineers, inspectors, risk analysts and other personnel in the hydrocarbon and chemical industry. RF' 5 80 is intended to supplement API 5 1 O Pressure Vessel Inspection Code, API 570 Pip- ing Inspection Code and API 653 Tunk Inspection, Rep&< Alteration und Reconstruction. These API inspection codes and standards allow an ownerhser latitude to plan an inspection strategy and increase or decrease the code designated inspection frequencies based on the results of a RBI assessment. The assessment must systematically evaluate both the probabil- ity of failure and the associated consequence of failure. The probability of failure assessment must be based on all forms of deterioration that could reasonably be expected to affect the piece of equipment in the particular service. Refer to the appropriate code for other RBI assessment requirements. RP 580 is intended to serve as a guide for users in properly per- forming such a RBI assessment. The information in this recommended practice does not constitute and should not be con- strued as a code of rules, regulations, or minimum safe practices. The practices described in this publication are not intended to supplant other practices that have proven satisfactory, nor is this publication intended to discourage innovation and originality in the inspection of hydrocarbon and chemical facilities. Users of this recommended practice are reminded that no book or manual is a substitute for the judgment of a responsible, qualified inspector or engineer. API publications may be used by anyone desiring to do so. Every effort has been made by the Institute to assure the accuracy and reliability of the data contained in them; however, the Institute makes no representation, warranty, or guarantee in connection with this publication and hereby expressly disclaims any liability or responsibility for loss or damage resulting from its use or for the violation of any federal, state, or municipal regulation with which this Publication may conflict. Suggested revisions are invited and should be submitted to the director, Standards Depart- ment, American Petroleum Institute, 1220 L Street, N.W., Washington D.C. 20005, stan- dards@api.org. ... 111 COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION. PURPOSE AND SCOPE ................................ 1 1.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Target Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 6 7 8 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.2 Other References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 Referenced Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2 Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 BASIC CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1 WhatisRisk? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2 4.3 4.5 Risk Management and Risk Reduction ................................. 7 The Evolution of Inspection Intervals .................................. 7 4.4 Inspection Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Relative Risk vs . Absolute Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 INTRODUCTION TO RISK-BASED INSPECTION .......................... 8 5.1 Consequence and Probability for Risk-Based Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2 Types of RBI Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.3 Precision vs . Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.4 Understanding How RBI Can Help to Manage Operating Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.5 Management of Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.6 Relationship Between RBI and Other Risk-Based and Safety Initiatives . . . . . 12 5.7 Relationship with Jurisdictional Requirements .......................... 13 PLANNING THE RBI ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1 Getting Started . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.2 Establishing Objectives and Goals of a RBI Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.3 Initial Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.4 Establish Operating Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.5 Selecting a Type of RBI Assessment .................................. 16 6.6 Estimating Resources and Time Required ............................. 17 DATA AND INFORMATION COLLECTION FOR RBI ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . 17 7.1 RBIDataNeeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.2 DataQuality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.3 Codes and Standards-National and International ....................... 18 7.4 Sources of Site Specific Data and Information .......................... 18 IDENTIFYING DETERIORATION MECHANISMS AND FAILURE MODES . . 19 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.2 Failure and Failure Modes for Risk-Based Inspection .................... 19 8.3 Deterioration Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.4 OtherFailures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 V COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services Page 9 ASSESSING PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ............................... 20 9.1 Introduction to Probability Analysis .................................. 20 9.2 Units of Measure in the Probability of Failure Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 9.3 Types of Probability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.4 Determination of Probability of Failure ............................... 21 10 ASSESSING CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE ............................ 23 10.1 Introduction to Consequence Analysis ................................ 23 10.2 Types of Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10.3 Units of Measure in Consequence Analysis ............................ 24 10.4 Volume of Fluid Released . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10.5 Consequence Effect Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11 RISK DETERMINATION. ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 11.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 11.2 Determination of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 11.3 Risk Management Decisions and Acceptable Levels of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 11.4 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 11.5 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 11.6 Risk Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 11.7 Establishing Acceptable Risk Thresholds .............................. 29 11.8 Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 12 RISK MANAGEMENT WITH INSPECTION ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 12.1 12.2 Identifjing Risk Management Opportunities from RBI 12.3 Managing Risk by Reducing Uncertainty Through Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 and Probability of Failure Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Establishing an Inspection Strategy Based on Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 12.4 Managing Risk with Inspection Activities ............................. 31 12.5 Managing Inspection Costs with RBI ................................. 32 12.6 Assessing Inspection Results and Determining Corrective Action . . . . . . . . . . 32 12.7 Achieving Lowest Life Cycle Costs with RBI .......................... 32 13 OTHER RISK MITIGATION ACTIVITIES ................................ 32 13.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 13.2 Equipment Replacement and Repair .................................. 33 13.3 Evaluating Flaws for Fitness-for- Service .............................. 33 13.4 Equipment Modification, Redesign and Rerating ........................ 33 13.5 Emergency Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.6 Emergency DepressurizingDe-inventory .............................. 33 13.7 ModifjProcess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.8 Reduce Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.9 Water SprayíDeluge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.10 Water Curtain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.1 1 Blast-Resistant Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.12Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 vi COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services Page 14 REASSESSMENT AND UPDATING RBI ASSESSMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 14.1 RBI Reassessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 14.2 Why Conduct a RBI Reassessment? .................................. 34 14.3 When to Conduct a RBI Reassessment ................................ 35 15 ROLES. RESPONSIBILITIES. TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS . . . . . . . . . 35 15.1 Team Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 15.2 Team Members. Roles & Responsibilities ............................. 35 15.3 Training and Qualifications For RBI Application ........................ 36 16 RBI DOCUMENTATION AND RECORD-KEEPING ....................... 37 16.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16.2 RBI Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16.3 RBIPersonnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16.4 TimeFrame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16.5 Assignment of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16.6 Assumptions Made to Assess Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16.7 Risk Assessment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16.8 Mitigation and Follow-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 16.9 Codes, Standards and Government Regulations ......................... 38 APPENDIX A DETERIORATION MECHANISMS ........................... 39 Figures 1 Management of Risk Using RBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 RiskPlot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3 Continuum of RBI Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4 Risk-based Inspection Planning Process ................................ 11 5 Example Event Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6 Example Risk Matrix Using Probability and Consequence Categories to Display Risk Rankuigs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7 Risk Plot when Using Quantitative or Numeric Risk Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Tables 1 Thinning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2 Stress Corrosion Cracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 3 Metallurgical and Environmental Failures ............................... 43 4 Mechanical Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 vii COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services Risk-based Inspection 1 Introduction, Purpose and Scope 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this document is to provide users with the basic elements for developing and implementing a risk-based inspection (RBI) program. The methodology is presented in a step-by-step manner to the maximum extent practicable. Items covered are: a. An introduction to the concepts and principles of risk- based inspection for risk management; and b. Individual sections that describe the steps in applying these principles within the framework of the RBI process: 1. Planning the RBI Assessment. 2. Data and Information Collection. 3. Identifjing Deterioration Mechanisms and Failure Modes. 4. Assessing Probability of Failure. 5. Assessing Consequence of Failure. 6. Risk Determination, Assessment and Management. 7. Risk Management with Inspection Activities. 8. Other Risk Mitigation Activities. 9. Reassessment and Updating. 10. Roles, Responsibilities, Training and Qualifications. 11. Documentation and record-keeping. The expected outcome from the application of the RBI pro- cess should be the linkage of risks with appropriate inspec- tion or other risk mitigation activities to manage the risks. The RBI process is capable of generating: a. A rankuig by risk of all equipment evaluated. b. A detailed description of the inspection plan to be employed for each equipment item, including: 1. Inspection method(s) that should be used (e.g., visual, UT, Radiography, WFMT). 2. Extent of application of the inspection method@) (e.g., percent of total area examined or specific locations). 3. Timing of inspections/examinations. 4. Risk management achieved through implementation of the inspection plan. c. A description of any other risk mitigation activities (such as repairs, replacements or safety equipment upgrades). d. The expected risk levels of all equipment after the inspec- tion plan and other risk mitigation activities have been implemented. 1 .I .I Key Elements of a RBI Program Key elements that should exist in any RBI program are: a. Management systems for maintaining documentation, per- sonnel qualifications, data requirements and analysis updates. b. Documented method for probability of failure determination. c. Documented method for consequence of failure determination. d. Documented methodology for managing risk through inspection and other mitigation activities. However, all the elements outlined in 1.1 should be ade- quately addressed in RBI applications, in accordance with the recommended practices in this document. 1 .I .2 RBI Benefits and Limitations The primary work products of the RBI assessment and management approach are plans that address ways to manage risks on an equipment level. These equipment plans highlight risks from a safety/health/environment perspective and/or from an economic standpoint. In these plans, cost-effective actions for risk mitigation are recommended along with the resulting level of risk mitigation expected. Implementation of these plans provides one of the follow- a. An overall reduction in risk for the facilities and equip- ment assessed. b. An acceptance/understanding of the current risk. The RBI plans also identifj equipment that does not require inspection or some other form of mitigation because of the acceptable level of risk associated with the equipment’s current operation. In this way, inspection and maintenance activities can be focused and more cost effective. This often results in a significant reduction in the amount of inspection data that is collected. This focus on a smaller set of data should result in more accurate information. In some cases, in addition to risk reductions and process safety improvements, RBI plans may result in cost reductions. RBI is based on sound, proven risk assessment and manage- ment principles. Nonetheless, RBI will not compensate for: ing: a. b. d. e. f. C. Inaccurate or missing information. Inadequate designs or faulty equipment installation. Operating outside the acceptable design envelope. Not effectively executing the plans. Lack ofqualified personnel or teamwork. Lack of sound engineering or operational judgment. 1 COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 2 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 1 . I .3 Using RBI as a Continuous Improvement Tool Utilization of RBI provides a vehicle for continuously improving the inspection of facilities and systematically reducing the risk associated with pressure boundary failures. As new data (such as inspection results) becomes available or when changes occur, reassessment of the RBI program can be made that will provide a refreshed view of the risks. Risk management plans should then be adjusted appropriately. RBI offers the added advantage of identifjing gaps or shortcomings in the effectiveness of commercially available inspection technologies and applications. In cases where technology cannot adequately andíor cost-effectively mitigate risks, other risk mitigation approaches can be implemented. RBI should serve to guide the direction of inspection technol- ogy development, and hopefully promote a faster and broader deployment of emerging inspection technologies as well as proven inspection technologies that may be available but are underutilized. 1 . I .4 RBI as an Integrated Management Tool RBI is a risk assessment and management tool that addresses an area not completely addressed in other organiza- tional risk management efforts such as Process Hazards Anal- yses (PHA) or reliability centered maintenance (RCM). It complements these efforts to provide a more thorough assess- ment of the risks associated with equipment operations. RBI produces Inspection and Maintenance Plans for equip- ment that identifj the actions that should be implemented to provide reliable and safe operation. The RBI effort can provide input into an organization’s annual planning and budgeting that d e h e the stafñng and funds required to maintain equip- ment operation at acceptable levels of performance and risk. 1.2 SCOPE 1.2.1 Industry scope Although the risk management principles and concepts that RBI is built on are universally applicable, Rp 580 is spe- cifically targeted at the application of RBI in the hydrocarbon and chemical process industry. 1.2.2 Flexibility in Application Because of the broad diversity in organizations’ size, cul- ture, federal andíor local regulatory requirements, Rp 580 offers users the flexibility to apply the RBI methodology within the context of existing corporate risk management practices and to accommodate unique local circumstances. The document is designed to provide a framework that clari- fies the expected attributes of a quality risk assessment with- out imposing undue constraints on users. RP 580 is intended to promote consistency and quality in the identification, assessment and management of risks pertaining to material deterioration, which could lead to loss of containment. Many types of RBI methods exist and are currently being applied throughout industry. This document is not intended to single out one specific approach as the recommended method for conducting a RBI effort. The document instead is intended to clarifj the elements of a RBI analysis. 1.2.3 Mechanical Integrity Focused The RBI process is focused on maintaining the mechanical integrity of pressure equipment items and minimizing the risk of loss of containment due to deterioration. RBI is not a sub- stitute for a process hazards analysis (PHA) or HAZOP. Typi- cally, PHA risk assessments focus on the process unit design and operating practices and their adequacy given the unit’s current or anticipated operating conditions. RBI complements the PHA by focusing on the mechanical integrity related dete- rioration mechanisms and risk management through inspec- tion. RBI also is complementary to reliability centered maintenance (RCM) programs in that both programs are focused on understanding failure modes, addressing the modes and therefore improving the reliability of equipment and process facilities. 1.2.4 Equipment Covered ated componentshnternals are covered by this document: a. Pressure vessels-all pressure containing components. b. Process piping-pipe and piping components. c. Storage tanks-atmospheric and pressurized. d. Rotating equipment-pressure containing components. e. Boilers and heaters-pressurized components. f. Heat exchangers (shells, heads, channels and bundles). g. Pressure relief devices. The following types of pressurized equipment and associ- 1.2.5 Equipment Not Covered The following non-pressurized equipment is not covered by this document: a. Instrument and control systems. b. Electrical systems. c. Structural systems. d. Machinery components (except pump and compressor casings). 1.3 TARGET AUDIENCE The primary audience for RP 580 is inspection and engi- neering personnel who are responsible for the mechanical integrity and operability of equipment covered by this rec- ommended practice. However, while an organization’s Inspectioflaterials Engineering group may champion the RBI initiative, RBI is not exclusively an inspection activity. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 3 RBI requires the involvement of various segments of the organization such as engineering, maintenance arid opera- tions. Implementation of the resulting RBI product (e.g., inspection plans, replacementhpgrading recommendations, etc.) may rest with more than one segment of the organiza- tion. RBI requires the commitment and cooperation of the total organization. In this context, while the primary audi- ence may be inspection and materials engineering personnel, others within the organization who are likely to be involved should be familiar with the concepts and principles embod- ied in the RBI methodology. 2 References 2.1 REFERENCED PUBLICATIONS API API 510 API 570 RP 579 Std 653 RP 750 RP 752 RP 941 ACC A I C ~ E ~ ASME3 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code-lnspec- tion, Rep& Alteration, and Rerating Piping Inspection Code-Inspection, Rep& Alteration, and Rerating of In- service Piping Systems Fitness-For-Service Tank Inspection, Rep& Alteration, and Reconstruction Management of Process Hazards Management of Hazards Associated With Location of Process Plant Buildings, CMA Managers Guide Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Refineries and Petrochemical Plants Responsible Care-CAER Code Resource Guide Dow’s Fire and Explosion Inda Hazard ClassiJication Guide, 1994 A Comparison of Criteria For Acceptance of Risk ~ PVRC Project 99-IP-01, Febru- ary 16,2000 American Chemistry Council, 1300 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia, 22209, www.americanchemistry.com. 2American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 3 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10016-5991, www.aiche.org. 3American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 345 East 47th Street, NewYork, NewYork 10017, www.asme.org. EPA4 58 FR 54190 (40 CFR Past 68) Risk Management Plan @MP) Regulations 1s05 OS HA^ Risk Management Terminology 29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management 2.2 OTHER REFERENCES The following publications are offered as a guide to assist the user in the development of risk-based inspection pro- grams. These references have been developed specifically for determining risk of process units and equipment, and/or developing risk-based inspection programs for process equip- ment. In these references, the user will find many more refer- ences and examples pertaining to risk assessments of process equipment. 1. Publication 58 1 Base Resource Document on Risk-Based Inspection, American Petroleum Institute. 2. Risk-Based Inspection, ApplicationsHandbook, Ameri- can Society of Mechanical Engineers. 3. Risk-Based Inspection, Development of Guidelines, CRTD, Vol. 20-3, American Society of Mechanical Engi- neers, 1994. 4. Risk-Based Inspection, Development of Guidelines, CRTD, Vol. 20-2, American Society of Mechanical Engi- neers, 1992. Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, Center for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemi- cal Engineers, 1989. 6. A Collaborative Framework for Office of Pipeline Safety Cost-Benefit Analyses, September 2, 1999. 7. Economic Values for Evaluation of Federal Aviation Admmistration Investment and Regulatory Programs, FAA-APO-98-8, June 1998. The following references are more general in nature, but provide background development in the field of risk analysis and decision making, while some provide relevant examples. 1. Pipeline Risk Management Manual, Muhlbauer, W.K., Gulf Publishing Company, 2nd Edition, 1996. 2. Engineering Economics and Investment Decision Meth- ods, Stennole, F.J., Investment Evaluations Corporation, 1984. 5. 4Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, District of Columbia 20460, www.epa.gov. International Organization for Standardization, 1, rue de Varembe, Case postale 56, CH-121 1 Geneve 20, Switzerland, www.iso.ch. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, District of Columbia 20210, www.osha.gov. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 4 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. Introduction to Decision Analysis, Skinner, D.C., Proba- bilistic Publishing, 1994. Center for Process Safety, American Institute of Chemi- cal Engineers (AIChE). Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires, and BLEVEs. New York AIChE, 1994. Center for Process Safety, American Institute of Chemi- cal Engineers (AIChE). Guidelines for Use of Vapor Cloud Dispersion Models. New York, AIChE, 1987. Center for Process Safety, American Institute of Chemi- cal Engineers (AIChE). “International Conference and Workshop on Modeling and Mitigating the Conse- quences of Accidental Releases of Hazardous Materials,” September 26-29,1995. NewYork AIChE, 1995. Federal Emergency Management Agency, US. Depart- ment of Transportation, US. Environmental Protection Agency. Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Proce- dures, 1989. Madsen, Warren W. and Robert C. Wagner. “An Accu- rate Methodology for Modeling the Characteristics of Explosion Effects.” Process Safety Progress, 13 (July Mercx, W.P.M., D.M. Johnson, and J. Puttock. “Valida- tion of Scaling Techniques for Experimental Vapor Cloud Explosion Investigations.” Process Safety Progress, 14 (April 1995), 120. Mercx, W.P.M., R.M.M. van Wees, and G. Opschoor. “Current Research at TNO on Vapor Cloud Explosion Modeling.” Process Safety Progress, 12 (October 1993), 222. Prugh, Richard W. “Quantitative Evaluation of Fireball Hazards.” Process Safety Progress, 13 (April 1994), 83- 91. Scheuermann, Klaus P. “Studies About the Inñuence of Turbulence on the Course of Explosions.” Process Safety Progress, 13 (October 1994), 219. TNO Bureau for Industrial Safety, Netherlands Organiza- tion for Applied Scientific Research. Methods for the Calculation of the Physical Effects of the Escape of Dan- gerous Material (Liquids and Gases). Voorburg, the Netherlands: TNO (Commissioned by Directorate-Gen- eral of Labour), 1980. TNO Bureau for Industrial Safety, Netherlands Organiza- tion for Applied Scientific Research. Methods for the Determination of Possible Deterioration to People and Objects Resulting from Releases of Hazardous Materi- als. Rijswijk, the Netherlands: TNO (Commissioned by Directorate-General of Labour), 1992. Touma, Jawad S., et al. “Performance Evaluation of Dense Gas Dispersion Models.” Journal of Applied Meteorology, 34 (March 1995), 603-615. US. Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emer- gency Management Agency, US. Department of Transportation. Technical Guidance for Hazards Analy- 1994), 171-175. sis, Emergency Planning for Extremely Hazardous Substances. December 1987. 17. US. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. Workbook of Screening Techniques for Assessing Impacts of Toxic Air Pollutants. EPA-450/4-88-009. September 1988. 18. US. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. Guidance on the Appli- cation of Refined Dispersion Models for Hazardous/ Toxic Air Release. EPA-454IR-93-002. May 1993. 19. US. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pollu- tion Prevention and Toxic Substances. Flammable Gases and Liquids and Their Hazards. EPA 744-R-94-002. February 1994. 3 Definitions and Acronyms 3.1 DEFINITIONS For purposes of this recommended practice, the following definitions shall apply. 3.1.1 absolute risk: An ideal and accurate description and quantification of risk. 3.1.2 ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practical): A concept of minimization that postulates that attributes (such as risk) can only be reduced to a certain minimum under cur- rent technology and with reasonable cost. 3.1.3 consequence: Outcome from an event. There may be one or more consequences from an event. Consequences may range from positive to negative. However, consequences are always negative for safety aspects. Consequences may be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively. 3.1.4 damage tolerance: The amount of deterioration that a component can withstand without failing. 3.1.5 deterioration: The reduction in the ability of a component to provide its intended purpose of containment of fluids. This can be caused by various deterioration mecha- nisms (e.g., thinning, cracking, mechanical). Damage or deg- radation may be used in place of deterioration. 3.1.6 event: Occurrence of a particular set of circum- stances. The event may be certain or uncertain. The event can be singular or multiple. The probability associated with the event can be estimated for a given period of time. 3.1.7 event tree: An analytical tool that organizes and characterizes potential accidents in a logical and graphical manner. The event tree begins with the identification of potential initiating events. Subsequent possible events (including activation of safety functions) resulting from the initiating events are then displayed as the second level of the event tree. This process is continued to develop pathways or scenarios from the initiating events to potential outcomes. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 5 3.1.8 external event: Events resulting from forces of nature, acts of God or sabotage, or such events as neighboring ñres or explosions, neighboring hazardous material releases, electrical power failures, tornadoes, earthquakes, and intru- sions of external transportation vehicles, such as aircraft, ships, trains, trucks, or automobiles. External events are usu- ally beyond the direct or indirect control of persons employed at or by the facility. 3.1.9 failure: Termination of the ability of a system, struc- ture, or component to perform its required function of con- tainment of fluid (Le., loss of containment). Failures may be unannounced and undetected until the next inspection (unan- nounced failure), or they may be announced and detected by any number of methods at the instance of occurrence (announced failure). 3.1.10 failure mode: The manner of failure. For risk- based inspection, the failure of concern is loss of containment of pressurized equipment items. Examples of failure modesare small hole, crack, and rupture. 3.1 . I 1 hazard: A physical condition or a release of a haz- ardous material that could result from component failure and result in human injury or death, loss or damage, or environ- mental degradation. Hazard is the source of harm. Compo- nents that are used to transport, store, or process a hazardous material can be a source of hazard. Human error and external events may also create a hazard. 3.1.12 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study: A HAZOP study is a form of failure modes and effects analysis. HAZOP studies, which were originally developed for the pro- cess industry, use systematic techniques to identify hazards and operability issues throughout an entire facility. It is partic- ularly useful in identifjing unforeseen hazards designed into facilities due to lack of information, or introduced into exist- ing facilities due to changes in process conditions or operat- ing procedures. The basic objectives of the techniques are: a. To produce a full description of the facility or process, including the intended design conditions. b. To systematically review every part of the facility or pro- cess to discover how deviations from the intention of the design can occur. c. To decide whether these deviations can lead to hazards or operability issues. d. To assess effectiveness of safeguards. 3.1.13 likelihood: Probability. 3.1 . I4 mitigation: Limitation of any negative conse- quence or reduction in probability of a particular event. 3.1.15 probability: Extent to which an event is likely to occur within the time frame under consideration. The mathe- matical dehition of probability is ?a real number in the scale O to 1 attached to a random event?. Probability can be related to a long-run relative frequency of occurrence or to a degree of belief that an event will occur. For a high degree of belief, the probability is near one. Frequency rather than probability may be used in describing risk. Degrees of belief about prob- ability can be chosen as classes or ranks like ?Rare/unlikely/ moderate/likely/almost certain? or ?incredible/improbable/ remote/ occasionaUprobable/frequent?. 3.1 . I 6 Qualitative Risk Analysis (Assessment): Methods that use engineering judgment and experience as the bases for the analysis of probabilities and consequences of failure. The results of qualitative risk analyses are dependent on the background and expertise of the analysts and the objectives of the analysis. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criti- cality Analysis (MECA) and HAZOPs are examples of qualitative risk analysis techniques that become quantitative risk analysis methods when consequence and failure proba- bility values are estimated along with the respective descrip- tive input. 3.1 . I 7 Quantitative Risk Analysis (Assessment): An analysis that: a. Identifies and delineates the combinations of events that, if they occur, will lead to a severe accident (e.g., major explo- sion) or any other undesired event. b. Estimates the frequency of occurrence for each combination. c. Estimates the consequences. Quantitative risk analysis integrates into a uniform meth- odology the relevant information about facility design, oper- ating practices, operating history, component reliability, human actions, the physical progression of accidents, and potential environmental and health effects, usually in as real- istic a manner as possible. Quantitative risk analysis uses logic models depicting combinations of events that could result in severe accidents and physical models depicting the progression of accidents and the transport of a hazardous material to the environment. The models are evaluated probabilistically to provide both qualitative and quantitative insights about the level of risk and to identifj the design, site, or operational characteristics that are the most important to risk. Quantitative risk analysis logic models generally consist of event trees and fault trees. Event trees delineate initiating events and combinations of system successes and failures, while fault trees depict ways in which the system failures rep- resented in the event trees can occur. These models are ana- lyzed to estimate the frequency of each accident sequence. 3.1.18 relative risk: The comparative risk of a facility, process unit, system, equipment item or component to other facilities, process units, systems, equipment items or compo- nents, respectively. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 6 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 3.1 . I9 residual risk: The risk remaining after risk miti- gation. 3.1.20 risk: Combination of the probability of an event and its consequence. In some situations, risk is a deviation from the expected. When probability and consequence are expressed numerically, risk is the product. 3.1.21 risk acceptance: A decision to accept a risk. Risk acceptance depends on risk criteria. 3.1.22 risk analysis: Systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk. Risk analysis pro- vides a basis for risk evaluation, risk mitigation and risk acceptance. Information can include historical data, theoreti- cal analysis, informed opinions and concerns of stakeholders. 3.1.23 risk assessment: Overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation. 3.1.24 risk avoidance: Decision not to become involved in, or action to withdraw from a risk situation. The decision may be taken based on the result of risk evaluation. 3.1.25 risk-based inspection: A risk assessment and management process that is focused on loss of containment of pressurized equipment in processing facilities, due to material deterioration. These risks are managed primarily through equipment inspection. 3.1.26 risk communication: Exchange or sharing of information about risk between the decision maker and other stakeholders. The information may relate to the existence, nature, form, probability, severity, acceptability, mitigation or other aspects of risk. 3.1.27 risk control: Actions implementing risk manage- ment decisions. Risk control may involve monitoring, re- evaluation, acceptance and compliance with decisions. 3.1.28 risk criteria: Terms of reference by which the sig- nificance of risk is assessed. Risk criteria may include associ- ated cost and benefits, legal and statutory requirements, socio-economic and environmental aspects, concerns of stakeholders, priorities and other inputs to the assessment. 3.1.29 risk estimation: Process used to assign values to the probability and consequence of a risk. Risk estimation may consider cost, benefits, stakeholder concerns and other variables, as appropriate for risk evaluation. 3.1.30 risk evaluation: Process used to compare the esti- mated risk against given risk criteria to determine the signifi- cance of the risk. Risk evaluation may be used to assist in the acceptance or mitigation decision. 3.1.31 risk identification: Process to find, list, and char- acterize elements of risk. Elements may include; source, event, consequence, probability. Risk identification may also identify stakeholder concerns. 3.1.32 risk management: Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk. Risk management typically includes risk assessment, risk mitiga- tion, risk acceptance and risk communication. 3.1.33 risk mitigation: Process of selection and imple- mentation of measures to modify risk. The term risk mitiga- tion is sometimes used for measures themselves. 3.1.34 risk reduction: Actions taken to lessen the proba- bility, negative consequences, or both associated with a par- ticular risk. 3.1.35 source: Thing or activity with a potential for con- sequence. Source in a safety context is a hazard. 3.1.36 source identification: Process to find, list, andcharacterize sources. In the safety area, source identification is called hazard identification. 3.1.37 stakeholder: Any individual, group or organiza- tion that may affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by the risk. 3.1.38 toxic chemical: Any chemical that presents a physical or health hazard or an environmental hazard accord- ing to the appropriate Material Safety Data Sheet. These chemicals (when ingested, inhaled or absorbed through the skin) can cause damage to living tissue, impairment of the central nervous system, severe illness, or in extreme cases, death. These chemicals may also result in adverse effects to the environment (measured as ecotoxicity and related to per- sistence and bioaccumulation potential). 3.1.39 unmitigated risk: The risk prior to mitigation activities. 3.2 ACRONYMS ACC AIChE ALARP ANSI API ASME ASNT ASTM BLEVE CCPS COF EPA FAR M E A HAZOP American Chemistry Council American Institute of Chemical Engineers As Low As Reasonably Practical American National Standards Institute American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers American Society of Nondestructive Testing American Society of Testing and Materials Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion Center for Chemical Process Safety Consequence of Failure Environmental Protection Agency Fatality Accident Rate Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Hazard and Operability Assessment COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 7 IS0 MOC NACE NDE NFPA OSHA PHA PMI POF PSM PVRC QMQc QRA RBI RCM RMP TEMA TNO International Organization for Standardization Management of Change National Association of Corrosion Engineers Non destructive examination National Fire Protection Association Occupational Safety and Health Admmistration Process Hazards Analysis Positive Material Identification Probability of Failure Process Safety Management Pressure Vessel Research Council Quality AssuranceQuality Control Quantitative Risk Assessment Risk-Based Inspection Reliability Centered Maintenance Risk Management Plan Tubular Exchangers Manufacturers Association The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research 4 Basic Concepts 4.1 WHAT IS RISK? Risk is something that we as individuals live with on a day- to-day basis. Knowingly or unknowingly, people are con- stantly makmg decisions based on risk. Simple decisions such as driving to work or walking across a busy street involve risk. More important decisions such as buying a house, investing money and getting married all imply an acceptance of risk. Life is not risk-free and even the most cautious, risk-adverse individuals inherently take risks. For example, in driving a car, people accept the probability that they could be killed or seriously injured. The reason this risk is accepted is that people consider the probability of being killed or seriously injured to be sufficiently low as to make the risk acceptable. Influencing the decision are the type of car, the safety features installed, traffic volume and speed, and other factors such as the availability, risks and affordability of other alternatives (e.g., mass transit). Risk is the combination of the probability of some event occurring during a time period of interest and the conse- quences, (generally negative) associated with the event. In mathematical terms, risk can be calculated by the equation: Risk = Probability x Consequence Likelihood is sometimes used as a synonym for probabil- ity, however probability is used throughout this document for consistency. 4.2 RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK REDUCTION At ñrst, it may seem that risk management and risk reduc- tion are synonymous. However, risk reduction is only part of risk management. Risk reduction is the act of mitigating a known risk to a lower level of risk. Risk management is a pro- cess to assess risks, to determine if risk reduction is required and to develop a plan to maintain risks at an acceptable level. By using risk management, some risks may be identified as acceptable so that no risk reduction (mitigation) is required. 4.3 THE EVOLUTION OF INSPECTION INTERVALS In process plants, inspection and testing programs are established to detect and evaluate deterioration due to in-ser- vice operation. The effectiveness of inspection programs var- ies widely, ranging from reactive programs, which concentrate on known areas of concern, to broad proactive programs covering a variety of equipment. One extreme of this would be the “don’t fix it unless it’s broken” approach. The other extreme would be complete inspection of all equip- ment items on a frequent basis. Setting the intervals between inspections has evolved over time. With the need to periodically veri6 equipment integrity, organizations initially resorted to time-based or “calendar- based” intervals. With advances in inspection approaches, and better under- standing of the type and rate of deterioration, inspection inter- vals became more dependent on the equipment condition, rather than what might have been an arbitrary calendar date. Codes and standards such as API 5 1 O, 570 and 653 evolved to an inspection philosophy with elements such as: a. Inspection intervals based on some percentage of equip- ment life (such as half life). b. On-stream inspection in lieu of internal inspection based on low deterioration rates. c. Internal inspection requirements for deterioration mecha- nisms related to process environment induced cracking. d. Consequence based inspection intervals. RBI represents the next generation of inspection approaches and interval setting, recognizing that the ultimate goal of inspection is the safety and reliability of operating facilities. RBI, as a risk-based approach, focuses attention specifically on the equipment and associated deterioration mechanisms representing the most risk to the facility. In focusing on risks and their mitigation, RBI provides a better linkage between the mechanisms that lead to equipment fail- ure and the inspection approaches that will effectively reduce the associated risks. In this document, failure is loss of containment. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 8 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 4.4 INSPECTION OPTIMIZATION When the risk associated with individual equipment items is determined and the relative effectiveness of different inspection techniques in reducing risk is estimated or quanti- fied, adequate information is available for developing an opti- mization tool for planning and implementing a risk-based inspection program. Figure 1 presents stylized curves showing the reduction in risk that can be expected when the degree and frequency of inspection are increased. The upper curve in Figure 1 repre- sents a typical inspection program. Where there is no inspec- tion, there may be a higher level of risk, as indicated on the y- axis in the figure. With an initial investment in inspection activities, risk generally is significantly reduced. A point is reached where additional inspection activity begins to show a diminishing return and, eventually, may produce very little additional risk reduction. If excessive inspection is applied, the level of risk may even go up. This is because invasive inspections in certain cases may cause additional deteriora- tion (e.g., moisture ingress in equipment with polythionic acid; inspection damage to protective coatings or glass lined vessels). This situation is represented by the dotted line at the end of the upper curve. RBI provides a consistent methodology for assessing the optimum combination of methodsand frequencies. Each available inspection method can be analyzed and its relative effectiveness in reducing failure probability estimated. Given this information and the cost of each procedure, an optimiza- tion program can be developed. The key to developing such a procedure is the ability to assess the risk associated with each item of equipment and then to determine the most appropriate inspection techniques for that piece of equipment. A concep- tual result of this methodology is illustrated by the lower curve in Figure 1. The lower curve indicates that with the application of an effective RBI program, lower risks can be achieved with the same level of inspection activity. This is because, through RBI, inspection activities are focused on higher risk items and away from lower risk items. As shown in Figure 1, risk cannot be reduced to zero solely by inspection efforts. The residual risk factors for loss of con- tainment include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Humanerror. b. Natural disasters. c. External events (e.g., collisions or falling objects). d. Secondary effects from nearby units. e. Consequential effects from associated equipment in the same unit. f. Deliberate acts (e.g., sabotage). g. Fundamental limitations of inspection method. h. Design errors. i. Unknown mechanisms of deterioration. Many of these factors are strongly influenced by the pro- cess safety management system in place at the facility. 4.5 RELATIVE RISK VS. ABSOLUTE RISK The complexity of risk calculations is a function of the number of factors that can affect the risk. Calculating abso- lute risk can be very time and cost consuming and often, due to having too many uncertainties, is impossible. Many vari- ables are involved with loss of containment in hydrocarbon and chemical facilities and the determination of absolute risk numbers is often not cost effective. RBI is focused on a sys- tematic determination of relative risks. In this way, facilities, units, systems, equipment or components can be ranked based on relative risk. This serves to focus the risk manage- ment efforts on the higher ranked risks. It is considered, however, that if a Quantitative RBI study is conducted rigorously that the resultant risk number is a fair approximation of the actual risk of loss of containment due to deterioration. Numeric risk values determined in qual- itative and semi-quantitative assessments using appropriate sensitivity analysis methods also may be used to evaluate risk acceptance. 5 Introduction to Risk-Based Inspection 5.1 CONSEQUENCE AND PROBABILITY FOR RISK-BASED INSPECTION The objective of RBI is to determine what incident could occur (consequence) in the event of an equipment failure, and how likely (probability) is it that the incident could happen. For example, if a pressure vessel subject to deterioration from corrosion under insulation develops a leak, a variety of conse- quences could occur. Some of the possible consequences are: Risk with typical inspection programs v) Y ...*- ...* .....e ....... .-- I ._ r.Y t Risk using RBI and an optimized inspection program affected by RBI Residual risk not Level of inspection activity - Figure I-Management of Risk Using RBI COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 9 a. Form a vapor cloud that could ignite causing injury and equipment damage. b. Release of a toxic chemical that could cause health problems. c. Result in a spill and cause environmental deterioration. d. Force a unit shutdown and have an adverse economic impact. e. Have minimal safety, health, environmental and/or eco- nomic impact. Combining the probability of one or more of these events with its consequences will determine the risk to the operation. Some failures may occur relatively frequently without signifi- cant adverse safety, environmental or economic impacts. Similarly, some failures have potentially serious conse- quences, but if the probability of the incident is low, then the risk may not warrant immediate action. However, if the prob- ability and consequence combination (risk) is high enough to be unacceptable, then a mitigation action to predict or prevent the event is recommended. Traditionally, organizations have focused solely on the consequences of failure or on the probability without system- atic efforts tying the two together. They have not considered how likely it is that an undesirable incident will occur. Only by considering both factors can effective risk-based decision making take place. Typically, risk acceptability criteria are defined, recognizing that not every failure will lead to an undesirable incident with serious consequence (e.g., water leaks) and that some serious consequence incidents have very low probabilities. Understanding the two-dimensional aspect of risk allows new insight into the use of risk for inspection prioritization and planning. Figure 2 displays the risk associated with the operation of a number of equipment items in a process plant. Both the probability and consequence of failure have been determined for ten equipment items, and the results have been plotted. The points represent the risk associated with each equipment item. Ordering by risk produces a risk-based ranking of the equipment items to be inspected. From this list, an inspection plan can be developed that focuses atten- tion on the areas of highest risk. An “iso-risk” line is shown on Figure 2. This line represents a constant risk level. A user defined acceptable risk level could be plotted as an iso-risk line. In this way the acceptable risk line would separate the unacceptable from the acceptable risk items. Often a risk plot is drawn using log-log scales for a better understanding of the relative risks of the items assessed. 5.2 TYPES OF RBI ASSESSMENT Various types of RBI assessment may be conducted at sev- eral levels. The choice of approach is dependent on multiple variables such as: I 2 \ 3 Consequence of failure - Figure 2-Risk Plot a. Objective of the study. b. Number of facilities and equipment items to study. c. Available resources. d. Study time frame. e. Complexity of facilities and processes. f. Nature and quality of available data. The RBI procedure can be applied qualitatively, quantita- tively or by using aspects of both (i.e., semi-quantitatively). Each approach provides a systematic way to screen for risk, identify areas of potential concern, and develop a prioritized list for more in depth inspection or analysis. Each develops a risk rankuig measure to be used for evaluating separately the probability of failure and the potential consequence of failure. These two values are then combined to estimate risk. Use of expert opinion will typically be included in most risk assess- ments regardless of type or level. 5.2.1 Qualitative Approach This approach requires data inputs based on descriptive information using engineering judgment and experience as the basis for the analysis of probability and consequence of failure. Inputs are often given in data ranges instead of dis- crete values. Results are typically given in qualitative terms such as high, medium and low, although numerical values may be associated with these categories. The value of this type of analysis is that it enables completion of a risk assess- ment in the absence of detailed quantitative data. The accu- racy of results from a qualitative analysis is dependent on the background and expertise of the analysts. 5.2.2 Quantitative Approach Quantitative risk analysis integrates into a uniform meth- odology the relevant information about facility design, oper- ating practices, operating history, component reliability, COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by InformationHandling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 10 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 Serni-qualitative RBI Figure 3-Continuum of RBI Approaches human actions, the physical progression of accidents, and potential environmental and health effects. Quantitative risk analysis uses logic models depicting combinations of events that could result in severe accidents and physical models depicting the progression of accidents and the transport of a hazardous material to the environment. The models are evaluated probabilistically to provide both qualitative and quantitative insights about the level of risk and to identifj the design, site, or operational characteristics that are the most important to risk. Quantitative risk analysis is distinguished from the qualitative approach by the analysis depth and integration of detailed assessments. Quantitative risk analysis logic models generally consist of event trees and fault trees. Event trees delineate initiating events and combinations of system successes and failures, while fault trees depict ways in which the system failures rep- resented in the event trees can occur. These models are ana- lyzed to estimate the probability of each accident sequence. Results using this approach are typically presented as risk numbers (e.g., cost per year). 5.2.3 Semi-quantitative Approach Semi-quantitative is a term that describes any approach that has aspects derived from both the qualitative and quanti- tative approaches. It is geared to obtain the major benefits of the previous two approaches (e.g., speed of the qualitative and rigor of the quantitative). Typically, most of the data used in a quantitative approach is needed for this approach but in less detail. The models also may not be as rigorous as those used for the quantitative approach. The results are usually given in consequence and probability categories rather than as risk numbers but numerical values may be associated with each category to permit the calculation of risk and the appli- cation of appropriate risk acceptance criteria. 5.2.4 Continuum of Approaches In practice, a RBI study typically uses aspects of qualita- tive, quantitative and semi-quantitative approaches. These RBI approaches are not considered as competing but rather as complementary. For example, a high level qualitative approach could be used at a unit level to find the unit within a facility that provides the highest risk. Systems and equipment within the unit then may be screened using a qualitative approach with a more quantitative approach used for the higher risk items. Another example could be to use a qualita- tive consequence analysis combined with a semi-quantitative probability analysis. The three approaches are considered to be a continuum with qualitative and quantitative approaches being the extremes of the continuum and everything in between being a semi-quantitative approach. Figure 3 illustrates this contin- uum concept. The RBI process, shown in the simplified block diagram in Figure 4, depicts the essential elements of inspection plan- ning based on risk analysis. This diagram is applicable to Fig- ure 3 regardless which RBI approach is applied, i.e., each of the essential elements shown in Figure 4 are necessary for a complete RBI program regardless of approach (qualitative, semi- quantitative or quantitative). 5.2.5 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) refers to a prescrip- tive methodology that has resulted from the application of risk analysis techniques at many different types of facilities, including hydrocarbon and chemical process facilities. For all intents and purposes, it is a traditional risk analysis. A RBI analysis shares many of the techniques and data requirements with a QRA. If a QRA has been prepared for a process unit, the RBI consequence analysis can borrow extensively from this effort. The traditional QRA is generally comprised of five tasks: a. Systems identification. b. Hazards identification. c. Probability assessment. d. Consequence analysis. e. Risk results. The systems definition, hazard identification and conse- quence analysis are integrally linked. Hazard identification in a RBI analysis generally focuses on identifiable failure mech- anisms in the equipment (inspectable causes) but does not explicitly deal with other potential failure scenarios resulting from events such as power failures or human errors. A QRA COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 11 - deals with total risk, not just risk associated with equipment deterioration. The QRA typically involves a much more detailed evalua- tion than a RBI analysis. The following data are typically ana- lyzed: quence) that cannot be fully taken into account with a fixed model. Therefore, it may be beneficial to use quantitative and qualitative methods in a complementary fashion to produce the most effective and efficient assessment. Quantitative analysis uses logic models to calculate proba- Consequence of i failure - a. Existing HAZOP or process hazards analysis (PHA) results . b. Dike and drainage design. c. Hazard detection systems. d. Fire protection systems. e. Release statistics. f. Injury statistics. g. Population distributions. h. Topography. i. Weather conditions. j. Landuse. are opportunities to link the detailed QRA with a RBI study. Experienced risk analysts generally perform a QRA. There Data and i information 7 collection i 5.3 PRECISION VS. ACCURACY Risk presented as a precise numeric value (as in a quantita- tive analysis) implies a greater level of accuracy when com- pared to a risk matrix (as in a qualitative analysis). The implied linkage of precision and accuracy may not exist because of the element of uncertainty that is inherent with probabilities and consequences. The accuracy of the output is a function of the methodology used as well as the quantity and quality of the data available. The basis for predicted dam- age and rates, the level of confidence in inspection data and the technique used to perform the inspection are all factors that should be considered. In practice, there are often many extraneous factors that will affect the estimate of damage rate (probability) as well as the magnitude of a failure (conse- i Risk Inspection Mitigation i_ ranking - plan + (if any) + Probability of - i bilities and consequences of failure. Logic models used to characterize materials deterioration of equipment and to determine the consequence of failures typically can have sig- nificant variability and therefore could introduce error and inaccuracy impacting the quality of the risk assessment. Therefore, it is important that results from these logic models are validated by expert judgment. The accuracy of any type of RBI analysis depends on using a sound methodology, quality data and knowledgeable personnel. A 5.4 UNDERSTANDING HOW RBI CAN HELP TO MANAGE OPERATING RISKS failure The mechanical integrity and functional performance of equipment depends on the suitability of the equipment to operate safely and reliably under the normal and abnormal (upset) operating conditions to which the equipment is exposed. In performing a RBI assessment, the susceptibility of equipment to deterioration by one or more mechanisms (e.g., corrosion, fatigue and cracking) is established. The sus- ceptibility of each equipment item should be clearly deked for the current operating conditions including such factors as: a. Process fluid, contaminants and aggressive components. b. Unit throughput. c. Desired unit run length between scheduled shutdowns. d. Operating conditions, including upset conditions: e.g., pressures, temperatures, flowrates, pressure andor tempera- ture cycling. .................................................... .. Risk assessment process .................................................... ~ Y Figure 4-Risk-based Inspection Planning Process COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 12 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 The suitability and current condition of the equipment within the current operating envelope will determine the probability of failure (POF) of the equipment from one or more deterioration mechanisms. This probability, when cou- pled with the associated consequence of failure (COF) (see Section 11) will determine the operating risk associated with the equipment item, and therefore the need for mitigation, if any, such as inspection, metallurgy change or change in oper- ating conditions. 5.5 MANAGEMENT OF RISKS 5.5.1 Risk Management Through Inspection Inspection inñuences the uncertainty of the risk associated with pressure equipment primarily by improving knowledge of the deterioration state and predictability of the probability of failure. Although inspection does not reduce risk directly, it is a risk management activity that may lead to risk reduction. In-service inspection is primarily concerned with the detec- tion and monitoring of deterioration. The probability of fail- ure due to such deterioration is a function of four factors: a. Deterioration type and mechanism. b. Rate of deterioration. c. Probability of identifjing and detecting deterioration and predicting iüture deterioration states with inspection technique(s). d. Tolerance of the equipment to the type of deterioration. 5.5.2 Using RBI to Establish Inspection Plans and Priorities The primary product of a RBI effort should be an inspec- tion plan for each equipment item evaluated. The inspection plan should detail the unmitigated risk related to the current operation. For risks considered unacceptable, the plan should contain the mitigation actions that are recommended to reduce the unmitigated risk to acceptable levels. For those equipment items where inspection is a cost- effective means of risk management, the plans should describe the type, scope and timing of inspectiodexamination recommended. Ranking of the equipment by the unmitigated risk level allows users to assign priorities to the various inspectiodexamination tasks. The level of the unmitigated risk should be used to evaluate the urgency for performing the inspection. 5.5.3 Other Risk Management It is recognized that some risks cannot be adequately man- aged by inspection alone. Examples where inspection may not be sufficient to manage risks to acceptable levels are: a. Equipment nearing retirement. b. Failure mechanisms (such as brittle fracture, fatigue) where avoidance of failure primarily depends on operating within a deked pressure/temperature envelope. c. Consequence-dominated risks. In such cases, non-inspection mitigation actions (such as equipment repair, replacement or upgrade, equipment rede- sign or maintenance of strict controls on operating condi- tions) may be the only appropriate measures that can be taken to reduce risk to acceptable levels. Refer to Section 13 for methods of risk mitigation other than inspection. 5.6 RELATIONSHIP BEMIEEN RBI AND OTHER RISK-BASED AND SAFETY INITIATIVES The risk-based inspection methodology is intended to complement other risk-based and safety initiatives. The out- put from several of these initiatives can provide input to the RBI effort, and RBI outputs may be used to improve safety and risk-based initiatives already implemented by organiza- tions. Examples of some initiatives are: a. OSHA psm programs. b. EPA risk management programs. c. ACC responsible care. d. ASME risk assessment publications. e. CCPS risk assessment techniques. f. Reliability centered maintenance. g. Process hazards analysis. h. Seveso 2 directive in Europe. described in the following examples: The relationship between RBI and several initiatives is 5.6.1 Process Hazards Analysis A process hazards analysis (PHA) uses a systemized approach to identifj and analyze hazards in a process unit. The RBI study can include a review of the output from any PHA that has been conducted on the unit being evaluated. Hazards identified in the PHA can be specifically addressed in the RBI analysis. Potential hazards identified in a PHA will often affect the probability of failure side of the risk equation. The hazard may result from a series of events that could cause a process upset, or it could be the result of process design or instnunen- tation deficiencies. In either case, the hazard may increase the probability of failure, in which case the RBI procedure should reflect the same. Some hazards identified would affect the consequence side of the risk equation. For example, the potential failure of an isolation valve could increase the inventory of material avail- able for release in the event of a leak. The consequence calcu- lation in the RBI procedure can be modified to reflect this added hazard. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 13 Likewise, the results of a RBI assessment can significantly enhance the overall value of a PHA. 5.6.2 Process Safety Management A strong process safety management system can signifi- cantly reduce risk levels in a process plant (refer to OSHA 29 CFR 19 1 O. 1 19 or API RP 750). RBI may include methodolo- gies to assess the effectiveness of the management systems in maintaining mechanical integrity. The results of such a man- agement systems evaluation are factored into the risk deter- minations. Several of the features of a good PSM program provide input for a RBI study. Extensive data on the equipment and the process are required in the RBI analysis, and output from PHA and incident investigation reports increases the validity of the study. In turn, the RBI program can improve the mechanical integrity aspect of the PSM program. An effective PSM program includes a well-structured equipment inspec- tion program. The RBI system will improve the focus of the inspection plan, resulting in a strengthened PSM program. Operating with a comprehensive inspection program should reduce the risks of releases from a facility and should provide benefits in complying with safety-related initiatives. 5.6.3 Equipment Reliability Equipment reliability programs can provide input to the probability analysis portion of a RBI program. Specifically, reliability records can be used to develop equipment failure probabilities and leak frequencies. Equipment reliability is especially important if leaks can be caused by secondary fail- ures, such as loss of utilities. Reliability efforts, such as reli- ability centered maintenance (RCM), can be linked with RBI, resulting in an integrated program to reduce downtime in an operating unit. 5.7 RELATIONSHIP WITH JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS Codes and legal requirements vary from one jurisdiction to another. In some cases, jurisdictional requirements mandate specific actions such as the type of inspections and intervals between inspections. In jurisdictions that permit the applica- tion of the API inspection codes and standards, RBI should be an acceptable method for setting inspection plans. It is recom- mended that all users review their jurisdictional code and legal requirements for acceptability of using RBI for inspec- tion planning purposes. 6 Planning the RBI Assessment 6.1 GETTING STARTED This section helps a user determine the scope and the prior- ities for a RBI assessment. Screening is done to focus the effort. Boundary limits are identified to determinewhat is vital to include in the assessment. The organizing process of aligning priorities, screening risks, and identifying bound- aries improves the efficiency and effectiveness of conducting the assessment and its end-results in managing risk. A RBI assessment is a team-based process. At the begin- ning of the exercise, it is important to define: a. Why the assessment is being done. b. How the RBI assessment will be carried out. c. What knowledge and skills are required for the assessment. d. Who is on the RBI team. e. What are their roles in the RBI process. f. Who is responsible and accountable for what actions. g. Which facilities, assets, and components will be included. h. What data is to be used in the assessment. i. What codes and standards are applicable. j . When the assessment will be completed. k. How long the assessment will remain in effect and when it will be updated. 1. How the results will be used. 6.2 ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES AND GOALS OF A RBI ASSESSMENT A RBI assessment should be undertaken with clear objec- tives and goals that are fully understood by all members of the RBI team and by management. Some examples are listed in 6.2.1 to 6.2.7. 6.2.1 Understand Risks An objective of the RBI assessment may be to better understand the risks involved in the operation of a plant or process unit and to understand the effects that inspection, maintenance and mitigation actions have on the risks. From the understanding of risks, an inspection program may be designed that optimizes the use of inspection and plant maintenance resources. 6.2.2 Define Risk Criteria A RBI assessment will determine the risk associated with the items assessed. The RBI team and management may wish to judge whether the individual equipment item and cumulative risks are acceptable. Establishing risk criteria to judge acceptability of risk could be an objective of the RBI assessment if such criteria do not exist already within the user’s company. 6.2.3 Management of Risks When the risks are identified, inspection actions andíor other mitigation that have a positive effect in reducing risk to an acceptable level may be undertaken. These actions may be COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 14 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 significantly different from the inspection actions undertaken during a statutory or certification type inspection program. The results of managing and reducing risk are improved safety, avoided losses of containment, and avoided commer- cial losses. 6.2.4 Reduce Costs Reducing inspection costs is usually not the primary objec- tive of a RBI assessment, but it is frequently a side effect of optimization. When the inspection program is optimized based on an understanding of risk, one or more of the follow- ing cost reduction benefits may be realized. a. Ineffective, unnecessary or inappropriate inspection activi- ties may be eliminated. b. Inspection of low risk items may be eliminated or reduced. c. On-line or non-invasive inspection methods may be substi- tuted for invasive methods that require equipment shutdown. d. More effective infrequent inspections may be substituted for less effective frequent inspections. 6.2.5 Meet Safety and Environmental Management Requirements Managing risks by using RBI assessment can be useful in implementing an effective inspection program that meets per- formance-based safety and environmental requirements. RBI focuses efforts on areas where the greatest risk exists. RBI provides a systematic method to guide a user in the selection of equipment items to be included and the frequency, scope and extent of inspection activities to be conducted to meet performance objectives. 6.2.6 Sort Mitigation Alternatives The RBI assessment may identify risks that may be man- aged by actions other than inspection. Some of these mitiga- tion actions may include but are not limited to: a. Modification of the process to eliminate conditions driving the risk. b. Modification of operating procedures to avoid situations driving the risk. c. Chemical treatment of the process to reduce deterioration rates/susceptibilities. d. Change metallurgy of components to reduce POF. e. Removal of unnecessary insulation to reduce probability of corrosion under insulation. f. Reduce inventories to reduce COF. g. Upgrade safety or detection systems. h. Change fluids to less flammable or toxic fluids. The data within the RBI assessment can be useful in deter- mining the optimum economic strategy to reduce risk. The strategy may be different at different times in a plant's life cycle. For example, it is usually more economical to modify the process or change metallurgy when a plant is being designed than when it is operating. 6.2.7 New Project Risk Assessment A RBI assessment made on new equipment or a new project, while in the design stage, may yield important infor- mation on potential risks. This may allow the risks to be min- imized by design, prior to actual installation. 6.2.8 Facilities End of Life Strategies Facilities approaching the end of their economic or operat- ing service life are a special case where application of RBI can be very useful. The end of life case for plant operation is about gaining the maximum remaining economic benefit from an asset without undue personnel, environmental or financial risk. End of life strategies focus the inspection efforts directly on high-risk areas where the inspections will provide a reduc- tion of risk during the remaining life of the plant. Inspection activities that do not impact risk during the remaining life are usually eliminated or reduced. End of life inspection RBI strategies may be developed in association with a fitness for service assessment of damaged components using methods described in API Rp 579. It is important to revisit the RBI assessment if the remain- ing plant life is extended after the remaining life strategy has been developed and implemented. 6.3 INITIAL SCREENING 6.3.1 Establish Physical Boundaries of a RBI Assessment Boundaries for physical assets included in the assessment are established consistent with the overall objectives. The level of data to be reviewed and the resources available to accomplish the objectives directly impact the extent of physi- cal assets that can be assessed. The screening process is important in centering the focus on the most important physi- cal assets so that time and resources are effectively applied. The scope of a RBI assessment may vary between an entire refinery or plant and a single component within a single piece of equipment. Typically, RBI is done on multiple pieces of equipment (e.g., an entire process unit) rather than on a single component. 6.3.2 Facilities Screening plants including but not limited to: a. Oil and gas production facilities. b. Oil and gas processing and transportation terminals. c. Refineries. d. Petrochemical and chemical plants. At the facility level, RBI may be applied to all types of COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 15 e. Pipelines and pipeline stations. f. LNGplants. Screening at the facility level may be done by a simplified qualitative RBI assessment. Screening at the facility level could also be done by: a. Asset or product value. b. History of problems/failures at each facility. c. PSWnon-PSM facilities. d. Age of facilities. e. Proximity to the public. f. Proximity to environmentally sensitive areas. Examples of key questions to answer at the facility level 1. Is the facility located in a regulatory jurisdiction that will accept modifications to statutory inspection intervals basedon RBI? 2. Is the management of the facility willing to invest in the resources necessary to achieve the benefits of RBI? 3. Does the facility have sufficient resources and exper- tise available to conduct the RBI assessment? are: 6.3.3 Process Units Screening If the scope of the RBI assessment is a multi-unit facility, then the ñrst step in the application of RBI is screening of entire process units to rank relative risk. The screening points out areas that are higher in priority and suggests which pro- cess units to begin with. It also provides insight about the level of assessment that may be required for operating sys- tems and equipment items in the various units. Priorities may be assigned based on one of the following: a. Relative risk of the process units. b. Relative economic impact of the process units. c. Relative COF of the process units. d. Relative reliability of the process units. e. Turnaround schedule. f. Experience with similar process units. Examples of key questions to answer at the process unit 1. Does the process unit have a significant impact on the operation of the facility? 2. Are there significant risks involved in the operation of the process unit and would the effect of risk reduction be measurable? 3. Do process unit operators see that some benefit may be gained through the application of RBI? 4. Does the process unit have sufficient resources and expertise available to conduct the RBI assessment? level are similar to the questions at the facility level: 6.3.4 Systems within Process Units Screening It is often advantageous to group equipment within a pro- cess unit into systems or circuits where common environmen- tal operating conditions exist based on process chemistry, pressure and temperature, metallurgy, equipment design and operating history. By dividing a process unit into systems, the equipment can be screened together saving time com- pared to treating each piece of equipment separately. A common practice utilizes block flow or process flow dia- grams for the unit to identify the systems. Information about metallurgy, process conditions, credible deterioration mecha- nisms and historical problems may be identified on the dia- gram for each system. When a process unit is identified for a RBI assessment and overall optimization is the goal, it is usually best to include all systems within the unit. Practical considerations such as resource availability may require that the RBI assessment is limited to one or more systems within the unit. Selection of systems may be based on: a. Relative risk of the systems. b. Relative COF of systems. c. Relative reliability of systems. d. Expected benefit from applying RBI to a system. 6.3.5 Equipment Items Screening In most plants, a large percentage of the total unit risk will be concentrated in a relatively small percentage of the equip- ment items. These potential high-risk items should receive greater attention in the risk assessment. Screening of equip- ment items is often conducted to identify the higher risk items to carry forward to more detailed risk assessment. A RBI assessment may be applied to all pressure contain- ing equipment such as: a. Piping. b. Pressure vessels. c. Reactors. d. Heat exchangers. e. Furnaces. f. Tanks. g. Pumps (pressure boundary). h. Compressors (pressure boundary). i. Pressure relief devices. j . Control valves (pressure boundary). Selection of equipment types to be included is based on meeting the objectives discussed in 6.2. The following issues may be considered in screening the equipment to be included: 1. Will the integrity of safeguard equipment be compro- mised by deterioration mechanisms? 2. Which types of equipment have had the most reliability problems? COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 16 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 3. Which pieces of equipment have the highest COF if there is a pressure boundary failure? 4. Which pieces of equipment are subject to most deterio- ration that could affect pressure boundary containment? 5. Which pieces of equipment have lower design safety margins andor lower corrosion allowances that may affect pressure boundary containment considerations? 6.3.6 Utilities, Emergency and Off-plot Systems Whether or not utilities, emergency and off-plot systems should be included depends on the planned use of the RBI assessment and the current inspection requirements of the facility. Possible reasons for inclusion of off-plot and utilities are: a. The RBI assessment is being done for an overall optimiza- tion of inspection resources and environmental and business COF are included. b. There is a specific reliability problem in a utility system. An example would be a cooling water system with corrosion and fouling problems. A RBI approach could assist in devel- oping the most effective combination of inspection, mitigation, monitoring, and treatment for the entire facility. c. Reliability of the process unit is a major objective of the RBI analysis. When emergency systems (e.g., flare systems, emergency shutdown systems) are included in the RBI assessment, their service conditions during both routine operations and their duty cycle should be considered. 6.4 ESTABLISH OPERATING BOUNDARIES Similar to physical boundaries, operating boundaries for the RBI study are established consistent with the study objectives, level of data to be reviewed and resources. The purpose of establishing operational boundaries is to identifj key process parameters that may impact deterioration. The RBI assess- ment normally includes review of both POF and COF for nor- mal operating conditions. Start-up and shut-down conditions as well as emergency and non-routine conditions should also be reviewed for their potential effect on POF and COF. The operating conditions, including any sensitivity analy- sis, used for the RBI assessment should be recorded as the operating limits for the assessment. Operating within the boundaries is critical to the validity of the RBI study as well as good operating practice. It may be worthwhile to monitor key process parameters to determine whether operations are maintained within boundaries. 6.4.1 Start-up and Shut-down Process conditions during start-up and shut-down can have a significant effect on the risk of a plant especially when they are more severe (likely to cause accelerated deterioration) than normal conditions. A good example is polythionic acid stress corrosion cracking. The POF for susceptible plants is controlled by whether mitigation measures are applied during shutdown procedures. Start-up lines are often included within the process piping and their service conditions during start-up and subsequent operation should be considered. 6.4.2 Normal, Upset and Cyclic Operation The normal operating conditions may be most easily pro- vided if there is a process flow model or mass balance avail- able for the plant or process unit. However, the normal operating conditions found on documentation should be veri- fied as it is not uncommon to find discrepancies that could impact the RBI results substantially. The following data should be provided: a. Operating temperature and pressure including variation ranges. b. Process fluid composition including variation with feed composition ranges. c. Flow rates including variation ranges. d. Presence of moisture or other contaminant species. Changes in the process, such as pressure, temperature or fluid composition, resulting from unit abnormal or upset con- ditions should be considered in the RBI assessment. Systems with cyclic operation, such as reactor regeneration systems, should consider the complete cyclic range of condi- tions. Cyclic conditions could impact the probability of fail- ure dueto some deterioration mechanisms (e.g., fatigue, thermal fatigue, corrosion under insulation). 6.4.3 Operating Time Period The unit run lengths of the selected process unitdequip- ment is an important limit to consider. The RBI assessment may include the entire operational life, or may be for a selected period. For example, process units are occasionally shut down for maintenance activities and the associated run length may depend on the condition of the equipment in the unit. A RBI analysis may focus on the current run period or may include the current and next-projected run period. The time period may also inñuence the types of decisions and inspection plans that result from the study, such as inspection, repair, replace, operating, and so on. Future operational pro- jections are also important as part of the basis for the opera- tional time period. 6.5 SELECTING ATYPE OF RBI ASSESSMENT Selection of the type of RBI assessment will be dependent on a variety of factors, such as: a. Is the assessment at a facility, process unit, system, equip- ment item or component level. b. Objective of the assessment. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 17 c. Availability and quality of data. d. Resource availability. e. Perceived or previously evaluated risks. f. Time constraints. A strategy should be developed, matching the type of assessment to the expected or evaluated risk. For example, processing units that are expected to have lower risk may only require simple, fairly conservative methods to adequately accomplish the RBI objectives. Whereas, process units which have a higher expected risk may require more detailed meth- ods. Another example would be to evaluate all equipment items in a process unit qualitatively and then evaluate the higher risk items identified more quantitatively. Refer to 5.2 for more on types of RBI assessment. 6.6 ESTIMATING RESOURCES ANDTIME REQUIRED The resources and time required to implement a RBI assessment will vary widely between organizations depend- ing on a number of factors including: a. Implementation strategy/plans. b. Knowledge and training of implementers. c. Availability and quality of necessary data and information. d. Availability and cost of resources needed for implement ation. e. Amount of equipment included in each level of RBI analysis. f. Degree of complexity of RBI analysis selected. g. Degree of accuracy required. The estimate of scope and cost involved in completing a RBI assessment might include the following: 1. Number of facilities, units, equipment items, and com- ponents to be evaluated. 2. Time and resources required to gather data for the items to be evaluated. 3 . Training time for implementers. 4. Time and resources required for RBI assessment of data and information. 5. Time and resources to evaluate RBI assessment results and develop inspection, maintenance, and mitigation plans. 7 Data and Information Collection for RBI Assessment 7.1 RBI DATA NEEDS A RBI study may use a qualitative, semi-quantitative and/ or quantitative approach. The fundamental difference among these approaches is the amount and detail of input, calcula- tions and output. For each RBI approach it is important to document all bases for the study and assumptions from the onset and to apply a consistent rationale. Any deviations from prescribed, standard procedures should be well documented. Documenta- tion of unique equipment and piping identifiers is a good starting point for any level of study. The equipment should also correspond to a unique group or location such as a partic- ular process unit at a particular plant site. Typical data needed for a RBI analysis may include but is not limited to: a. Type of equipment. b. Materials of construction. c. Inspection, repair and replacement records. d. Process fluid compositions. e. Inventory of fluids. f. Operating conditions. g. Safety systems. h. Detection systems. i. Deterioration mechanisms, rates and severity. j . Personnel densities. k. Coating, cladding and insulation data. 1. Business interruption cost. m. Equipment replacement costs. n. Environmental remediation costs. 7.1 . I Qualitative RBI The qualitative approach typically does not require all of the data mentioned in 7.1. Further, items required only need to be categorized into broad ranges or classified versus a ref- erence point. It is important to establish a set of rules to assure consistency in categorization or classification. Generally, a qualitative analysis using broad ranges requires a higher level of judgment, skill and understanding from the user than a quantitative approach. Ranges and sum- mary fields may evaluate circumstances with widely varying conditions requiring the user to carefully consider the impact of input on risk results. Therefore, despite its simplicity, it is important to have knowledgeable and skilled persons perform the qualitative RBI analysis. 7.1.2 Quantitative RBI Quantitative risk analysis uses logic models depicting combinations of events that could result in severe accidents and physical models depicting the progression of accidents and the transport of a hazardous material to the environment. The models are evaluated probabilistically to provide both qualitative and quantitative insights about the level of risk and to identifj the design, site, or operational characteristics that are the most important to risk. Hence, more detailed informa- tion and data are needed for quantitative RBI in order to pro- vide input for the models. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 18 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 7.1.3 Semi-quantitative RBI The semi-quantitative analysis typically requires the same data as a quantitative analysis but generally not as detailed. For example, the fluid volumes may be estimated. Although the precision of the analysis may be less, the time required for data gathering and analysis will be less too. 7.2 DATA QUALITY The data quality has a direct relation to the relative accu- racy of the RBI analysis. Although the data requirements are quite different for the various types of RBI analysis, quality of input data is equally important. It is beneficial to the integ- rity of a RBI analysis to assure that the data are up to date and validated by knowledgeable persons (see Section 15). As is true in any inspection program, data validation is essential for a number of reasons. Among the reasons are out- dated drawings and documentation, inspector error, clerical error, and measurement equipment accuracy. Another poten- tial source of error in the analysis is assumptions on equip- ment history. For example if baseline inspections were not performed or documented, nominal thickness may be used for the original thickness. This assumption can significantly impact the calculated corrosion rate early in the equipment’s life. The effect may be to mask a high corrosion rate or to inflate a low corrosion rate. A similar situation exists when the remaining life of a piece of equipment with a low corro- sion rate requires inspection more frequently. The measure- ment error may result in the calculated corrosion rate appearing artificially high or low. This validation step stresses the need for a knowledgeable individual comparing data from the inspections to the expected deterioration mechanism and rates. This person may also com- pare the results with previous measurements on that system, similar systems at the site or within the company or published data. Statistics may be useful in this review. This review should also factor in any changes or upsets in the process. 7.3CODES AND STANDARDS-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL In the data collection stage, an assessment of what codes and standards are currently in use, or were in use during the equipment design, is generally necessary. The amount and type of codes and standards used by a facility can have a sig- nificant impact on RBI results. 7.4 SOURCES OF SITE SPECIFIC DATA AND IN FORMATION Information for RBI can be found in many places within a facility. It is important to stress that the precision of the data should match the complexity of the RBI method used. The individual or team should understand the sensitivity of the data needed for the program before gathering any data. It may be advantageous to combine RBI data gathering with other riskhazard analysis data gathering (e.g,, PHA, QRA) as much of the data overlaps. Specific potential sources of information include but are not limited to: a. Design and Construction Records/Drawings. 1. P&IDs, PFDs, MFDs, etc. 2. Piping isometric drawings. 3. Engineering specification sheets. 4. Materials of construction records. 5. Construction QA/QC records. 6. Codes and standards used. 7. Protective instrument systems. 8. Leak detection and monitoring systems. 9. Isolation systems. 10. Inventory records. 11. Emergency depressurizing and relief systems. 12. Safety systems. 13. Fire-proofkg and ñre fighting systems. 14. Layout. b. Inspection Records. 1. Schedules and frequency. 2. Amount and types of inspection. 3. Repairs and alterations. 4. PMI records. 5. Inspection results. c. Process Data. 1. Fluid composition analysis including contaminants or trace components. 2. Distributed control system data. 3. Operating procedures. 4. Start-up and shut-down procedures. 5. Emergency procedures. 6. Operating logs and process records. 7. PSM, PHA, RCM and QRA data or reports. d. Management of change (MOC) records. e. Off-Site data and information-if consequence may affect off-site areas. f. Failure data. 1. Generic failure frequency data-industry or in-house. 2. Industry specific failure data. 3. Plant and equipment specific failure data. 4. Reliability and condition monitoring records. 5. Leakdata. g. Site conditions. 1. Climate/weather records. 2. Seismic activity records. h. Equipment replacement costs. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 19 1. Project cost reports. 2. Industry databases. 1. PSM studies. 2. PHA studies. 3 . QRA studies. 4. Other site specific risk or hazard studies. i. Hazards data. j. Incident investigations. 8 Identifying Deterioration Mechanisms and Failure Modes 8.1 INTRODUCTION Identification of the appropriate deterioration mechanisms, susceptibilities and failure modes for all equipment included in a RBI study is essential to the quality and the effectiveness of the RBI evaluation. A metallurgist or corrosion specialist should be consulted to define the equipment deterioration mechanisms, susceptibility and potential failure modes. Data used and assumptions made should be validated and docu- mented. Process conditions (normal and upset) as well as anticipated process changes should be considered in the eval- uation. The deterioration mechanisms, rates and susceptibili- ties are the primary inputs into the probability of failure evaluation. The failure mode is a key input in determining the consequence of failure except when a worst case conse- quence analysis, assuming total release of component inven- tory, is used. 8.2 FAILURE AND FAILURE MODES FOR RISK- BASED INSPECTION The term failure can be defined as termination of the ability to perform a required function. RBI, as described in this Rec- ommended Practice, is concerned with one type of failure, namely loss of containment caused by deterioration. The term failure mode is defined as the manner of failure. Failure modes can range from a small hole to a complete rupture. 8.3 DETERIORATION MECHANISMS The term deterioration mechanism is defined as the type of deterioration that could lead to a loss of containment. There are four major deterioration mechanisms observed in the hydrocarbon and chemical process industry: a. Thinning (includes internal and external). b. Stress corrosion cracking. c. Metallurgical and environmental. d. Mechanical. Understanding equipment operation and the interaction with the chemical and mechanical environment is key to per- forming deterioration mechanism identification. For example, understanding that localized thinning may be caused by the method of fluid injection and agitation is as important as knowing the corrosion mechanism. Process specialists can provide useful input (such as the spectrum of process condi- tions, injection points etc.) to aid materials specialists in the identification of deterioration mechanisms and rates. Appendix A provides tables describing the individual dete- rioration mechanisms covered by these four categories, the key variables driving deterioration, and typical process indus- try examples of where they may occur. These tables cover most of the common deterioration mechanisms. Other deteri- oration types and mechanisms may occur in specific hydro- carbon and chemical processing applications; however, these are relatively infrequent. 8.3.1 Thinning Thinning includes general corrosion, localized corrosion, pitting, and other mechanisms that cause loss of material from internal or external surfaces. The effects of thinning can be determined from the following information: a. Thickness - both the original, historic and current mea- sured thickness. b. Equipment age - number of years in the current service and if the service has changed. c. Corrosion allowance - design allowance for the current service. d. Corrosion rate. e. Operating pressure and temperature. f. Design pressure. g. Number and types of inspections. 8.3.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) occurs when equipment is exposed to environments conducive to certain cracking mech- anisms such as caustic cracking, amine cracking, sulfide stress cracking (SSC), hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC), stress-oriented hydrogen-induced cracking (SOHIC), carbon- ate cracking, polythionic acid cracking (PTA), and chloride cracking (ClSCC). Literature, expert opinion and experience are often necessary to establish susceptibility of equipment to stress corrosion cracking. Susceptibility is often designated as high, medium, or low based on: a. Material of construction. b. Mechanism and susceptibility. c. Operating temperature and pressure. d. Concentration of key process corrosives such as pH, chlo- rides, sulfides, etc. e. Fabrication variables such as post weld heat treatment. The determination of susceptibility should not only con- sider susceptibility of the equipment/piping to cracking (or COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 20 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 probability of initiating a crack), but also the probability of a crack resulting in a leak or rupture. 8.3.3 Metallurgical and Environmental Deterioration of Properties Causes of metallurgical and environmental failure are var- ied but typically involve some form of mechanical andíor physical property deterioration of the material due to expo- sure to the process environment. One example of this is high-temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA). HTHA occurs in carbon and low alloy steels exposed to high partial pressures of hydrogen at elevated tem- peratures. Historically, HTHA resistance has been predicted based on industry experience that has been plotted on a series of curves for carbon and low alloy steels showing the temper- ature and hydrogenpartial pressure regime in which these steels have been successfully used without deterioration due to HTHA. These curves, which are commonly referred to as the Nelson curves, are maintained based on industry experi- ence in API Rp 94 1. Consideration for equipment susceptibility to HTHA is based on: a. Material of construction. b. Operating temperature. c. Hydrogen partial pressure. d. Exposure time. Refer to Appendix A for other examples of these types of failures and causes. In general, the critical variables for dete- rioration are material of construction, process operating, start- up and shut-down conditions (especially temperature) and knowledge of the deterioration caused by those conditions. 8.3.4 Mechanical Similar to the metallurgical and environmental failures, various types and causes of mechanical deterioration are pos- sible. Examples and the types of failure resulting can be found in the Appendix A. The most common mechanical deterioration mechanisms are fatigue (mechanical, thermal and corrosion), stresdcreep rupture, and tensile overload. 8.4 OTHER FAILURES RBI could be expanded to include failures other than loss of containment. Examples of other failures and failure modes are: a. Pressure relief device failure - plugging, fouling, non- activation. b. Heat exchanger bundle failure - tube leak, plugging. c. Pump failure - seal failure, motor failure, rotating parts damage. d. Internal linings -hole, disbondment. 9 Assessing Probability of Failure 9.1 INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY ANALYSIS The probability analysis in a RBI program is performed to estimate the probability of a specific adverse consequence resulting from a loss of containment that occurs due to a dete- rioration mechanism@). The probability that a specific con- sequence will occur is the product of the probability of failure (POF) and the probability of the scenario under consideration assuming that the failure has occurred. This section provides guidance only on determining the POF. Guidance on deter- mining the probability of specific consequences is provided in Section 11. The probability of failure analysis should address all dete- rioration mechanisms to which the equipment being studied is susceptible. Further, it should address the situation where equipment is susceptible to multiple deterioration mecha- nisms (e.g., thinning and creep). The analysis should be cred- ible, repeatable and well documented. It should be noted that deterioration mechanisms are not the only causes of loss of containment. Other causes of loss of containment could include but are not limited to: a. Seismic activity. b. Weather extremes. c. Overpressure due to pressure relief device failure. d. Operator error. e. Inadvertent substitution of materials of construction. f. Design error. g. Sabotage. These and other causes of loss of containment may have an impact on the probability of failure and may be included in the probability of failure analysis. 9.2 UNITS OF MEASURE IN THE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ANALYSIS Probability of failure is typically expressed in terms of fre- quency. Frequency is expressed as a number of events occur- ring during a specific time frame. For probability analysis, the time frame is typically expressed as a fixed interval (e.g., one year) and the frequency is expressed as events per interval (e.g., 0.0002 failures per year). The time frame may also be expressed as an occasion (e.g., one run length) and the fre- quency would be events per occasion (e.g., 0.03 failures per run). For a qualitative analysis, the probability of failure may be categorized (e.g., high, medium and low, or 1 through 5). However, even in this case, it is appropriate to associate an event frequency with each probability category to provide guidance to the individuals who are responsible for determin- ing the probability. If this is done, the change from one cate- gory to the next could be one or more orders of magnitude or other appropriate demarcations that will provide adequate discrimination. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 21 9.3 TYPES OF PROBABILITY ANALYSIS The following paragraphs discuss different approaches to the determination of probability. For the purposes of the dis- cussion, these approaches have been categorized as “qualita- tive” or “quantitative.” However, it should be recognized that “qualitative” and “quantitative” are the end points of a contin- uum rather than distinctive approaches (see Figure 3). Most probability assessments use a blend of qualitative and quanti- tative approaches. The methodology used for the assessment should be struc- tured such that a sensitivity analysis or other approach may be used to assure that realistic, though conservative, probability values are obtained (see 11.4). 9.3.1 Qualitative Probability of Failure Analysis A qualitative method involves identification of the units, systems or equipment, the materials of construction and the corrosive components of the processes. On the basis of knowledge of the operating history, future inspection and maintenance plans and possible materials deterioration, prob- ability of failure can be assessed separately for each unit, sys- tem, equipment grouping or individual equipment item. Engineering judgment is the basis for this assessment. A probability of failure category can then be assigned for each unit, system, grouping or equipment item. Depending on the methodology employed, the categories may be described with words (such as high, medium or low) or may have numerical descriptors (such as 0.1 to 0.01 times per year). 9.3.2 Quantitative Probability of Failure Analysis There are several approaches to a quantitative probability analysis. One example is to take a probabilistic approach where specific failure data or expert solicitations are used to calculate a probability of failure. These failure data may be obtained on the specific equipment item in question or on similar equipment items. This probability may be expressed as a distribution rather than a single deterministic value. Another approach is used when inaccurate or insufficient failure data exists on the specific item of interest. In this case, general industry, company or manufacturer failure data are used. A methodology should be applied to assess the applica- bility of these general data. As appropriate, these failure data should be adjusted and made specific to the equipment being analyzed by increasing or decreasing the predicted failure fre- quencies based on equipment specific information. In this way, general failure data are used to generate an adjusted fail- ure frequency that is applied to equipment for a specific appli- cation. Such modifications to general values may be made for each equipment item to account for the potential deterio- ration that may occur in the particular service and the type and effectiveness of inspection andíor monitoring performed. Knowledgeable personnel should make these modifications on a case-by-case basis. 9.4 DETERMINATION OF PROBABILITY OF FAILURE Regardless of whether a more qualitative or a quantitative analysis is used, the probability of failure is determined by two main considerations: a. Deterioration mechanisms and rates of the equipment item’s material of construction, resulting from its operating environment (internal and external). b. Effectiveness of the inspection program to identifj and monitor the deterioration mechanisms so that the equipment can be repaired or replaced prior to failure. Analyzing the effect of in-service deterioration and inspec- tion on the probability of failure involves the following steps: a. Identifj active and credible deterioration mechanisms that are reasonably expected to occurduring the time period being considered (considering normal and upset conditions). b. Determine the deterioration susceptibility and rate. c. Quantifj the effectiveness of the past inspection and main- tenance program and a proposed future inspection and maintenance program. It is usually necessary to evaluate the probability of failure considering several alternative future inspection and maintenance strategies, possibly including a “no inspection or maintenance” strategy. d. Determine the probability that with the current condition, continued deterioration at the predictedíexpected rate will exceed the damage tolerance of the equipment and result in a failure. The failure mode (e.g., small leak, large leak, equip- ment rupture) should also be determined based on the deterioration mechanism. It may be desirable in some cases to determine the probability of more than one failure mode and combine the risks. 9.4.1 Determine the Deterioration Susceptibility and Rate Combinations of process conditions and materials of con- struction for each equipment item should be evaluated to identify active and credible deterioration mechanisms. One method of determining these mechanisms and susceptibility is to group components that have the same material of con- struction and are exposed to the same internal and external environment. Inspection results from one item in the group can be related to the other equipment in the group. For many deterioration mechanisms, the rate of deteriora- tion progression is generally understood and can be estimated for process plant equipment. Deterioration rate can be expressed in terms of corrosion rate for thinning or suscepti- bility for mechanisms where the deterioration rate is unknown or immeasurable (such as stress corrosion crack- COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 22 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 ing). Susceptibility is often designated as high, medium or low based on the environmental conditions and material of construction combination. Fabrication variables and repair history are also important. The deterioration rate in specific process equipment is often not known with certainty. The ability to state the rate of deterioration precisely is affected by equipment complexity, type of deterioration mechanism, process and metallurgical variations, inaccessibility for inspection, limitations of inspection and test methods and the inspector’s expertise. Sources of deterioration rate information include: a. Published data. b. Laboratory testing. c. In-situ testing and in-service monitoring. d. Experience with similar equipment. e. Previous inspection data. The best information will come from operating experi- ences where the conditions that led to the observed deteriora- tion rate could realistically be expected to occur in the equipment under consideration. Other sources of information could include databases of plant experience or reliance on expert opinion. The latter method is often used since plant databases, where they exist, sometimes do not contain suffi- ciently detailed information. 9.4.2 Determine Failure Mode Probability of failure analysis is used to evaluate the failure mode (e.g., small hole, crack, catastrophic rupture) and the probability that each failure mode will occur. It is important to link the deterioration mechanism to the most likely result- ing failure mode. For example: a. Pitting generally leads to small hole-sized leaks. b. Stress corrosion cracking can develop into small, through wall cracks or, in some cases, catastrophic rupture. c. Metallurgical deterioration and mechanical deterioration can lead to failure modes that vary from small holes to ruptures. d. General thinning from corrosion often leads to larger leaks or rupture. Failure mode primarily affects the magnitude of the conse- quences. For this and other reasons, the probability and con- sequence analyses should be worked interactively. 9.4.3 Quantify Effectiveness of Past Inspection Inspection programs (the combination of NDE methods such as visual, ultrasonic, radiographic etc., frequency and coverage/location of inspections) vary in their effectiveness for locating and sizing deterioration, and thus for determining deterioration rates. After the likely deterioration mechanisms Program have been identified, the inspection program should be evalu- ated to determine the effectiveness in finding the identified mechanisms. Limitations in the effectiveness of an inspection program could be due to: a. Lack of coverage of an area subject to deterioration. b. Inherent limitations of some inspection methods to detect and quanti@ certain types of deterioration. c. Selection of inappropriate inspection methods and tools. d. Application of methods and tools by inadequately trained inspection personnel. e. Inadequate inspection procedures. f. Deterioration rate under some extremes of conditions is so high that failure can occur within a very short time. Even though no deterioration is found during an inspection, failure could still occur as a result of a change or upset in conditions. For example, if a very aggressive acid is carried over from a corrosion resistant part of a system into a downstream vessel that is made of carbon steel, rapid corrosion could result in failure in a few hours or days. Similarly, if an aqueous chlo- ride solution is carried into a sensitized stainless steel vessel, chloride stress corrosion cracking could occur very rapidly (depending on the temperature). If multiple inspections have been performed, it is important to recognize that the most recent inspection may best reflect current operating conditions. If operating conditions have changed, deterioration rates based on inspection data from the previous operating conditions may not be valid. Determination of inspection effectiveness should consider the following: 1. Equipment type. 2. Active and credible deterioration mechanism(s). 3 . Rate of deterioration or susceptibility. 4. NDE methods, coverage and frequency. 5. Accessibility to expected deterioration areas. The effectiveness of hture inspections can be optimized by utilization of NDE methods better suited for the active/credi- ble deterioration mechanisms, adjusting the inspection cover- age, adjusting the inspection frequency or some combination. 9.4.4 Calculate the Probability of Failure by Deterioration Type By combining the expected deterioration mechanism, rate or susceptibility, inspection data and inspection effectiveness, a probability of failure can now be determined for each dete- rioration type and failure mode. The probability of failure may be determined for hture time periods or conditions as well as current. It is important for users to validate that the method used to calculate the POF is in fact thorough and ade- quate for the users’ needs. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 23 10 Assessing Consequences of Failure 10.1 INTRODUCTION TO CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS The consequence analysis in a RBI program is performed to provide discrimination between equipment items on the basis of the significance of a potential failure. In general, a RBI program will be managed by plant inspectors or inspec- tion engineers, who will normally manage risk by managing the probability of failure with inspection and maintenance planning. They will not normally have much ability to modify the consequence of failure. On the other hand, management and process safety personnel may desire to manage the conse- quence side of the risk equation. Numerous methods for mod- ifying the consequence of failure are mentioned in Section13. For all of these users, the consequence analysis is an aid in establishing a relative risk ranking of equipment items. The consequence analysis should be a repeatable, simplified, credible estimate of what might be expected to happen if a failure were to occur in the equipment item being assessed. More or less complex and detailed methods of conse- quence analysis can be used, depending on the desired appli- cation for the assessment. The consequence analysis method chosen should have a demonstrated ability to provide the required level of discrimination between higher and lower consequence equipment items. 10.1 . I Loss of Containment The consequence of loss of containment is generally evalu- ated as loss of fluid to the external environment. The conse- quence effects for loss of containment can be generally considered to be in the following categories: a. Safety and health impact. b. Environmental impact. c. Production losses. d. Maintenance and reconstruction costs. 10.1.2 Other Functional Failures Although RBI is mainly concerned with loss of contain- ment failures, other functional failures could be included in a RBI study if a user desired. Other functional failures could include: a. Functional or mechanical failure of internal components of pressure containing equipment (e.g., column trays, demis- ter mats, coalescer elements, distribution hardware, etc.). b. Heat exchanger tube failure. Note: There may be situations where a heat exchanger tube failure could lead to a loss of containment of the heat exchanger or ancillary equipment. These would typically involve leakage from a high pres- sure side to a low pressure side of the exchanger and subsequent breach of containment of the low pressure side. c. Pressure relief device failure. d. Rotating equipment failure (e.g., seal leaks, impeller fail- ures, etc.). These other functional failures are usually covered within reliability centered maintenance (RCM) programs and there- fore are not covered in detail in this document. 10.2 TYPES OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS The following paragraphs discuss different approaches to the determination of consequences of failure. For the pur- poses of the discussion, these approaches have been catego- rized as “qualitative” or “quantitative.” However, it should be recognized that “qualitative” and “quantitative” are the end points of a continuum rather than distinctive approaches (see Figure 3). 10.2.1 Qualitative Consequences Analysis A qualitative method involves identification of the units, systems or equipment, and the hazards present as a result of operating conditions and process fluids. On the basis of expert knowledge and experience, the consequences of failure (safety, health, environmental or hancial impacts) can be estimated separately for each unit, system, equipment group or individual equipment item. For a qualitative method, a consequences category (such as “A” through “E” or “high”, “medium” or “low”) is typically assigned for each unit, system, grouping or equipment item. It may be appropriate to associate a numerical value, such as cost (see 10.3.2), with each consequence category. 10.2.2 Quantitative Consequences Analysis A quantitative method involves using a logic model depict- ing combinations of events to represent the effects of failure on people, property, the business and the environment. Quan- titative models usually contain one or more standard failure scenarios or outcomes and calculate consequence of failure based on: a. Type of process fluid in equipment. b. State of the process fluid inside the equipment (solid, liq- uid or gas). c. Key properties of process fluid (molecular weight, boiling point, autoignition temperature, ignition energy, density, etc.). d. Process operating variables such as temperature and pressure. e. Mass of inventory available for release in the event of a leak. f. Failure mode and resulting leak size. g. State of fluid after release in ambient conditions (solid, gas or liquid). COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 24 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 Results of a quantitative analysis are usually numeric. Con- sequence categories may be also used to organize more quan- titatively assessed consequences into manageable groups. 10.3 UNITS OF MEASURE IN CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Different types of consequences may be described best by different measures. The RBI analyst should consider the nature of the hazards present and select appropriate units of measure. However, the analyst should bear in mind that the resultant consequences should be comparable, as much as possible, for subsequent risk prioritization. The following provide some units of measure of conse- quence that can be used in a RBI assessment. 10.3.1 Safety Safety consequences are often expressed as a numerical value or characterized by a consequence category associated with the severity of potential injuries that may result from an undesirable event. For example, safety consequences could be expressed based on the severity of an injury (e.g., fatality, serious injury, medical treatment, ñrst aid) or expressed as a category linked to the injury severity (e.g., A through E). 10.3.2 Cost Cost is commonly used as an indicator of potential conse- quences. It is possible, although not always credible, to assign costs to almost any type of consequence. Typical conse- quences that can be expressed in “cost” include: a. Production loss due to rate reduction or downtime. b. Deployment of emergency response equipment and personnel. c. Lost product from a release. d. Degradation of product quality. e. Replacement or repair of damaged equipment. f. Property damage offsite. g. Spillhelease cleanup onsite or offsite. h. Business interruption costs (lost profits). i. Loss of market share. j . Injuries or fatalities. k. Land reclamation. 1. Litigation. m. Fines. n. Goodwill. The above list is reasonably comprehensive, but in practice some of these costs are neither practical nor necessary to use in a RBI assessment. Cost generally requires fairly detailed information to fully assess. Information such as product value, equipment costs, repair costs, personnel resources, and environmental damage may be difficult to derive, and the manpower required to per- form a complete financial-based consequence analysis may be limited. However, cost has the advantage of permitting a direct comparison of various types of losses on a common basis. 10.3.3 Affected Area Affected area is also used to describe potential conse- quences in the field of risk assessment. As its name implies, affected area represents the amount of surface area that expe- riences an effect (toxic dose, thermal radiation, explosion overpressure, etc.) greater than a pre-defined limiting value. Based on the thresholds chosen, anything - personnel, equipment, environment - within the area will be affected by the consequences of the hazard. In order to rank consequences according to affected area, it is typically assumed that equipment or personnel at risk are evenly distributed throughout the unit. A more rigorous approach would assign a population density with time or equipment value density to different areas of the unit. The units for affected area consequence (square feet or square meters) do not readily translate into our everyday experiences and thus there is some reluctance to use this mea- sure. It has, however, several features that merit consider- ation. The affected area approach has the characteristic of being able to compare toxic and flammable consequences by relating to the physical area impacted by a release. 10.3.4 Environmental Damage Environmental consequence measures are the least devel- oped among those currently used for RBI.A common unit of measure for environmental damage is not available in the cur- rent technology, makmg environmental consequences diffi- cult to assess. Typical parameters used that provide an indirect measure of the degree of environmental damage are: a. Acres of land affected per year. b. Miles of shoreline affected per year. c. Number of biological or human-use resources consumed. The portrayal of environmental damage almost invariably leads to the use of cost, in terms of dollars per year, for the loss and restoration of environmental resources. 10.4 VOLUME OF FLUID RELEASED In most consequence evaluations, a key element in deter- mining the magnitude of the consequence is the volume of fluid released. The volume released is typically derived from a combination of the following: a. Volume of fluid available for release - Volume of fluid in the piece of equipment and connected equipment items. In theory, this is the amount of fluid between isolation valves that can be quickly closed. b. Failure mode. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 25 c. Leakrate. d. Detection and isolation time. In some cases, the volume released will be the same as the volume available for release. Usually, there are safeguards and procedures in place so that the breach of containment can be isolated and the volume released will be less than the vol- ume available for release. 10.5 CONSEQUENCE EFFECT CATEGORIES The failure of the pressure boundary and subsequent release of fluids may cause safety, health, environmental, facility and business damage. The RBI analyst should con- sider the nature of the hazards and assure that appropriate fac- tors are considered for the equipment, system, unit or plant being assessed. Regardless of whether a more qualitative or quantitative analysis is used, the major factors to consider in evaluating the consequences of failure are listed in the following sections. 10.5.1 Flammable Events (Fire and Explosion) Flammable events occur when both a leak and ignition occurs. The ignition could be through an ignition source or auto-ignition. Flammable events can cause damage in two ways: thermal radiation and blast overpressure. Most of the damage from thermal effects tends to occur at close range, but blast effects can cause damage over a larger distance from the blast center. Following are typical categories of ñre and explosion events: a. Vapor cloud explosion. b. Poolñre. c. Jet ñre. d. Flashñre. e. Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). from a combination of the following elements: The flammable events consequence is typically derived 1. Inherent tendency to ignite. 2. Volume of fluid released. 3 . Ability to flash to a vapor. 4. Possibility of auto-ignition. 5. Effects of higher pressure or higher temperature operations. 6. Engineered safeguards. 7. Personnel and equipment exposed to damage. 10.5.2 Toxic Releases Toxic releases, in RBI, are only addressed when they affect personnel (site and public). These releases can cause effects at greater distances than flammable events. Unlike flammable releases, toxic releases do not require an additional event (e.g., ignition, as in the case of flammables) to cause person- nel injuries. The RBI program typically focuses on acute toxic risks that create an immediate danger, rather than chronic risks from low-level exposures. The toxic consequence is typically derived from the fol- lowing elements: a. Volume of fluid released and toxicity. b. Ability to disperse under typical process and environmen- tal conditions. c. Detection and mitigation systems. d. Population in the vicinity of the release. 10.5.3 Releases of Other Hazardous Fluids Other hazardous fluid releases are of most concern in RBI assessments when they affect personnel. These materials can cause thermal or chemical burns if a person comes in contact with them. Common fluids, including steam, hot water, acids and caustics can have a safety consequence of a release and should be considered as part of a RBI program. Generally, the consequence of this type of release is significantly lower than for flammable or toxic releases because the affected area is likely to be much smaller and the magnitude of the hazard is less. Key parameters in this evaluation are: a. Volume of fluid released. b. Personnel density in the area. c. Type of fluid and nature of resulting injury. d. Safety systems (e.g., personnel protective clothing, show- ers etc.). Other considerations in the analysis are: e. Environmental damage if the spill is not contained. f. Equipment damage. For some reactive fluids, contact with equipment or piping may result in aggressive deterioration and failure. 10.5.4 Environmental Consequences Environmental consequences are an important component to any consideration of overall risk in a processing plant. The RBI program typically focuses on acute and immediate envi- ronmental risks, rather than chronic risks from low-level emissions. The environmental consequence is typically derived from the following elements: a. Volume of fluid released. b. Ability to flash to vapor. c. Leak containment safeguards. d. Environmental resources affected. e. Regulatory consequence (e.g., citations for violations, &es, potential shutdown by authorities). Liquid releases may result in contamination of soil, groundwater andor open water. Gaseous releases are equally important but more difficult to assess since the consequence COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 26 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 typically relates to local regulatory constraints and the pen- alty for exceeding those constraints. The consequences of environmental damage are best understood by cost. The cost may be calculated as follows: Environmental Cost = Cost for cleanup + Fines + Other costs The cleanup cost will vary depending on many factors. Some key factors are: 1. Type of spill-above ground, below ground, surface water etc. 2. Type of liquid. 3. Method of cleanup. 4. Volume of spill. 5. Accessibility and terrain at the spill location. The fine component cost will depend on the regulations and laws of the applicable local and federal jurisdictions. The other cost component would include costs that may be associated with the spill such as litigation from landowners or other parties. This component is typically specific to the locale of the facility. 10.5.5 Production Consequences Production consequences generally occur with any loss of containment of the process fluid and often with a loss of con- tainment of a utility fluid (water, steam, fuel gas, acid, caustic etc). These production consequences may be in addition to or independent of flammable, toxic, hazardous or environmental consequences. The main production consequences for RBI are financial. The financial consequences could include the value of the lost process fluid and business interruption. The cost of the lost fluid can be calculated fairly easily by multiplying the volume released by the value. Calculation of the business interruption is more complex. The selection of a specific method depends on: a. The scope and level of detail of the study. b. Availability of business interruption data. A simple method for estimating the business interruption consequence is to use the equation: Business Interruption = Process Unit Daily Value x Downtime (Days) The Unit Daily Value could be on a revenue or profit basis. The downtime estimate would represent the time required to get back into production. The Dow Fire and Explosion Index is a typical method of estimating downtime after a fire or explosion.More rigorous methods for estimating business interrup- tion consequences may take into account factors such as: a. Ability to compensate for damaged equipment (e.g., spare equipment, rerouting, etc.). b. Potential for damage to nearby equipment (knock-on damage). c. Potential for production loss to other units. Site specific circumstances should be considered in the business interruption analysis to avoid over or under stating this consequence. Examples of these considerations include: 1. Lost production may be compensated at another underutilized or idle facility. 2. Loss of profit could be compounded if other facilities use the unit’s output as a feedstock or processing fluid. 3. Repair of small damage cost equipment may take as long as large damage cost equipment. 4. Extended downtime may result in losing customers or market share, thus extending loss of profit beyond produc- tion restart. 5. Loss of hard to get or unique equipment items may require extra time to obtain replacements. 6. Insurance coverage. 10.5.6 Maintenance and Reconstruction Impact Maintenance and reconstruction impact represents the effort required to correct the failure and to fix or replace equipment damaged in the subsequent events (e.g., fire, explosion). The maintenance and reconstruction impact should be accounted for in the RBI program. Maintenance impact will generally be measured in monetary terms and typically includes: a. Repairs. b. Equipment replacement. 11 Risk Determination, Assessment and Management 11.1 PURPOSE This section describes the process of determining risk by combining the results of work done as described in Section 9 and 1 O. It also provides guidelines for prioritizing and assess- ing the acceptability of risk with respect to risk criteria. This work process leads to creating and implementing a risk man- agement plan. 11.2 DETERMINATION OF RISK 11.2.1 Determination of the Probability of a Specific Consequence Once the probabilities of failure and failure mode@) have been determined for the relevant deterioration mechanisms COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 27 (see Section 9), the probability of each credible consequence scenario should be determined. In other words, the loss of containment failure may only be the ñrst event in a series of events that lead to a specific consequence. The probability of credible events leading up to the specific consequence should be factored into the probability of the specific consequence occurring. For example, after a loss of containment the ñrst event may be initiation or failure of safeguards (isolation, alarms, etc.). The second event may be dispersion, dilution or accumulation of the fluid. The third event may be initiation of or failure to initiate preventative action (shutting down nearby ignition sources, neutralizing the fluid, etc) and so on until the specific consequence event (ñre, toxic release, injury, envi- ronmental release etc.) It is important to understand this linkage between the prob- ability of failure and the probability of possible resulting inci- dents. The probability of a specific consequence is tied to the severity of the consequence and may differ considerably from the probability of the equipment failure itself. Probabilities of incidents generally decrease with the severity of the incident. For example, the probability of an event resulting in a fatality will generally be less than the probability that the event will result in a ñrst aid or medical treatment injury. It is important to understand this relationship. Personnel inexperienced in risk assessment methods often link the probability of failure with the most severe conse- quences that can be envisioned. An extreme example would be coupling the POF of a deterioration mechanism where the mode of failure is a small hole leak with the consequence of a major ñre. This linkage would lead to an overly conservative risk assessment since a small leak will rarely lead to a major ñre. Each type of deterioration mechanism has its own char- acteristic failure mode(s). For a specific deterioration mecha- nism, the expected mode of failure should be taken into account when considering the probability of incidents in the aftermath of an equipment failure. For instance, the conse- quences expected from a small leak could be very different than the consequences expected from a brittle fracture. The following example serves to illustrate how the proba- bility of a specific consequence could be determined. The example has been simplified and the numbers used are purely hypothetical. Suppose a piece of equipment containing hydrocarbons is being assessed. An event tree starting with a loss of contain- ment could be depicted as shown in Figure 5. The probability of the specific consequence is the product of the probability of each event leading up to the specific con- sequence. In the example, the specific consequence being evaluated is a ñre. The probability of a ñre would be: Probability of Fire = (Probability of Failure) x (Probability of Ignition) Probability of Fire = 0.001 per year x 0.01 = 0.00OOi or i x io-5 per year The probability of no ñre encompasses two scenarios (loss of containment and no loss of containment). The probability of no ñre would be: Probability of No Fire = (Probability of Failure x Probability of Non-ignition) + Probability of No Failure Probability of No Fire = (0.001 per year x 0.99) + 0.999 per year = 0.99999 per year Note: The probability of all consequence scenarios should equal 1 .O. In the example, the probability of the specific consequence of a fire (1 X per year) plus the probability of no fire (9.9999 X 10-lper year) equals 1 .O. Typically, there will be other credible consequences that should be evaluated. However, it is often possible to deter- mine a dominant probability/consequence pair, such that it is not necessary to include every credible scenario in the analy- sis. Engineering judgment and experience should be used to eliminate trivial cases. 11.2.2 Calculate Risk Referring back to the Risk equation: Risk = Probability x Consequence it is now possible to calculate the risk for each specific con- sequence. The risk equation can now be stated as: Risk of a specific consequence = (Probability of a specific consequence) x (Specific Consequence) The total risk is the sum of the individual risks for each specific consequence. Often one probability/consequence pair will be dominant and the total risk can be approximated by the risk of the dominant scenario. For the example mentioned in 1 1.2.1, if the consequence of a ñre had been assessed at $1 x lo7 then the resulting risk would be: Risk of Fire = (1 x per year) x ($1 x lo7) = $100/year If probability and consequence are not expressed as numer- ical values, risk is usually determined by plotting the proba- bility and consequence on a risk matrix (see 11.6). Probability and consequence pairs for various scenarios may be plotted to determine risk of each scenario. Note that when a risk matrix is used, the probability to be plotted should be COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 28 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 the probability of the associated consequence, not the proba- bility of failure. 11.3 RISK MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AND ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF RISK 11.3.1 Risk Acceptance Risk-based inspection is a tool to provide an analysis of the risks of loss of containment of equipment. Many companies have corporate risk criteria defining acceptable and prudent levels of safety, environmental and hancial risks. These risk criteria should be used when makmgrisk-based inspection decisions. Because each company may be different in terms of acceptable risk levels, risk management decisions can vary among companies. Cost-benefit analysis is a powerful tool that is being used by many companies, governments and regulatory authorities as one method in determining risk acceptance. Users are referred to "A Comparison of Criteria for Acceptance of Risk" by the Pressure Vessel Research Council, for more information on risk acceptance. Risk acceptance may vary for different risks. For example, risk tolerance for an environ- mental risk may be higher than for a safetyíhealth risk. 11.3.2 Using Risk Assessment in Inspection and Maintenance Planning The use of risk assessment in inspection and maintenance planning is unique in that consequential information, which is traditionally operations-based, and probability of failure infor- mation, which is typically engineering'maintenance/inspec- tion-based, is combined to assist in the planning process. Part of this planning process is the determination of what to inspect, how to inspect (technique), and the extent of inspection (cover- age). Determining the risk of process units, or individual pro- cess equipment items facilitates this, as the inspections are now prioritized based on the risk value. The second part of this pro- cess is determining when to inspect the equipment. Under- standmg how risk varies with time facilitates this part of the process. Refer to Section 12 for a more detailed description of inspection planning based on risk analysis. 11.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS Understanding the value of each variable and how it influ- ences the risk calculation is key to identifying which input variables deserve closer scrutiny versus other variables which may not have significant effects. This is more important when performing risk analyses that are more detailed and quantitative in nature. Sensitivity analysis typically involves reviewing some or all input variables to the risk calculation to determine the overall influence on the resultant risk value. Once this analy- sis has been performed, the user can see which input variables significantly influence the risk value. Those key input vari- ables deserve the most focus or attention. It often is worthwhile to gather additional information on such variables. Typically, the preliminary estimates of proba- bility and consequence may be too conservative or too pessi- mistic; therefore, the information gathering performed after the sensitivity analysis should be focused on developing more certainty for the key input variables. This process should ulti- mately lead to a re-evaluation of the key input variables. As such, the quality and accuracy of the risk analysis should improve. This is an important part of the data validation phase of risk assessment. 11.5 ASSUMPTIONS Assumptions or estimates of input values are often used when consequence andor probability of failure data are not available. Even when data are known to exist, conservative estimates may be utilized in an initial analysis pending input of hture process or engineering modeling information, such as a sensitivity analysis. Caution is advised in being too con- servative, as overestimating consequences andor probability of failure values will unnecessarily inflate the calculated risk values. Presenting over inñated risk values may mislead inspection planners, management and insurers, and can create a lack of credibility for the user and the RBI process. Loss of containment Probability of failure = 1/1000 = 0.0011year Probability of non-ignition = 99/100 = 0.99 Probability of Ignition = 1/100 = 0.01 Figure 5-Example Event Tree COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 29 Qualitative Risk Matrix Figure 6-Example Risk Matrix Using Probability and Consequence Categories to Display Risk Rankings 11.6 RISK PRESENTATION Once risk values are developed, they can then be presented in a variety of ways to communicate the results of the analysis to decision-makers and inspection planners. One goal of the risk analysis is to communicate the results in a common for- mat that a variety of people can understand. Using a risk matrix or plot is helpful in accomplishing this goal. 11.6.1 Risk Matrix For risk rankuig methodologies that use consequence and probability categories, presenting the results in a risk matrix is a very effective way of communicating the distribution of risks throughout a plant or process unit without numerical values. An example risk matrix is shown in Figure 6. In this figure, the consequence and probability categories are arranged such that the highest risk rankuig is toward the upper right-hand corner. It is usually desirable to associate numerical values with the categories to provide guidance to the personnel performing the assessment (e.g., probability category C ranges from 0.001 to 0.01). Different sizes of matrices may be used (e.g., 5 x 5, 4 x 4, etc.). Regardless of the matrix selected, the consequence and probability catego- ries should provide sufficient discrimination between the items assessed. Risk categories may be assigned to the boxes on the risk matrix. An example risk categorization (higher, medium, lower) of the risk matrix is shown in Figure 6. In this example the risk categories are symmetrical. They may also be asym- metrical where for instance the consequence category may be given higher weighting than the probability category. 11.6.2 Risk Plots When more quantitative consequence and probability data are being used, and where showing numeric risk values is more meaningful to the stakeholders, a risk plot (or graph) is used (Figure 7). This graph is constructed similarly to the risk matrix in that the highest risk is plotted toward the upper right-hand corner. Often a risk plot is drawn using log-log scales for a better understanding of the relative risks of the items assessed. In the example plot in Figure 7, ten pieces of equipment are shown, as well as an iso-risk line (line of con- stant risk). If this line is the acceptable threshold of risk in this example, then equipment items 1,2 and 3 should be mitigated so that their resultant risk levels fall below the line. 11.6.3 Using a Risk Plot or Matrix Equipment items residing towards the upper right-hand corner of the plot or matrix (in the examples presented) will most likely take priority for inspection planning because these items have the highest risk. Similarly, items residing toward the lower left-hand corner of the plot (or matrix) will tend to take lower priority because these items have the low- est risk. Once the plots have been completed, the risk plot (or matrix) can then be used as a screening tool during the priori- tization process. 11.7 ESTABLISHING ACCEPTABLE RISK THRESHOLDS After the risk analysis has been performed, and risk values plotted, the risk evaluation process begins. Risk plots and matrices can be used to screen, and initially identify higher, COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 30 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 Risk dot ISO-risk line 2 c. Consequence mitigation: Can actions be taken to lessen the consequences related to an equipment failure? d. Probability mitigation: Can actions be taken to lessen the probability of failure such as metallurgy changes or equip- ment redesign? Risk management decisions can now be made on which mitigation actions(s) to take. Risk managementhitigation is covered fwther in Sections 12 and 13. I ’ O \ 3 Consequence of failure - Figure 7-Risk Plot when Using Quantitative or Numeric Riskvalues intermediate and lower risk equipmentitems. The equipment can also be ranked (prioritized) according to its risk value in tabular form. Thresholds that divide the risk plot, matrix or table into acceptable and unacceptable regions of risk can be developed. Corporate safety and hancial policies and con- straints or risk criteria inñuence the placement of the thresh- olds. Regulations and laws may also specify or assist in identifying the acceptable risk thresholds. Reduction of some risks to an acceptable level may not be practical due to technology and cost constraints. An “As Low As Reasonably Practical” (ALARP) approach to risk man- agement or other risk management approach may be neces- sary for these items. 11.8 RISK MANAGEMENT Based on the ranking of items and the risk threshold, the risk management process begins. For risks that are judged acceptable, no mitigation may be required and no fwther action necessary. For risks considered unacceptable and therefore requiring risk mitigation, there are various mitigation categories that should be considered: a. Decommission: Is the equipment really necessary to sup- port unit operation? b. Inspectiodcondition monitoring: Can a cost-effective inspection program, with repair as indicated by the inspection results, be implemented that will reduce risks to an acceptable level? 12 Risk Management with Inspection Activities 12.1 MANAGING RISK BY REDUCING UNCERTAINTYTHROUGH INSPECTION In previous sections, it has been mentioned that risk can be managed by inspection. Obviously, inspection does not arrest or mitigate deterioration mechanisms. Inspection serves to identify, monitor, and measure the deterioration mecha- nism(s). Also, it is invaluable input in the prediction of when the deterioration will reach a critical point. Correct applica- tion of inspections will improve the user’s ability to predict the deterioration mechanisms and rates of deterioration. The better the predictability, the less uncertainty there will be as to when a failure may occur. Mitigation (repair, replacement, changes etc.) can then be planned and implemented prior to the predicted failure date. The reduction in uncertainty and increase in predictability through inspection translate directly into a reduction in the probability of a failure and therefore a reduction in the risk. However, users should be diligent to assure that temporary inspection alternatives, in lieu of more permanent risk reductions, are effective. Risk mitigation achieved through inspection presumes that the organization will act on the results of the inspection in a timely manner. Risk mitigation is not achieved if inspection data that are gathered are not properly analyzed and acted upon where needed. The quality of the inspection data and the analysis or interpretation will geatly affect the level of risk mitigation. Proper inspection methods and data analysis tools are therefore critical. 12.2 IDENTIFYING RISK MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES FROM RBI AND PROBABILITY OF FAILURE RESULTS As discussed in Section 11, typically a risk priority list is developed. RBI will also identify whether consequence or probability of failure or both is driving risk. In the situations where risk is being driven by probability of failure, there is usually potential for risk management through inspection. Once a RBI assessment has been completed, the items with higher or unacceptable risk should be assessed for potential COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 31 risk management through inspection. Whether inspections will be effective or not will depend on: a. Equipment type. b. Active and credible deterioration mechanism(s). c. Rate of deterioration or susceptibility. d. Inspection methods, coverage and frequency. e. Accessibility to expected deterioration areas. f. Shutdown requirements. g. Amount of achievable reduction in probability of failure (POF) (Le., a reduction in POF of a low POF item may be dif- ficult to achieve through inspection). Depending on factors such as the remaining life of the equipment and type of dete- rioration mechanism, risk management through inspection may have little or no effect. Examples of such cases are: 1. Corrosion rates well-established and equipment near- ing end of life. 2. Instantaneous failures related to operating conditions such as brittle fracture. 3 . Inspection technology that is not sufficient to detect or quantifj deterioration adequately. 4. Too short a time frame from the onset of deterioration to h a 1 failure for periodic inspections to be effective (e.g., high-cycle fatigue cracking). 5. Event-driven failures (circumstances that cannot be predicted). In cases such as these, an alternative form of mitigation may be required. The most practical and cost effective risk mitigation strat- egy can then be developed for each item. Usually, inspection provides a major part of the overall risk management strategy. 12.3 ESTABLISHING AN INSPECTION STRATEGY BASED ON RISK ASSESSMENT The results of a RBI assessment and the resultant risk man- agement assessment may be used as the basis for the develop- ment of an overall inspection strategy for the group of items included. The inspection strategy should be designed in con- junction with other mitigation plans so that all equipment items will have resultant risks that are acceptable. Users should consider risk rank, risk drivers, item history, number and results of inspections, type and effectiveness of inspec- tions, equipment in similar service and remaining life in the development of their inspection strategy. Inspection is only effective if the inspection technique cho- sen is sufficient for detecting the deterioration mechanism and its severity. As an example, spot thickness readings on a piping circuit would be considered to have little or no benefit if the deterioration mechanism results in unpredictable local- ized corrosion (e.g., pitting, ammonia bisulfide corrosion, local thin area, etc.). In this case, ultrasonic scanning, radiog- raphy, etc. will be more effective. The level of risk reduction achieved by inspection will depend on: a. Mode of failure of the deterioration mechanism. b. Time interval between the onset of deterioration and fail- ure, (i.e., speed of deterioration). c. Detection capability of inspection technique. d. Scope of inspection. e. Frequency of inspection. Organizations should be deliberate and systematic in assigning the level of risk management achieved through inspection and should be cautious not to assume that there is an unending capacity for risk management through inspec- tion. The inspection strategy should be a documented, iterative process to assure that inspection activities are continually focused on items with higher risk and that the risks are effec- tively reduced by the implemented inspection activity. 12.4 MANAGING RISK WITH INSPECTION ACTIVITIES The effectiveness of past inspections is part of the determi- nation of the present risk. The future risk can now be impacted by future inspection activities. RBI can be used as a “what if’ tool to determine when, what and how inspections should be conducted to yield an acceptable future risk level. Key parameters and examples that can affect the future risk are: a. Frequency of inspection - Increasing the frequency of inspections may serve to better dehe , identifj or monitor the deterioration mechanism(s) and therefore reduce the risk. Both routine and turnaround inspection frequencies can be optimized. b. Coverage - Different zones or areas of inspection of an item or series of items can be modeled and evaluated to deter- mine the coverage that will produce an acceptable level of risk. For example: 1. A high risk piping system may be a candidate for extensiveinspection, using one or more NDE techniques targeted to locating the identified deterioration mechanisms. 2. An assessment may reveal the need for focus on parts of a vessel where the highest risk may be located and focus on quantifjing this risk rather than look at the rest of the vessel where there are perhaps only low risk deteriora- tion processes occurring. c. Tools and techniques - The selection and usage of the appropriate inspection tools and techniques can be optimized to cost effectively and safely reduce risk. In the selection of inspection tools and techniques, inspection personnel should take into consideration that more than one technology may achieve risk mitigation. However, the level of mitigation COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 32 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 achieved can vary depending on the choice. As an example, radiography may be more effective than ultrasonic for thick- ness monitoring in cases of localized corrosion. d. Procedures and practices - Inspection procedures and the actual inspection practices can impact the ability of inspec- tion activities to identify, measure andíor monitor deterioration mechanisms. If the inspection activities are exe- cuted effectively by well-trained and qualified inspectors, the expected risk management should be obtained. The user is cautioned not to assume that all inspectors and NDE examin- ers are well qualified and experienced, but rather to take steps to assure that they have the appropriate level of experience and qualifications. e. Internal or external inspection - Risk reductions by both internal and external inspections should be assessed. Often external inspection with effective on-stream inspection tech- niques can provide useful data for risk assessment. It is worth noting that invasive inspections, in some cases, may cause deterioration and increase the risk of the item. Examples where this may happen include: 1. Moisture ingress to equipment leading to SCC or poly- thionic acid cracking. 2. Internal inspection of glass lined vessels. 3 . Removal of passivating films. 4. Human errors in re-streaming. 5. Risk associated with shutting down and starting up equipment. The user can adjust these parameters to obtain the opti- mum inspection plan that manages risk, is cost effective, and is practical. 12.5 MANAGING INSPECTION COSTS WITH RBI Inspection costs can be more effectively managed through the utilization of RBI. Resources can be applied or shifted to those areas identified as a higher risk or targeted based on the strategy selected. Consequently, this same strategy allows consideration for reduction of inspection activities in those areas that have a lower risk or where the inspection activity has little or no affect on the associated risks. This results in inspec- tion resources being applied where they are needed most. Another opportunity for managing inspection costs is by identifying items in the inspection plan that can be inspected non-intrusively on-stream. If the non-intrusive inspection provides sufficient risk management, then there is a potential for a net savings based on not having to blind, open, clean, and internally inspect during downtime. If the item consid- ered is the main driver for bringing an operational unit down, then the non-intrusive inspection may contribute to increased uptime of the unit. The user should recognize that while there is a potential for the reduction of inspection costs through the utilization of RBI, equipment integrity and inspection cost optimization should remain the focus. 12.6 ASSESSING INSPECTION RESULTS AND DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTION Inspection results such as deterioration mechanisms, rate of deterioration and equipment tolerance to the types of dete- rioration should be used as variables in assessing remaining life and fiture inspection plans. The results can also be used for comparison or validation of the models that may have been used for probability of failure determination. A documented mitigation action plan should be developed for any equipment item requiring repair or replacement. The action plan should describe the extent of repair (or replace- ment), recommendations, the proposed repair method@), appropriate QNQC and the date the plan should be completed. 12.7 ACHIEVING LOWEST LIFE CYCLE COSTS WITH RBI Not only can RBI be used to optimize inspection costs that directly affect life cycle costs, it can assist in lowering overall life cycle costs through various cost benefit assessments. The following examples can give a user ideas on how to lower life cycle costs through RBI with cost benefit assessments. a. RBI should enhance the prediction of failures caused by deterioration mechanisms. This in turn should give the user confidence to continue to operate equipment safely, closer to the predicted failure date. By doing this, the equipment cycle time should increase and life cycle costs decrease. b. RBI can be used to assess the effects of changing to a more aggressive fluid. A subsequent plan to upgrade con- struction material or replace specific items can then be developed. The construction material plan would consider the optimized run length safely attainable along with the appro- priate inspection plan. This could equate to increased profits and lower life cycle costs through reduced maintenance, opti- mized inspections, and increased unit/equipment uptime. c. Turnaround and maintenance costs also have an affect on the life cycle costs of an equipment item. By using the results of the RBI inspection plan to identify more accurately where to inspect and what repairs and replacements to expect, turn- around and maintenance work can be preplanned and, in some cases, executed at a lower cost than if unplanned. 13 Other Risk Mitigation Activities 13.1 GENERAL As described in the previous section, inspection is often an effective method of risk management. However, inspection may not always provide sufficient risk mitigation or may not be the most cost effective method. The purpose of this section is to describe other methods of risk mitigation. This list is not COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 33 meant to be all inclusive. These risk mitigation activities fall into one or more of the following: a. Reduce the magnitude of consequence. b. Reduce the probability of failure. c. Enhance the survivability of the facility and people to the consequence. d. Mitigate the primary source of consequence. 13.2 EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT AND REPAIR When equipment deterioration has reached a point that the risk of failure cannot be managed to an acceptable level, replacementhepair is often the only way to mitigate the risk. 13.3 EVALUATING FLAWS FOR FITNESS-FOR- SERVICE Inspection may identify flaws in equipment. A fitness-for- service assessment (e.g., API RP 579) may be performed to determine if the equipment may continue to be safely oper- ated, under what conditions and for what time period. A fit- ness-for-service analysis can also be performed to determine what size flaws, if found in hture inspections, would require repair or equipment replacement. 13.4 EQUIPMENT MODIFICATION, REDESIGN AND RERATING Modification and redesign of equipment can provide miti- gation of probability of failure. Examples include: a. Change of metallurgy. b. Addition of protective linings and coatings. c. Removal of deadlegs. d. Increased corrosion allowance. e. Physical changes that will help to controhinimize deterioration. f. Insulation improvements. g. Injection point design changes. Sometimes equipment is over designed for the process conditions.Rerating the equipment may result in a reduction of the probability of failure assessed for that item. 13.5 EMERGENCY ISOLATION Emergency isolation capability can reduce toxic, explosion or ñre consequences in the event of a release. Proper location of the isolation valves is key to successful risk mitigation. Remote operation is usually required to provide significant risk reduction. To mitigate flammable and explosion risk, operations need to be able to detect the release and actuate the isolation valves quickly (within a few minutes). Longer response times may still mitigate effects of ongoing ñres or toxic releases. 13.6 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZING/ DE-INVENTORY This method reduces the amount and rate of release. Like emergency isolation, the emergency depressurizing and/or de-inventory needs to be achieved within a few minutes to affect explosion/ñre risk. 13.7 MODIFY PROCESS Mitigation of the primary source of consequence can be achieved by changing the process towards less hazardous conditions. Examples: a. Reduce temperature to below atmospheric pressure boil- ing point to reduce size of cloud. b. Substitute a less hazardous material (e.g., high flash sol- vent for a low flash solvent). c. Use a continuous process instead of a batch operation. d. Dilute hazardous substances. 13.8 REDUCE INVENTORY This method reduces the magnitude of consequence. Some examples: a. Reduce/eliminate storage of hazardous feedstocks or inter- mediate products. b. Modify process control to permit a reduction in inventory contained in surge drums, reflux drums or other in-process inventories. c. Select process operations that require less inventory/hold- UP. d. Substitute gas phase technology for liquid phase. 13.9 WATER SPRAYIDELUGE This method can reduce ñre damage and minimize or pre- vent escalation. A properly designed and operating system can greatly reduce the probability that a vessel exposed to ñre will BLEW. 13.10 WATER CURTAIN Water sprays entrap large amounts of air into a cloud. Water curtains mitigate water soluble vapor clouds by absorp- tion as well as dilution and insoluble vapors (including most flammables) by air dilution. Early activation is required in order to achieve significant risk reduction. The curtain should preferably be between the release location and ignition sources (e.g., fwnaces) or locations where people are likely to be present. Design is critical for flammables, since the water curtain can enhance flame speed under some circumstances. 13.1 1 BLAST-RESISTANT CONSTRUCTION Utilizing blast resistant construction provides mitigation of the damage caused by explosions and may prevent escalation COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 34 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 of the incident. When used for buildings (see API RP 752), it may provide personnel protection from the effects of an explosion. This may also be useful for equipment critical to emergency response, critical instrument/control lines, etc. 13.12 OTHERS a. Spill detectors. b. Steam or air curtains. c. Fireproofing. d. Instrumentation (interlocks, shut-down systems, alarms, etc.). e. Inerting/gas blanketing. f. Ventilation of buildings and enclosed structures. g. Piping redesign. h. Mechanical flow restriction. i. Ignition source control. j . Improved design standards. k. Improvement in process safety management program. 1. Emergency evacuation. m. Shelters (safe havens). n. Toxic scrubbers on building vents. o. Spill containment. p. Facility siting. q. Condition monitoring. r. Improved training and procedures. 14 Reassessment and Updating RBI Assessments 14.1 RBI REASSESSMENTS RBI is a dynamic tool that can provide current and pro- jected future risk evaluations. However, these evaluations are based on data and knowledge at the time of the assessment. As time goes by, changes are inevitable and the results from the RBI assessment should be updated. It is important to maintain and update a RBI program to assure the most recent inspection, process, and maintenance information is included. The results of inspections, changes in process conditions and implementation of maintenance practices can all have significant effects on risk and can trig- ger the need to perform a reassessment. 14.2 WHY CONDUCT A RBI REASSESSMENT? There are several events that will change risks and make it prudent to conduct a RBI reassessment. It is important that the facility have an effective management of change process that identifies when a reassessment is necessary. Sections 14.2.1 through 14.2.4 provide guidance on some key factors that could trigger a RBI reassessment. 14.2.1 Deterioration Mechanisms and Inspection Activities Many deterioration mechanisms are time dependent. Typi- cally, the RBI assessment will project deterioration at a con- tinuous rate. In reality, the deterioration rate may vary over time. Through inspection activities, the average rates of dete- rioration may be better defined. Some deterioration mechanisms are independent of time (i.e., they occur only when there are specific conditions present). These conditions may not have been predicted in the original assessment but may have subsequently occurred. Inspection activities will increase information on the con- dition of the equipment. When inspection activities have been performed, the results should be reviewed to determine if a RBI reassessment is necessary. 14.2.2 Process and Hardware Changes Changes in process conditions and hardware changes, such as equipment modifications or replacement, frequently can significantly alter the risks, and dictate the need for a reas- sessment. Process changes, in particular, have been linked to equipment failure from rapid or unexpected corrosion or cracking. This is particularly important for deterioration mechanisms that depend heavily on process conditions. Typ- ical examples include chloride stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel, wet H2S cracking of carbon steel and sour water corrosion. In each case, a change in process conditions can dramatically affect the corrosion rate or cracking tenden- cies. Hardware changes can also have an effect on risk. For example: a. The probability of failure can be affected by changes in the design of internals in a vessel or size and shape of piping sys- tems that accelerate velocity related corrosion effects. b. The consequence of failure can be affected by the reloca- tion of a vessel to an area near an ignition source. 14.2.3 RBI Assessment Premise Change The premises for the RBI assessment could change and have a significant impact on the risk results. Some of the pos- sible changes could be: a. Increase or decrease in population density. b. Change in materials and repaidreplacement costs. c. Change in product values. d. Revisions in safety and environmental laws and regulations. e. Revisions in the users risk management plan (such as changes in risk criteria). 14.2.4 The Effect of Mitigation Strategies Strategies to mitigate risks such as installation of safety systems, repairs etc. should be monitored to assure they have COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 35 successfully achieved the desired mitigation. Once a mitiga- tion strategy is implemented, a reassessment of the risk may be performed to update the RBI program. 14.3 WHEN TO CONDUCTA RBI REASSESSMENT 14.3.1 After Significant Changes As discussed in 14.2, significant changes in risk can occur for a variety of reasons. Qualified personnel should evaluate each significant change to determine the potential for a change in risk. It may be desirable to conduct a RBIreassess- ment after significant changes in process conditions, deterio- ration mechanisms/rates/severities or RBI premises. 14.3.2 After a SetTime Period Although significant changes may not have occurred, over time many small changes may occur and cumulatively cause significant changes in the RBI assessment. Users should set default maximum time periods for reassessments. The gov- erning inspection codes (such as API 510, 570 and 653) and jurisdictional regulations should be reviewed in this context. 14.3.3 After Implementation of Risk Mitigation Strategies Once a mitigation strategy is implemented, it is prudent to determine how effective the strategy was in reducing the risk to an acceptable level. This should be reflected in a reassess- ment of the risk and appropriate update in the documentation. 14.3.4 Before and After Maintenance Turnarounds As part of the planning before a maintenance turnaround, it could be useful to perform a RBI reassessment. This can become a ñrst step in planning the turnaround to insure the work effort is focused on the higher risk equipment items and on issues that might affect the ability to achieve the premised operating run time in a safe, economic and environmentally sound manner. Since a large amount of inspection, repairs and modifica- tions are performed during a maintenance turnaround, it may be useful to update an assessment after the turnaround to reflect the new risk levels. 15 Roles, Responsibilities, Training and Qualifications 15.1 TEAM APPROACH RBI requires data gathering from many sources, special- ized analysis, and then risk management decision-makmg. Generally, one individual does not have the background or skills to single-handedly conduct the entire study. Usually, a team of people, with the requisite skills and background, is needed to conduct an effective RBI assessment. Section 15.2 sets out a listing of a typical RBI team. Depending on the application, some of the disciplines listed may not be required. Some team members may be part-time due to lim- ited input needs. It is also possible that not all the team mem- bers listed may be required if other team members have the required skill and knowledge of multiple disciplines. It may be useful to have one of the team members to serve as a facil- itator for discussion sessions and team interactions. 15.2 TEAM MEMBERS, ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES 15.2.1 Team Leader The team leader may be any one of the below mentioned team members. The team leader should be a full-time team member, and should be a stakeholder in the facility/equip- ment being analyzed. The team leader typically is responsi- ble for: a. Formation of the team and verifiing that the team mem- bers have the necessary skills and knowledge. b. Assuring that the study is conducted properly. 1. Data gathered is accurate. 2. Assumptions made are logical and documented. 3. Appropriate personnel are utilized to provide data and assumptions. 4. Appropriate quality and validity checks are employed on data gathered and on the data analysis. c. Preparing a report on the RBI study and distributing it to the appropriate personnel whom are either responsible for decisions on managing risks or responsible for implementing actions to mitigate the risks. d. Following up to assure that the appropriate risk mitigation actions have been implemented. 15.2.2 Equipment Inspector or Inspection Specialist The equipment inspector or inspection specialist is gener- ally responsible for gathering data on the condition and his- tory of equipment in the study. This condition data should include the new/design condition and current condition. Gen- erally, this information will be located in equipment inspec- tion and maintenance files. If condition data are unavailable, the inspector/specialist, in conjunction with the materials and corrosion specialist, should provide predictions of the current condition. The inspector/specialist and materials & corrosion specialist are also responsible for assessing the effectiveness of past inspections. The equipment inspector/inspection spe- cialist is usually responsible for implementing the recom- mended inspection plan derived from the RBI study. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 36 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 15.2.3 Materials and Corrosion Specialist The materials and corrosion specialist is responsible for assessing the types of deterioration mechanisms and their applicability and severity to the equipment considering the process conditions, environment, metallurgy, age, etc., of the equipment. This specialist should compare this assessment to the actual condition of the equipment, determine the reason for differences between predicted and actual condition, and then provide guidance on deterioration mechanisms, rates or severity to be used in the RBI study. Part of this comparison should include evaluating the appropriateness of the inspec- tions in relation to the deterioration mechanism. This special- ist also should provide recommendations on methods of mitigating the probability of failure (such as changes in met- allurgy, addition of inhibition, addition of coatings/linings, etc.) and methods of monitoring the process for possible changes in deterioration rates (such as pH monitoring, corro- sion rate monitoring, contaminant monitoring, etc.). 15.2.4 Process Specialist The process specialist is responsible for the provision of process condition information. This information generally will be in the form of process flow sheets. The process spe- cialist is responsible for documenting variations in the pro- cess conditions due to normal occurrences (such as start-ups and shutdowns) and abnormal occurrences. The process spe- cialist is responsible for describing the composition and vari- ability of all the process fluiddgases as well as their potential toxicity and flammability. The process specialist should eval- uate/recommend methods of risk mitigation (probability or consequence) through changes in process conditions. 15.2.5 Operations and Maintenance Personnel This person(s) is responsible for veri@ing that the facility/ equipment is being operated within the parameters set out in the process operating envelope. They are responsible for pro- viding data on occurrences when the process deviated from the limits of the process operating envelope. They are also responsible for veri@ing that equipment repairdreplace- mentdadditions have been included in the equipment condi- tion data supplied by the equipment inspector. Operations and maintenance are responsible for implementing recom- mendations that pertain to process or equipment modifica- tions and monitoring. 15.2.6 Management Management’s role is to provide sponsorship and resources (personnel and funding) for the RBI study. They are respon- sible for making decisions on risk management or providing the frameworlúmechanism for others to make these decisions based on the results of the RBI study. Finally, management is responsible for providing the resources and follow-up system to implement the risk mitigation decisions. 15.2.7 Risk Assessment Personnel This person@) is responsible for assembling all of the data and carrying out the RBI analysis. This person@) is typically responsible for: a. Defking data required from other team members. b. Defking accuracy levels for the data. c. Veri@ing through quality checks the soundness of data and assumptions. d. Inputtingítransferring data into the computer program and running the program (if one is used). e. Quality control of data input/output. f. Manually calculating the measures of risk (if a computer program is not used). g. Displaying the results in an understandable way and pre- paring appropriate reports onthe RBI analysis. Furthermore, this person@) should be a resource to the team conducting a riskhenefit analysis if it is deemed necessary. 15.2.8 Environmental and Safety Personnel This person@) is responsible for providing data on environ- mental and safety systems and regulations. He/she also is responsible for assessing/recommending ways to mitigate the consequence of failures. 15.2.9 FinanciallBusiness Personnel This person(s) is responsible for providing data on the cost of the facility/equipment being analyzed and the financial impact of having pieces of equipment or the facility shut down. He/she also should recommend methods for mitigat- ing the financial consequence of failure. 15.3 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR RBI APPLICATION 15.3.1 Risk Assessment Personnel This person@) should have a thorough understanding of risk analysis either by education, training, or experience. He/ she should have received detailed training on the RBI meth- odology and on the procedures being used for the RBI study so that he/she understands how the program operates and the vital issues that affect the final results. Contractors that provide risk assessment personnel for con- ducting RBI analysis should have a program of training and be able to document that their personnel are suitably qualified and experienced. Facility owners that have internal risk assessment personnel conduct RBI analysis should have a procedure to document that their personnel are sufficiently COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 37 qualified. The qualifications and training of the risk assess- ment personnel should be documented. 15.3.2 Other Team Members The other team members should receive basic training on RBI methodology and on the program(s) being used. This training should be geared primarily to an understanding and effective application of RBI. This training could be provided by the risk assessment personnel on the RBI Team or by another person knowledgeable on RBI methodology and on the program(s) being used. 16 RBI Documentation and Record- keeping 16.1 GENERAL It is important that sufficient information is captured to fully document the RBI assessment. Typically, this documen- tation should include the following data: a. The type of assessment. b. Team members performing the assessment. c. Time frame over which the assessment is applicable. d. The inputs and sources used to determine risk. e. Assumptions made during the assessment. f. The risk assessment results (including information on probability and consequence). g. Follow-up mitigation strategy, if applicable, to manage risk. h. The mitigated risk levels (Le., residual risk after mitigation is implemented). i. References to codes or standards that have jurisdiction over extent or frequency of inspection. Ideally, sufficient data should be captured and maintained such that the assessment can be recreated or updated at a later time by others who were not involved in the original assess- ment. To facilitate this, it is preferable to store the informa- tion in a computerized database. This will enhance the analysis, retrieval, and stewardship capabilities. The useful- ness of the database will be particularly important in steward- ing recommendations developed from the RBI assessment, and managing overall risk over the specified time frame. 16.2 RBI METHODOLOGY The methodology used to perform the RBI analysis should be documented so that it is clear what type of assessment was performed. The basis for both the probability and conse- quences of failure should be documented. If a specific soft- ware program is used to perform the assessment, this also should be documented and maintained. The documentation should be sufficiently complete so that the basis and the logic for the decision making process can be checked or replicated at a later time. 16.3 RBI PERSONNEL The assessment of risk will depend on the knowledge, experience and judgment of the personnel or team performing the analysis. Therefore, a record of the team members involved should be captured. This will be helpful in under- standing the basis for the risk assessment when the analysis is repeated or updated. 16.4 TIME FRAME The level of risk is usually a function of time. This either is as a result of the time dependence of a deterioration mecha- nism, or simply the potential for changes in the operation of equipment. Therefore, the time frame over which the RBI analysis is applicable should be dehed and captured in the h a 1 documentation. This will permit tracking and manage- ment of risk effectively over time. 16.5 ASSIGNMENT OF RISK The various inputs used to assess both the probability and consequence of failure should be captured. This should include, but not be limited to, the following information: a. Basic equipment data and inspection history critical to the assessment, e.g., operating conditions, materials of construc- tion, service exposure, corrosion rate, inspection history, etc. b. Operative and credible deterioration mechanisms. c. Criteria used to judge the severity of each deterioration mechanism. d. Anticipated failure mode(s) (e.g., leak or rupture). e. Key factors used to judge the severity of each failure mode. f. Criteria used to evaluate the various consequence catego- ries, including safety, health, environmental and hancial. g. Risk criteria used to evaluate the acceptability of the risks. 16.6 ASSUMPTIONS MADE TO ASSESS RISK Risk analysis, by its very nature, requires that certain assumptions be made regarding the nature and extent of equipment deterioration. Moreover, the assignment of failure mode and the severity of the contemplated event will invari- ably be based on a variety of assumptions, regardless of whether the analysis is quantitative or qualitative. To under- stand the basis for the overall risk, it is essential that these fac- tors be captured in the h a 1 documentation. Clearly documenting the key assumptions made during the analysis of probability and consequence will greatly enhance the capa- bility to either recreate or update the RBI assessment. 16.7 RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS The probability, consequence and risk results should be captured in the documentation. For items that require risk COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 38 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 mitigation, the results after mitigation should be documented as well. 16.8 MITIGATION AND FOLLOW-UP One of the most important aspects of managing risk through RBI is the development and use of mitigation strate- gies. Therefore, the specific risk mitigation required to reduce either probability or consequence should be docu- mented in the assessment. The mitigation “credit” assigned to a particular action should be captured along with any time dependence. The methodology, process and person@) respon- sible for implementation of any mitigation should also be documented. 16.9 CODES, STANDARDS AND GOVERNMENT REG U LATI ON S Since various codes, standards and governmental regula- tions cover the inspection for most pressure equipment, it will be important to reference these documents as part of the RBI assessment. This is particularly important where implemen- tation of RBI is used to reduce either the extent or frequency of inspection. Refer to Section 2 for a listing of some relevant codes and standards. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services APPENDIX A-DETERIORATION MECHANISMS Behavior Localized Localized Localized LocalizedDeterioration Mechanism Iydrochloric Acid :orrosion Key Variables Acid %, pH, materials of construction,tem- perature Joined materials of construction, distance in galvanic series W H S % in water @Pl, velocity, PH Carbon dioxide con- jalvanic :orrosion Localized Localized Localized Localized 3eneral at low telocities, local- zed at high telocities 3eneral uni- Form corrosion 3eneral to iighly ocalized immonia Bisul- ide Corrosion Acid %, pH, material of construction, tem- perature, velocity, oxi- dants Acid %, pH, material of construction, tem- perature, velocity, oxidants Acid %, pH, material of construction, temperature Acid %, pH, material of construction, temperature Amine type and con- centration, material of construction, tempera- ture, acid gas loading, velocity Presence of oxygen, temperature range and the availability of watedmoisture Presence of oxygen, temperature range and the availability of watedmoisture and corrosive constituents within the insulation. :arbon Dioxide Carbonic Acid) :orrosion Wlu-ic Acid :orrosion Iydrofluoric Acid :orrosion 'hosphoric Acid :orrosion 'heno1 (carbolic icid) Corrosion imine Corrosion itmosp heric :orrosion :orrosion Under nsulation Table I-Thinning Description Typically causes localized corrosion in car- bon and low alloy steel, particularly at initia condensation points (< 400°F). Austenitic stainless steels experience pitting and crev- ice corrosion. Nickel alloys can corrode under oxidizing conditions. Occurs when two metals are joined and exposed to an electrolyte. Highly localized metal loss due to erosion corrosion in carbon steel and admiralty brass. Carbon dioxide is a weakly acidic gas whicl is corrosive when dissolved in water becom ing carbonic acid @€2CO3). CO2 is com- monly found in upstream sections before treatment. Aqueous CO2 corrosion of carbor and low alloy steels is an electrochemical process involving the anodic dissolution of iron and the cathodic evolution of hydro- gen. The reactions are often accompanied by the formation of films of FeC03 (and/or Fe304) that can be protective or non-protec- tive deuending. on the conditions. Very strong acid that causes metal loss in various materials and depends on many factors. Very strong acid that causes metal loss in various materials. Weak acid that causes metal loss. Generally added for biological corrosion inhibition in water treatment. Weak organic acid causing corrosion and metal loss in various alloys. Used in gas treatment to remove dissolved CO2 and H2S acid gases. Corrosion gener- ally caused by desorbed acid gases or amine deterioration products. The general corrosion process occurring under atmospheric conditions where carbon steel v e ) is converted to iron oxide FqO3. CUI is a specific case of atmospheric corro- sion where the temperatures and the concen trations of watedmoisture can be higher. Often residualítrace corrosive elements can also be leached out of the insulation materia itself creating a more corrosive environmeni Examples Crude unit atmospheric column overhead, Hydrotreating effluent trains, Catalytic reforming effluent and regeneration systems. Seawater and some cooling water services. Formed by thermal or catalytic cracking in hydrotreating, hydroc- racking, coking, catalytic cracking, amine treating and sour water efflu- ent and gas separation systems. Refinery steam condensate system, hydrogen plant and the vapor recov ery section of catalytic cracking unit. Sulfuric acid alkylation units, dem- ineralized water. Hydrofluoric acid alkylation units, demineralized water. Water treatment plants. Heavy oil and dewaxing plants. Amine gas treating units. This process is readily apparent in high temperature processes where carbon steels have been used with- out protective coatings (steam pip- ing for example). Insulated piping/vessels. 39 COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 40 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 Deterioration Mechanism Soil Corrosion High Temperature julfidic Corrosion without H2 High Temperature julfidic Corrosion with H2 Vaphthenic Acid 2orrosion 3xidation Table I-Thinning Description Metallic structures in contact with soil will corrode. A corrosive process similar to atmospheric corrosion in the presence of oxygen. In this case the carbon steel (Fe) is converted in the presence of sulfur to iron sulfide ves) . Conversion rate (and therefore corrosion rate) is dependent on temperature of opera- tion and sulfur concentration. With the presence of hydrogen, a signifi- cantly more aggressive case of sulfidation (sulfidic corrosion) can exist. Naphthenic acid corrosion is attack of steel alloys by organic acids that condense in the range of 350°F to 750°F. The presence of potentially harmful amounts of naphthenic acids in crude may be signified by higher neutralization numbers. A high temperature corrosion reaction where metal is converted to a metal oxide above specific temperatures. Behavior General to localized General uni- form corrosion General uni- form corrosion Localized corrosion General uni- form corrosion Key Variables Material of construc- tion. soil characteris- tics, type of coating. Sulfur concentration and temperature. Sulfur and hydrogen concentration and ten perature. Niipliilieiiic oipiiiiic iicid coiicciiiriiiioii ;in( iemperiiilire. Temperature, presenci of air, material of con struction. Examples Tank bottoms, underground piping. All locations where there is suffi- cient temperature (450°F minimum) and sulfur is present in quantities greater than 0.2%. Common loca- tions are crude, coker, FCC, and hydroprocessing units. All locations where there is suffi- cient temperature (450°F minimum and sulfur is present in quantities greater than 0.2%. Areas of hydro- processing units- reactor feed dowr stream of the hydrogen mix point, the reactor, the reactor effluent and the recycle hydrogen gas including the exchangers, heaters, separators, piping, etc. Middle section of a vacuum column in a crude unit (primarily in the MVGO cut), can also occur in atmospheric distillation units, fur- naces and transfer lines. Outside of furnace tubes, furnace tube hangers, and other internal fur- nace components exposed to com- bustion pases containing. excess air. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 41 Key Variables k i d (chloride) concentra- ion, pH, material of con- itruction, temperature, àbrication, stresses ipproaching yield. Zaustic concentration, pH, naterial of construction, emperature, stress. víatenal of construction, iensitized microstructure, iresence of water, poly- hionic acid. \mine type and concentra- ion, material of construc- ion, temperature, stress. Deterioration Mechanism 2hloride Cracking Examples Externally present in equipment witl poor insulation and weatherproofing downwind of cooling water spray and equipment exposed to fire water Internally wherever chlorides can be present with water such as atmo- spheric column overheads of crude units and reactor effluent condensing streams. Caustic treating sections, caustic ser vice, mercaptan treatment, crude unit feed preheat desalting, sour water treatment, steam systems. Generally occurs in austenitic stain- less steel materials in catalytic crack ing unit reactor and flue gas systems desulfurizer furnaces and hydropro- cessing units. Amine treating units. 2austic Cracking emperature, stress. 'olythionic Acid :racking duction and handling suchas over- head condensation where ammonia is a neutralizer. imine Cracking immonia :racking Iydrogen Induced :racking / Stress Iriented Hydro- ;en Induced :racking hlfide Stress :racking Table 2-Stress Corrosion Cracking Description Cracking that can initiate from the ID or OD of austenitic stainless steel equipment, primarily due to fabrica- tion or residual stresses. Some applied stresses can also cause cracking. Cracking primarily initiated from the ID of carbon steel equipment, prima- rily due to fabrication or residual stresses. C'riickiiig o t'iitisieiiiiic siiiiiiless steels i i i ilie seiisiii/ed coiidiiioii (due i o Iiipli ieiiiperiiitire expostire o r \veldiiig) i i i ilic preseiicc ol'polyiliioiiic ticid i i i \ \vi . iiiiibieiii coiidiiioiis. Polyiliioiiic iicid is 1i)riiied by ii coii\wsioii ol'FeS i i i ilie preseiice ol'\\'iiier iiiid oxypeii. Amine is used in gas treatment to remove dissolved CO2 and H2S acid gases. Cracking generally caused by desorbed acid gases or amine deterio- ration products. Cracking of carbon steel and admiralty brass. Occurs in carbon and low alloy steel materials in the presence of water and H2S. Deterioration of the material properties is caused when atomic hydrogen, generated through corro- sion, diffuses into the material and reacts with other atomic hydrogen to form molecular hydrogen gas in inclu- sions of the steel. Detenoration can take the form of blisters and step-wise cracking in stress relieved equipment and non-stress relieved equipment. Occurs in carbon and low alloy steel materials in the presence of water and H2S. Deterioration takes the form of cracking in non or improperly stress relieved equipment. Behavior ïransgranular :racking. ïypically, inter- granular, also :an be trans- granular crack- ing. Intergranular :racking. Intergranular :racking. Intergranular :racking in car- bon steel, trans- granular in sopper zinc Planar cracks [blisters), ïransgranular :racks as blis- ters progress toward welds. alloys. ïransgranular :racking, nor- mally associ- ated with fabrication, attachment and reuair welds. I víatenal of construction, I Generally present in ammonia pro- I 32s concentration, water, I Anywhere that H2S is present with emperature, pH, material If construction. 32s concentration, water, emperature, pH, material If construction, post weld ieat treatment condition, iardness water such as crude units, catalytic cracking compression and gas recov ery, hydroprocessing, sour water anc coker units. water such as crude units, catalytic cracking compression and gas recov ery, hydroprocessing, sour water anc coker units. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 42 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 Description Occurs in carbon and low alloy steel materials in the presence of water and H2S. Deterioration of the material properties is caused by atomic hydro- gen generated through corrosion dif- fuses into the material and reacts with other atomic hydrogen to form molec- ular hydrogen gas in inclusions of the steel. Deterioration takes the form of planar blisters and can occur in stress relieved and non-stress relieved equip- ment. Presence if hydrogen cyanide can pro- mote hydrogen deterioration (SOHIC, SCC, and blistering) by destabilizing the iron sulfide protective surface scale. Deterioration Mechanism Behavior Planar cracks (blisters). Planar cracks (blisters) and transgranular cracking. Iydrogen Ilistering Hydrogen Cyanide Cracking Table 2-Stress Corrosion Cracking Key Variables 32s concentration, water, emperature, pH, material )f construction. Zresence of HCN, H2S con :entration, water, tempera- ure, pH, material of :onstruction. Examples 4nywhere that H2S is present with Mater such as crude units, catalytic :racking compression and gas recov xy, hydroprocessing, sour water anc :oker units. 4nywhere that H2S is present with Mater such as crude units, catalytic :racking compression and gas recov xy, hydroprocessing, sour water anc :oker units. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 43 Description Occurs in carbon and low alloy steel Deterioration Mechanism High-Temperature Hydrogen Attack Behavior Intergranular fis- Grain Growth Key Variables Matenal of construction, hydrogen partial pressure, temperature, time in ser- vice. Maximum temperature reached, time at maximum temperature, material of construction. Material of construction, temperature and time of expo sure. Material of construction, temperature and time of expo sure. Graphitization Examples Typically occurs in reaction sections of hydrocarbon pro- cessing units such as hydro- desulfurizers, hydrocrackers, hydroforming and hydrogen production units. Furnace tubes failures, fire damaged equipment, equip- ment susceptible to run-away reactions. FCC reactor. Cast furnace tubes and compo. nents, regenerator cyclones in FCC unit. Sigma Phase Embrittlement with carbon from the steel, forming methane gas and depleting the steel of carbon. Occurs when steels are heated above a certain temperature, begin- ning about 1100°F for CS and most pronounced at 1350°F. Austenitic stainless steels and high nickel- chromium alloys do not become subject to grain growth until heated to above 1650°F. Occurs when the normal pearlite grains in steels decompose into soft weak femte grains and graphite nodules usually due to long term exposure in the 825"F-140OoF range. Occurs when austenitic and other stainless steels with more than 17% chromium are held in the range of 1000"F-1500"F for extended time periods. Occurs after aging of femte con- taining stainless steels at 650°F- 1000°F and produces a loss of ambient temperature ductility. Occurs when low alloy steels are held for long periods of time in tem- perature range of 7OO0F-1050"F. There is a loss of toughness that is not evident at operating temperature but rather shows up at ambient tem- perature and can result in brittle fracture. Form of catastrophic brittle failure of a normally ductile metal caused when it is in, or has been in, contact with a liquid metal and is stressed in tension. Examples include stainles: steel and zinc combination and cop 885°F Embrittlement Localized Localized Generalized Generalized Generalized Localized ïemper Embrittlement Material of construction, temperature and time of expo sure. Material of construction, tension stress, presence of liquid metal. Liquid Metal Embrittlement During shutdown and start-up conditions the problem may appear for equipment in older refinery units that have oper- ated long enough for this con- dition to develop. Hydrotreating and hydrocrack. ing units are of interest because they are used at elevated tem- peratures. Mercury is found in some crude oils and subsequent refinery distillation can con- dense and concentrate it at lorn spots in equipment such as condenser shells. Failure of process instruments that utilize mercury has been known to introduce the liquid metal into refinery streams. Table 3-Meta I I u rg ica I and Envi ronm enta I Fa i I u res materials in the presence of high temperature and hydrogen, usually as a part of the hydrocarbon stream. At elevated temperatures (> 500°F) deterioration of the material proper ties is caused by methane gas form ing fissures along the grain boundaries. Atomic hydrogen dif- fuses into the material and reacts sure cracking, decarburization. temperature. steels during shutdowns. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensedby Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 44 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 580 Table 3-Meta I I u rg ica I and Envi ronm enta I Fa i I u res Deterioration Mechanism Carburization Decarburization Metal Dusting Selective Leaching Description Caused by carbon diffusion into the steel at elevated temperatures. The increased carbon content results in an increase in the hardenability of ferritic steels and some stainless steels. When carburized steel is cooled a brittle structure can result. Loss of carbon from the surface of i ferrous alloy as a result of heating ir a medium that reacts with carbon. Highly localized carburization and subsequent wastage of steels exposed to mixtures of hydrogen, methane, CO, COZ, and light hydro carbons in the temperature range oí 900"F-1500"F. Preferential loss of one alloy phase in a multiphase alloy. Behavior Localized Localized Localized Localized Key Variables Material of construction, temperature and time of sxpo sure. Material of construction, temperature environment. ïemperature, process stream composition. Process stream flow condi- tions, material of construc- tion. Examples Furnace tubes having coke deposits are a good candidate for carburization (ID). Carbon steel furnace tubes (OD). Result of excessive over heating (fire). Dehydrogenation units, fired heaters, coker heaters, cracking units and gas turbines. Admiralty tubes used in cool- ing water systems. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services RISK-BASED INSPECTION 45 Description Failure of a component by cracking after the continued application of cyclic stress which exceeds the material's endurance limit. Deterioration Mechanism Mechanical Fatigue Behavior Localized Corrosion Fatigue Form of fatigue where a corrosion process, typically pitting corrosion adds or promotes the mechanical fatigue process. Caused by the rapid formation and collapse of vapor bubbles in liquid at a metal surface as a result of pres- sure variations. Typical examples are the misuse of tools and equipment, wind deterio- ration, careless handling when equipment is moved or erected. Occurs when loads in excess of the maximum permitted by design are applied to equipment. Application of pressure in excess of the maximum allowable working pressure of the equipment under consideration. Loss of ductility wherein the steel is referred to as having low notch toughness or uoor imuact strength. Cavitation Localized Localized N/A N/A N/A Localized Mec hanical Deterioration High temperature mechanism wherein continuous plastic defor- mation of a metal takes place while under stresses below the normal yield strength. Time to failure for a metal at ele- vated temperatures under applied stress below its normal yield strength. Occurs when large and non-uniform thermal stresses develop over a rela- tively short time in a piece of equip- ment due to differential expansion or contraction. If movement of the equipment is restrained this can pro- duce stresses above the yield strength of the material. Thermal fatigue is a process of cyclic changes in stress in a material due to cyclic change in temperature. Overloading Localized Localized Localized Localized Over-pressuring Brittle Fracture Creep Stress Rupture ïhermal Shock ïhermal Fatigue Table 4-Mechanical Failures Key Variables Cyclic stress level, materia of construction. Cyclic stress, material of zonstruction, pitting poten tia1 of the process stream. Pressure head value along the flow of process stream. Equipment design, operat- ing procedures. Equipment design, operat- ing procedures. Equipment design, operat- ing procedures. Material of construction, temperature. Material of construction, temperature, applied stress Material of construction, temperature, applied stress time of exposure. Equipment design, operat- ing procedures. Equipment design, operat- ing procedures. Examples Reciprocating parts in pumps and compressors and the shafts of rotating machinery and associated piping, cyclic equipment such as uressure swing absorbers. Steam drum headers, boiler tubes. Backside of pump impellers, elbows. Flange faces and other machined seating surfaces may be damaged when not protected with covers or when not handled with care. Hydrostatic testing can overload supporting structures due to excesc weight applied. Thermal expan- sion and contraction can cause overloading problems. Excess heat as a result of upset process condition can result in over-pressuring; blocking off equipment which is not designed to handle full process pressure. During equipment pressurization in absence of precautionary mea- sures. Furnace tubes and supports. Furnace tubes Associiiied with occiisioiiiil, biiel' tlow iiiieriiipiioiis o r dtiiiiig ii lire. Coke drums are subject to therma cycling and associated thermal fatigue cracking. Bypass valves and piping with heavy weld rein- forcement on reactors in cyclic temperature service are also prone to thermal fatime. COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services Available through Global Engineering Documents. C57901 C58101 C65303 K75000 Effective January 1, 2002. RP 579, Fitness-forService $595.00 $595.00 $155.00 $48.00 Pub1 581, Base Resource Document-Riskbased Insp&Yion SM 653, Tank lnsp&ion, Repair, Alteration, and REtonstNttion RP 750, Management of Process Hazards Phone Orders: 1-800-854-7179 (Toll-free in the US. and Canada) 303-397-7956 (Local and International) Fax Orders: 303-397-2740 Online Orders: www.global.ihs.com Date: m API Member (&&if%) Invoice To (U Check here if same as “Ship To”) Name: Name: Ship To (UPS will not deliver to a P.O. Box) Title: Title: Company: Company: DeDartment: DeDartment: Address: Address: citv: State/Province: citv: State/Province: Zip/Postal Code: Country: Zip/Postal Code: Country: Telephone: Telephone: Fax: Fax: E-Mail: E-Mail: kuantity IProduct Number1 Title Iso*~ Unit Price I Total I C51008 I API 510, Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: laintenante lnsp&ion, Rating, Repair, and Alterationl I $ 99-00 I I $86.00 API 570, Piping Insp&Yion Code: lnsp&ion, Repair, Alteration, and Rerating of /fiseNite Pipint Srstems C57002 I $72.00 RP 752, lanagement of Hazards Associated with location of Process Plant Buildings, C I A lanagers Guide K75201 $181.00 Pub1 760, lodel Risk lanagement Plan Guidance for Petroleum Reñneries- Guidance for Comp&ing wiih EPA ‘s RIP Rule (40 Code of Federal Regulations 68) K76003 m Payment Enclosed m P.O. No. (Enclose Copy) Subtotal I Applicable Sales Tax (see below) Rush Shipping Fee (see below) m Charge My Global Account No. Shipping and Handling (see below) 1- m VISA m MasterCard m American Express m Diners Club m Discovery Total (in U.S. Dollars) 1- Credit Card No.: - Print Name (As It Appears on Card): Expiration Date: Pricing and avaiiabiiity subJect to change without notice. Signature: Mail Orders - Payment by check or money order in U.S. dollars is required except for established accounts. State and local taxes, $10 processing fee*, and 5% shipping must be added. Send mail orders to: APi Publications, Global Engineering Documents, 15 Inverness Way East, M/S C303B, Engiewood, CO 80112-5776, USA. Purchase Orders - Purchase orders are accepted from established accounts. Invoice will include actualfreight cost, a $10 processingfee*, plus state and local taxes. Telephone Orders - If ordering by telephone, a $10 processingfee* and actual freight costs will be added to the order. Sales lax - All U.S. purchases must include applicable state and local sales tax. Customers claiming tax-exempt status must provide Global with a copy of their exemption ceitificate. Shipping (U.S. Orders) - Orders shipped within the U.S. are sent via traceable means. Most orders are shipped the same day. Subscription updates are sent by First-Class Mail. Other options, including next-day sewice, air sewice, and fax transmission are available at additional cost. Call 1-80@854-7179 for more information. Shipping (International Orders) - Standard international shipping is by air express courier sewice. Subscription updates are sent by World Mail. Normal delivery is 3-4 days from shipping date. Rush Shipping Fee - Next Day Delivery orders charge is $20 in addition to the carrier charges. Next Day Delivery orders must be placed by 2:OO p.m. MST to ensure overnight delivery. Returns - All returns must be pre-approved by calling Global’s Customer Sewice Depaitment at 1-800-624-3974 for information and assistance. There may be a 15% restocking fee. Special order items, electronic documents, and age-dated materials are non-returnable. *Minimum Order - There is a $50 minimum for all orders containing hardcopy documents. The $50 minimum applies to the order subtotal including the $10 processing fee, excluding any applicable taxes and freight charges. If the total cost of the documents on the order plus the $10 processing fee is less than $50, the processing fee will be increased to bring the order amount up to the $50 minimum. This processing fee will be applied before any applicable deposit account, quantity or member discounts have been applied. There is no minimum for orders containing only electronically delivered documents. * To be placed on Standlng Order for future edltlons of thls publlcatlon, place a check mark In the SO column and sign here: COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services There's more where this came from. The American Petroleum Institute provides additional resources and programs to the oil and natural gas industry which are based on API Standards. For more information, contact: Monogram Licensing Program Phon e: 202-9 62-4 7 9 1 Fax: 202-682-80 70 American Petroleum Institute Quality Registrar Phone: 202-962-4791 W Q R ) Fax: 202-682-80 70 API Spec Q 1 Registration Perforator System Registration Inspector Certification Programs Phon e: 202-9 62-4 7 9 1 Fax: 202-682-80 70 Phon e: 202-9 62-4 7 9 1 Fax: 202-682-80 70 Phone: 202-682-8161 Fax: 202-9 62-4 739 Engine Oil Licensing and Certification System Phone: 202-682-8233 (EOLCS) Fax: 202-9 62-4 739 Tra in i ng/Wor ks hops Phone: 202-682-8490 Fax: 202-9 62-4 79 7 Check out the API Publications, Programs, and Services Catalog online at www.a p i .o rg. m Institute Helping You Get The Job Done Rights" o1 o1 o2 COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services 05/02 COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services Additional copies are available through Global Engineering Documents at (800) 854-7179 or (303) 397-7956 Information about API Publications, Programs and Services is available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.api.org American 1220 L Street, Northwest Petroleum Washington, D.C. 20005-4070 Institute 202-682-8000 Product No. C58001 COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services COPYRIGHT American Petroleum Institute Licensed by Information Handling Services
Mais conteúdos dessa disciplina
Gestão de Carteira e Risco- _2 Existem diversas técnicas que podem ser utilizadas pelos mediadores, dentre elas a escuta ativa, o modo afirmativo e modo interrogativo docx
- Antes de abordar os procedimentos de resposta de emergência, é importante entender o papel do gerenciamento de riscos ocupacionais
- Quanto ao Proprietário de Riscos e Controles (PRisC), podemos afirmar: Questão 3Resposta a. emitir recomendações para o aprimoramento e atualização da
- Em relação ao atendimento ao público, identifique as alternativas falsas (F) e verdadeiras (V). ( ) Não é aconselhável o uso de gírias no atendimento
- numere a segunda coluna de acordo com a primeira. I. Riscos de produção. II. Riscos de mercado. III. Riscos especulativos. IV. Risc...
- Como as organizações de saúde respondem a eventos adversos? Implementando protocolos de resposta Ocultando a informação Ignorando o problema Deixa...
- Na gestão da segurança do trabalho, é fundamental adotar métodos que permitam antecipar falhas em processos e evitar que estas resultem em acidentes o
- No contexto da norma AS/NZS 4360:2004, é correto afirmar que ela: Questão 2Escolha uma opção: a. vê os riscos como exposição às consequências d...
- Questão 3 A instrução normativa n.º 01 de 2016 institui que todos os órgãos e entidades públicos devem implementar políticas de gestão de riscos. E...
- Leia atentamente as seguintes assertivas quanto à veracidade, pontuando V para VERDADEIRO ou F para FALSO: A promoção da saúde possui comoparticularid
- Podem ser resolvidos através de arbitragem as seguintes ações, exceto: A) Ações de Indenização. B) Relações Contratuais. C) Questões re...
- Marque a alternativa que cita corretamente a prioridade no emprego dos meios: Escolha uma opção: a. Negociação; Invasão informal; Objetivo de acuar os
- OOs princípios podem ser considerados como sendo base de sustentação de uma norma. A Norma ISO 31000 apresenta alguns princípios importantes para a...
- A cultura com relação à percepção e aos modelos de gestão de risco sofre alteração diante do progresso social ou tecnológico. Dessa forma, o aprimo...
- Gabarito das Autoatividades de Cultura Popular Brasileira
- Gabarito Autoatividades Multicritério de Apoio à Decisão
